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511(b)(3) CIAAct
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TOR: 201918Z MAR 03 (b)(1) 10909

~~SECRET~~ (b)(1) T 201914Z MAR 03 STAFF

(b)(3) NatSecAct

CITE (b)(3) NatSecAct

TO: DIRECTOR.

FOR: (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

SUBJECT: 20 MARCH - GENERAL MEDICAL REVIEW

REF: (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: NONE; FYI

2. AS THERE WAS NO WATER BOARD APPLICATION ON 20 MARCH, THE
FOLLOWING IS PROVIDED AS MEDICAL REPORTING FOR THE DAY:

3. ABRASIONS ON KSM'S ANKLES, SHINS, WRISTS AND OCCIPUT CONTINUE
TO BE STABLE WITHOUT SIGNS OF SECONDARY INFECTION. SUBJECT HAS SOME
PEDAL EDEMA AFTER CIRCA 36 HOURS OF STANDING WHICH IS NOT CAUSING
BREAKDOWN OF PREVIOUSLY NOTED ABRADED AREAS. SUBJECT CONTINUES TO
RECEIVE 1500 CALORIES PER DAY AND ADEQUATE HYDRATION. THERE IS NO
EVIDENCE THAT MEDICAL DECOMPENSATION IS LIKELY TO OCCUR IN THE FACE
OF CONTINUED USE OF ENHANCED TECHNIQUES. OTHER DETAINEES ALSO REMAIN
MEDICALLY STABLE.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

END OF MESSAGE

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522

Date:

TO: ALEC

FROM:

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - KSM PROVIDES ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON ISSA AL-BRITANI; CONFLICT
IN KSM REPORTING

----- BODY -----

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

TOR: 222049Z JUN 03

12095

----- (b)(1) -----
~~SECRET~~ 222051Z JUN 03 STAFF (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
CITE (b)(3) NatSecAct

TO: IMMEDIATE ALEC INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

FOR:

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - KSM PROVIDES ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON ISSA
AL-BRITANI; CONFLICT IN KSM REPORTING

REF:

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE NOTE SIGNIFICANT CONFLICT IN KSM
REPORTING TO INCLUDE ADMITTANCE OF FABRICATION ON HIS PART; PLEASE
SEE PARA THREE BELOW.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)

2. DURING A CUSTODIAL INTERVIEW CONDUCTED ON 21 AND 22 JUNE 2003, DEBRIEFER [REDACTED] USED REF A REQUIREMENTS TO QUESTION ((KHALID SHAYKH MUHAMMAD)) AKA MUKHTAR FOR FURTHER INFORMATION [REDACTED] AND ISSA'S TRAVEL TO THE UNITED STATES FOR THE PURPOSE OF SURVEILLING US ECONOMIC AND JEWISH TARGETS IN NEW YORK.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
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3. BASE NOTES THAT SOME OF THE INFORMATION MUKHTAR PROVIDED CONFLICTS WITH HIS EARLIER STATEMENTS ON THIS TOPIC AND WHEN CONFRONTED WITH THESE INCONSISTENCIES HE ADMITTED THAT HE FABRICATED INFORMATION IN REFS B, C, AND D. SPECIFICALLY, MUKHTAR SAID THAT HIS TASKING OF ISSA (REF B) TO RECRUIT BLACK AMERICAN MUSLIM CONVERTS IN MONTANA WAS IN FACT NOT/NOT TRUE. MUKHTAR ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE FABRICATED INFORMATION IN REF C, INDICATING THAT BLACK AMERICAN MUSLIMS SERVING AS BODYGUARDS FOR LONDON-BASED SHAYKH ((ABU HAMZA AL-MASRI)) HAD CONNECTIONS OR FAMILY IN MONTANA. WHEN MUKHTAR WAS CONFRONTED WITH REF D INFORMATION LISTING THE NAMES HE PROVIDED AS ABU HAMZA'S BODYGUARDS, HE EXPLAINED THAT THEY WERE JUST TWO AMERICAN JIHADISTS HE HAD HEARD ABOUT DURING THE AFGHAN JIHAD BUT THAT THEY WERE NOT/NOT ASSOCIATED WITH LONDON-BASED ABU HAMZA AL-MASRI, ISSA AL-BRITANI, OR MONTANA. MUKHTAR NERVOUSLY EXPLAINED TO DEBRIEFER THAT HE WAS UNDER "ENHANCED MEASURES" WHEN HE MADE THESE CLAIMS AND SIMPLY TOLD HIS INTERROGATORS WHAT HE THOUGHT THEY WANTED TO HEAR. MUKHTAR FURTHER CLARIFIED THAT TO HIS KNOWLEDGE ISSA MADE ONLY ONE/ONE TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES IN EARLY 2001 AND NEVER MADE A 1999 TRIP AS SUGGESTED IN REFS E AND F. DEBRIEFER WARNED MUKHTAR THAT THESE FABRICATIONS WERE UNACCEPTABLE AND THAT HE WOULD BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR ALL HIS RESPONSES TO DATE, REMINDING HIM THAT IT WAS IN HIS BEST INTEREST TO ALWAYS PROVIDE TRUTHFUL ANSWERS. BASE WILL PROVIDE A FOLLOW UP INTEL DETAILING MUKHTAR'S LATEST VERSION OF EVENTS CONCERNING ISSA AND HIS EARLY 2001 TRAVEL TO THE UNITED STATES.

4. PER REF A, PLEASE FIND SUBJECT'S COMMENTS ATTACHED BELOW IN QUESTION AND ANSWER FORMAT.

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5. PER REF A, KSM WAS QUESTIONED ON ISSA'S TRAVEL TO THE UNITED STATES. AS STATED ABOVE, KSM DENIED THAT ISSA MADE A TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES IN 1999 AND WAS ONLY AWARE OF ONE TRIP THAT TOOK PLACE APPROXIMATELY IN MARCH/APRIL 2001. FOLLOWING ARE KSM'S RESPONSES TO REF A QUESTIONS.

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END OF MESSAGE

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5322

Date:

TO: HQSDISSEM

FROM:

SUBJECT: CT: COMMENTS BY AMMAR AL-BALUCHI ON SAYFULLAH PARACHA AND UZHAYR PARACHA

----- BODY -----

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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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TOT: 181929Z JUN 03

DIRECTOR

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(b)(3) NatSecAct
INTEL 181929Z DIRECTOR
TO: HQSDISSEM.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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TOR: 301600Z MAY 03

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

CITE 39238

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

TO:

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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CIA

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

DIST: 18 JUNE 2003

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

SUBJ: CT: COMMENTS BY AMMAR AL-BALUCHI ON SAYFULLAH PARACHA
AND UZHAYR PARACHA

DOI: DECEMBER 2002 - FEBRUARY 2003

SOURCE: A DETAINEE. (A DETAINEE)

SUMMARY: NONE (b)(3) CIAAct

TEXT: 1. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS FROM DETAINEE ALI 'ABD AL-((AZIZ)) ALI, AKA ((AMMAR AL-BALUCHI)), MAY HAVE BEEN MEANT TO INFLUENCE AS WELL AS INFORM. AMMAR ALSO MAY HAVE BEEN INTENTIONALLY WITHHOLDING INFORMATION AND EMPLOYING COUNTERINTERROGATION TECHNIQUES.)

2. DURING CUSTODIAL INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED IN LATE MAY 2003, AMMAR DISCUSSED HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH SAYFULLAH ((PARACHA)), AKA SAYF AL-RAHMAN ((PARACHA)), AND HIS SON UZHAYR ((PARACHA)). AMMAR STATED THAT SAYFULLAH CONTINUED TO MEET WITH HIM AS A FRIEND AND POTENTIAL BUSINESS PARTNER EVEN AFTER THE CAPTURE OF KHALID SHAYKH ((MUHAMMAD)), AKA ((MUKHTAR)). AMMAR STATED, HOWEVER, THAT SAYFULLAH DID NOT KNOW OF MUKHTAR'S AL-QA'IDA AFFILIATION UNTIL THE INTERNATIONAL PUBLICITY OF HIS ARREST. AMMAR COMMENTED THAT AT THAT POINT, SAYFULLAH PROBABLY KNEW AMMAR'S AL-QA'IDA AFFILIATION AS WELL. AMMAR INSISTED THAT THERE WERE NO OPERATIONAL DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN HIMSELF AND SAYFULLAH. AMMAR ADDED THAT SAYFULLAH WAS UNWITTINGLY BEING USED TO ASSIST IN HIS BROADER PLANS WITH AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVE ((MAJID KHAN)), WHICH REQUIRED A BUSINESS BE SET UP IN PAKISTAN TO DO BUSINESS WITH MAJID'S COMPANY IN THE UNITED STATES. AMMAR CLAIMED HE USED HIS FRIENDSHIP WITH SAYFULLAH TO IDENTIFY THE PAKISTANI RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR ESTABLISHING HIS OWN BUSINESS, OR TO USE SAYFULLAH'S BUSINESS ITSELF AS THE CONDUIT TO MAJID. AMMAR DENIED KNOWING IF MUKHTAR EVER TASKED SAYFULLAH TO CONDUCT ANY OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES.

3. AMMAR CLAIMED HE MET WITH UZHAYR A TOTAL OF FOUR TIMES, EACH TIME WHILE VISITING SAYFULLAH AT SAYFULLAH'S HOUSE. AMMAR STATED THAT UZHAYR WAS TOTALLY UNWITTING OF AMMAR'S AL-QA'IDA AFFILIATION AND OF AMMAR'S INTENTION TO USE SAYFULLAH FOR BROADER OPERATIONAL PLANS INVOLVING MAJID KHAN. AMMAR STATED THAT IN APPROXIMATELY JANUARY 2003, HE REQUESTED SAYFULLAH HAVE UZHAYR INQUIRE ABOUT MAJID'S IMMIGRATION STATUS WHILE ON AN UPCOMING TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES. THE THIRD TIME AMMAR MET UZHAYR AT THE PARACHA RESIDENCE WAS IN ABOUT LATE JANUARY OR EARLY FEBRUARY 2003. MAJID WAS WITH HIM AND WAS INTRODUCED TO UZHAYR. MAJID EXPLAINED TO UZHAYR HOW TO INQUIRE INTO MAJID'S STATUS WHILE IN THE UNITED STATES. AMMAR AND MAJID MET WITH UZHAYR ONE ADDITIONAL TIME AT AN ICE CREAM PARLOR IN KARACHI, WHERE MAJID GAVE UZHAYR THE IDENTIFICATION CARDS AND NECESSARY INFORMATION REQUIRED TO LOOK INTO HIS IMMIGRATION STATUS. AMMAR STATED NEITHER HE NOR MAJID INDICATED TO UZHAYR AT ANY TIME THAT THEY WERE MUJAHIDIN OR AL-QA'IDA. AMMAR STATED THAT UZHAYR DID NOT COMPLETE THE TASK.

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(b)(3) CIAAct
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END OF MESSAGE

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Date: 20030530

532-4

TO: DIRECTOR, ALEC

FROM:

SUBJECT: (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

----- BODY -----

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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

TOR: 301600Z MAY 03 (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~ 301600Z MAY 03 STAFF

CITE (b)(1)
39239 (b)(3) NatSecAct

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, ALEC INFO (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

FOR: (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

SUBJECT: (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

REF: (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: NONE; FYI.

2. REF INFO WAS OBTAINED ON 25 AND 26 MAY 2003, DURING
INTERROGATIONS OF AL-QA'IDA DETAINEE ALI 'ABD AL-((AZIZ)) ALI, AKA
AMMAR AL-((BALUCHI)),

3. (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

END OF MESSAGE

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540

Date: 20030612

TO: (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

FROM:

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY -REQUIREMENTS FOR KSM ABOUT ABD AL-AZIZ AL-MASRI

----- BODY -----

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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1) TOT: 121550Z JUN 03 DIRECTOR (b)(3) NatSecAct
----- (b)(3) NatSecAct -----

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STAFF

121550Z DIRECTOR

(b)(3) NatSecAct

TO: PRIORITY INFO PRIORITY ALEC.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

FROM: (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY -REQUIREMENTS FOR KSM ABOUT ABD AL-AZIZ AL-MASRI

REF: (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE USE THE BELOW REQUIREMENTS WITH KSM AS APPROPRIATE.

2. RECENT DEBRIEFINGS OF KHALID SHAYKH ((MUHAMMAD)) (KSM) SUGGEST POSSIBLE INCONSISTENCIES IN HIS REPORTING AS TO THE WHEREABOUTS OF ABD AL-AZIZ ((AL-MASRI)), A PRIORITY WMD NUCLEAR AND CBW TARGET.

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3. WE REMAIN HIGHLY SUSPICIOUS THAT KSM IS WITHHOLDING, EXAGGERATING, MISDIRECTING, OR OUTRIGHT FABRICATING INFORMATION ON CBRN ISSUES, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARDS TO INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE NOT IN CUSTODY OR DEAD. ACCORDING TO RECENT REF C REPORTING FROM KSM, HE DISPLAYS LITTLE KNOWLEDGE ABOUT ABD AL-AZIZ AL-MASRI AND KNOWS NOTHING ABOUT AL-MASRI'S CW EFFORTS BEYOND AN APPARENTLY FAILED EFFORT INVOLVING PHOSGENE GAS OVER FIVE YEARS AGO. (b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

WE BELIEVE KSM IS TRYING TO PROTECT HIS CLOSE FRIEND AND ANY OPERATIONS THAT AL-MASRI MAY HAVE UNDERWAY. PLEASE USE THE FOLLOWING REQUIREMENTS WITH KSM, USING APPROPRIATE INTERROGATION STRATEGIES FOR A SITUATION LIKE THIS. (b)(1)

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(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

6. THANKS AND REGARDS.

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

END OF MESSAGE

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542

Date: (b)(1)
 TO: (b)(3) NatSecAct

FROM:

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - CONCERNS OVER RECENT KHALID SHAYKH MUHAMMAD THREAT REVEALATIONS

----- BODY -----

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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 (b)(3) NatSecAct
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TOT: 022012Z MAY 03

ALEC

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STAFF

022012Z ALEC

(b)(3) NatSecAct

TO: IMMEDIATE (b)(1) NFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

FROM:

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - CONCERNS OVER RECENT KHALID SHAYKH MUHAMMAD THREAT REVEALATIONS

REF: (b)(1)
 (b)(3) NatSecAct

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: --PLEASE SEE PARA FIVE REQUEST FOR INTERROGATION TEAM FEEDBACK REGARDING INTERROGATION STRATEGY FOR KSM.

2. HQS/ALEC GREATLY APPRECIATES BASE'S RECENT ACQUISITION OF REF THREAT INFORMATION REGARDING PLANNED ATTACKS AGAINST U.S. INTERESTS IN PAKISTAN FROM KHALID SHAYKH ((MUHAMMAD)) (KSM) AKA ((MUKHTAR)). WE AGREE THAT THE TEAM'S CONFRONTATIONAL SESSION

WITH KSM, THAT INCLUDED SHOWING THE CAPTURE PHOTOS OF AMMAR AL-BALUCHI AND WALID MUHAMMAD ((BIN ATTASH)) ON 29 APRIL WAS A KEY MOTIVATOR IN KSM'S DECISION TO PROVIDE REF INFORMATION. THAT SAID, KSM'S PROVISION OF SUCH INFORMATION -- ONLY AFTER HE WAS CONFRONTED WITH EVIDENCE WHICH LED HIM TO ASSUME THE OPERATIONS IN PAKISTAN WERE COMPROMISED -- IS OF SERIOUS CONCERN AND MUST BE ADDRESSED SOONEST.

3. WE WERE DISAPPOINTED TO SEE THAT KSM ONLY MADE THESE NEW ADMISSIONS OF PLANNED ATTACKS IN PAKISTAN AFTER SEEING THE CAPTURE PHOTOGRAPHS OF 'AMMAR AL-BALUCHI AND KHALLAD. WE CONSIDER KSM'S LONG-STANDING OMISSION OF REF INFORMATION TO BE A SERIOUS CONCERN, ESPECIALLY AS THIS OMISSION MAY WELL HAVE COST AMERICAN LIVES HAD PAKISTANI AUTHORITIES NOT BEEN DILIGENT IN FOLLOWING UP ON UNRELATED CRIMINAL LEADS THAT LED TO THE CAPTURE OF AMMAR, BIN ATTASH, AND OTHER PROBABLE OPERATIVES INVOLVED IN THE ATTACK PLANS. MOREOVER, DEBRIEFERS HAVE PREVIOUSLY ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS RAISED THE IDEA OF ATTACKS INSIDE PAKISTAN, BUT KSM EXPRESSLY TOLD ALEC THAT OPERATIONS INSIDE PAKISTAN WERE NOT ON THE TABLE. WHEN CONFRONTED WITH THE FACT THAT THIS HANDS OFF APPROACH DID NOT SQUARE WITH HIS STORY ON THE "PERFUME LETTER" PLOT TO ATTACK HOTELS IN PAKISTAN, KSM LAMELY COUNTERED THAT THESE HOTELS WERE AN EXCEPTION AS US "MILITARY" PERSONNEL WERE KNOWN TO RESIDE THERE. SIMPLY PUT, KSM HAS HAD EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO COME CLEAN ON THIS THREAT AND, FROM OUR OPTIC, HE DELIBERATELY WITHHELD THE INFORMATION UNTIL HE WAS CONFRONTED WITH EVIDENCE THAT WE ALREADY KNEW ABOUT IT, OR SOON WOULD KNOW ABOUT IT FROM AMMAR AND KHALLAD. THERE COULD BE OTHER SUCH INFORMATION.

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4. SINCE KSM'S CAPTURE, THE SOLE FOCUS OF OUR INTERROGATION EFFORT HAS BEEN THE ACQUISITION OF DETAILED THREAT INFORMATION -- WHICH WOULD ENABLE US TO DISRUPT FUTURE AL-QA'IDA ATTACKS. YET, DESPITE REPEATED AND NUMEROUS OFFERED OPPORTUNITIES TO PROVIDE SUCH THREAT INFORMATION, KSM HAS SHOWN A PERSISTENT PATTERN OF GIVING UP THIS INFORMATION ONLY WHEN HE ASSESSES WE ALREADY KNOW IT AND HE FEELS HE IS BACKED INTO A CORNER.

--KSM'S PROVISION OF THE PAKISTAN THREAT REPORTING - ONLY AFTER HE WAS MADE AWARE OF THE CAPTURE OF THE ATTACK PLANNERS - IS VIEWED AS A CLEAR ILLUSTRATION OF CONTINUED AND DELIBERATE WITHHOLDING OF THREAT INFORMATION WHICH HE BELIEVED HAD NOT YET BEEN COMPROMISED.

--WE ALSO POINT TO KSM'S REPEATED DISSEMBLING ABOUT JAFFAR ((AL-TAYYAR))'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE PADILLA PLOT, WHICH HE ADMITTED WAS A LIE BUT ONLY AFTER WE CONFRONTED HIM WITH BINYAM'S VERSION OF THE STORY.

--SIMILARLY, WE NOTE THAT WHEN DISCUSSING AL-QA'IDA'S PLANS FOR FOLLOW-ON ATTACKS INSIDE THE US, KSM CONVENIENTLY "FORGOT" ALL ABOUT HAMABLI OPERATIVE ARSHAD, WHO SAYS THAT HE WAS TASKED TO

CRASH A PLANE INTO THE TALLEST BUILDING IN CALIFORNIA. OF NOTE, DEBRIEFERS OBSERVED THAT KSM WAS NOT COMFORTABLE WITH THE LINE OF QUESTIONING AND SEEMED ONLY TO RELAX AND "REMEMBER" THE DETAILS WHEN HE HEARD THAT ARSHAD HAD BEEN ARRESTED.

5. THIS PERSISTENT PATTERN OF BEHAVIOR FURTHER UNDERSCORES OUR ASSESSMENT THAT KSM HAS DIRECT KNOWLEDGE OF OTHER PLANNED ATTACKS WHICH HE HAS YET TO REVEAL. OF CONCERN, ALL INDICATIONS ARE THAT PLANS FOR TERRORIST ATTACKS IN THE U.S., SAUDI ARABIA, AND EAST AFRICA ARE PROGRESSING AND MAY BE IMMINENT. WE ASSESS KSM IS MORE KNOWLEDGEABLE REGARDING THESE ATTACKS AND THE LIKELY TARGETS THAN HE HAS ADMITTED TO DATE. WITH THIS IN MIND, WE REQUEST BASE'S THOUGHTS ON HOW BEST TO ADAPT THE KSM INTERROGATION STRATEGY TO INCREASE OUR CHANCES OF ACQUIRING THIS CRITICAL AND TIME-SENSITIVE INFORMATION. WE LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR COMMENTS. MANY THANKS.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

END OF MESSAGE

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548

Date: (b)(1)
 TO: (b)(3) NatSecAct

FROM:

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - COMMENTS/OBSERVATIONS REGARDING DEBRIEFINGS AND PRODUCTION OF
 KHALID SHAYKH MUHAMMAD

----- BODY -----

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TOT: 302258Z JUN 03

ALEC

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STAFF

(b)(1)

302258Z ALEC

(b)(3) NatSecAct

TO: IMMEDIATE (b)(3) NatSecAct

IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

FROM:

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - COMMENTS/OBSERVATIONS REGARDING DEBRIEFINGS
 AND PRODUCTION OF KHALID SHAYKH MUHAMMAD

REF: (b)(1)
 (b)(3) NatSecAct

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: --REQUEST BASE OPINIONS AND INPUT ON
 POSSIBLE REMEDIES TO REDUCE KSM'S RESISTANCE AND INCREASE HIS
 COOPERATION.

2. WE ARE EXTREMELY APPRECIATIVE OF THE EFFORTS AND THE
 PROGRESS OF THE INTERROGATORS AND DEBRIEFERS TO DATE WITH KHALID
 SHAYKH ((MUHAMMAD)) AKA MUHKTAR (KSM), AS THEY WORK ON THIS
 EXTREMELY IMPORTANT ALBEIT VERY CHALLENGING CASE. ON 25 JUNE

2003, HQS, ALEC, AND CTC/RDG OFFICERS MET TO DISCUSS THE RECENT PRODUCTION AND RECENT REVELATIONS BY KHALID SHAYKH ((MUHAMMAD)) AKA MUHKTAR (KSM), PARTICULARLY THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION HE HAS PROVIDED ON THE HEATHROW PLOT, THE LOS ANGELES THREAT, AND THE KARACHI OPERATIONS. THE MEETING SERVED TO HIGHLIGHT TRENDS WE HAVE OBSERVED REGARDING KSM'S BEHAVIOR. THESE TRENDS APPEAR TO FORM A PATTERN OF PASSIVE RESISTANCE THAT IS REFLECTIVE OF KSM'S VERY LARGE EGO AND AN ATTEMPT BY KSM TO CONTROL HIS ENVIRONMENT AND MANIPULATE THOSE WITH WHOM HE IS CONTACT. WE CONCLUDED THAT THESE TACTICS ARE HINDERING OUR COLLECTIVE ABILITY TO EXTRACT TIMELY INFORMATION FROM KSM. WE HAVE OUTLINED THESE TACTICS BELOW, AND WE QUERY BASE'S THOUGHTS ON WAYS TO ALTER THIS BEHAVIOR TO A POINT WHERE WE CAN GET TO THE BOTTOM OF HIS STORIES. SINCE THIS MEETING, WE NOTICED THAT BASE IS ALREADY MAKING PROGRESS IN STARTING TO ADDRESS THESE PROBLEMS AND ACQUIRE MORE COMPLETE INFORMATION. WE BELIEVE BASE'S APPROACH TO KSM REGARDING GIVING HIM A "GRACE PERIOD" TO PRODUCE ADDITIONAL THREATS SEEMS TO BE PAYING OFF WITH GETTING HIM TO ADMIT ADDITIONAL REVELATIONS, PARTICULARLY HIS RECENT ADMISSION REGARDING ISRAEL. WHILE THIS IS MOST WELCOMED SHORT-TERM PROGRESS, WANT TO WORK WITH BASE TO ENSURE THAT KSM DEMONSTRATES A CONSISTENT PATTERN AND LONGER TRACK RECORD OF THESE TYPES OF REVELATIONS BEFORE THREAT AND/OR ACTUAL PRESSURE IS REDUCED/REMOVED.

3. OVER THE COURSE OF THE LAST TWO MONTHS WE NOTED THE FOLLOWING BEHAVIORAL ISSUES:

--COMPLAINTS ABOUT HIS FOOD: THERE WAS AN INCIDENT THAT KSM COMPLAINED THAT HIS "CHEESE" HAD BEEN STOLEN. THIS PREPOSTEROUS ALLEGATION UNDERSCORES HIS ATTEMPT TO CONTROL HIS ENVIRONMENT. IN ADDITION, HE CONTINUALLY COMPLAINS THAT WE ARE PUTTING PORK INTO HIS FOOD, AS AN AFFRONT TO HIS RELIGIOUS BELIEFS.

--RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS: IN ADDITION TO THE COMPLAINTS ABOUT PORK AND HOW IT IS AN AFFRONT TO HIS RELIGION, HE HAS ASKED THAT HE BE ALLOWED TO LEAD PRAYERS FOR A GROUP OF DETAINEES. HE COMPLAINED ABOUT THE SOUNDMASKING MUSIC BEING TURNED UP DURING PRAYER TIME (WHEN IT WAS NOT TURNED UP). THIS SUGGESTS TO US THAT HE BELIEVES TO BE OR WANTS TO BE IN A GTMO-TYPE SITUATION.

--GUARDS: ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS HE HAS FLATLY REFUSED TO DO WHAT HAS BEEN ROUTINE, SUCH AS NOT MOVING TO THE BACK OF THE CELL WHEN THE CELL IS TO BE OPENED. HE IS QUITE AWARE THAT THE GUARDS' DEMANDS ARE A NORMAL COURSE OF ACTION. AGAIN, WE SEE THIS AS A MANIPULATION EFFORT TO TEST THE LIMITS OF MUCH HE CAN GET AWAY WITH.

--DEBRIEFERS: HE WILL TELL DEBRIEFERS THAT HE PREFERS TO TALK TO THEM BUT NOT THE OTHERS OR THAT HE DESERVES MORE "IMPORTANT" DEBRIEFERS.

KSM CONTINUALLY CHALLENGES EACH AND EVERY DEBRIEFER/INTERROGATOR THAT HE COMES INTO CONTACT WITH, AND EVEN SINGLES OUT THE GENDER OF THOSE HE PREFERS TO TALK WITH. HE HAS BEEN REPEATEDLY WARNED THAT HE SHOULD TREAT EACH DEBRIEFER THE SAME AND ANSWER THE

QUESTIONS HE IS ASKED. EVEN WHEN KSM WAS GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH A "SENIOR" WASHINGTON OFFICIAL, HE STILL EXHIBITED BEHAVIOR THAT INDICATED THAT HE DID NOT RECOGNIZE HIS STATUS AS A PRISONER, AND THIS PROCESS DID NOT ELICIT ANY ADDITIONAL INTELLIGENCE ON THE HEATHROW PLOT. AGAIN, WE SEE THIS AS NOTHING MORE THAN A BLATANT ATTEMPT TO CONTROL AND MANIPULATE BY TRYING TO SOW DISSENSION WITHIN OUR OWN RANKS.

--"GUILT TRIP" LETTER: PERHAPS HIS MOST OBVIOUS TACT OF TRYING TO MANIPULATE WAS HIS "LETTER" IN RESPONSE TO THE SENIOR WASHINGTON OFFICIAL'S OFFER IN WHICH KSM COUNSELS US ABOUT OUR "GUILT TRIP" FOR NOT BEING ABLE TO PREVENT 9/11.

-- GRAINS OF SAND GAME: ADDITIONALLY, KSM CONTINUES TO PLAY GAMES WITH THE LEVEL OF DETAILS HE PROVIDES BASED ON THE LEVEL OF KNOWLEDGE HE ASSESSES THE INDIVIDUAL DEBRIEFERS TO HAVE. THIS GAME OF "I'M SMARTER THAN YOU" OVER THE LAST THREE MONTHS IS ANOTHER OF HIS EFFORT TO CONTROL HIS ENVIRONMENT. HE HAS OFTEN BEEN SEEN AS PROVIDING SMALL GRAINS OF TRUTH IN A DEBRIEFING AND LEAVING IT UP TO THE INDIVIDUAL DEBRIEFER TO CATCH THESE SMALL FACTS.

4. THE BEHAVIORS ABOVE ARE IN OUR VIEW A SIGN OF KSM'S TAKING AN OFFENSIVE STANCE AGAINST THE INTERROGATION SITUATION RESULTING IN LESS QUALITY INTELLIGENCE THAN WE BELIEVE KSM IS CAPABLE OF PROVIDING. MORE IMPORTANTLY, THESE BEHAVIORS HAVE BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY LIES OF OMISSION AND IN ONE CASE OUTRIGHT FABRICATIONS BY KSM. THE BELOW IS A LIST OF SOME OF THE RECENT OMISSIONS. IT IS THIS KIND OF DETAIL FROM KSM THAT WE BELIEVE HE MAY STILL BE WITHHOLDING ON OTHER PLOTS. WHEN VIEWED IN COMBINATION, WE BELIEVE KSM'S STRONG ATTITUDE AND WHAT WE ASSESS ARE HIS CALCULATED ACTIONS TO LIE AND WITHHOLD IS A CHALLENGE WE HAVE TO MEET. WE WELCOME CONTINUED [] TEAM COMMENT ON MEASURES WE CAN EMPLOY TO IMPROVE THIS DETAINEE'S PERFORMANCE. WE MAY NEVER GET THERE, BUT WE ENCOURAGE THE INTERROGATION TEAM TO CONTINUE TO PRESS HIM FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON PLOTS HE HAS DISCUSSED AND ANY NEW PLOTS HE HAS YET MENTIONED.

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A. OMISSIONS:

--KARACHI PLOTS: KSM MADE ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ON THE OPERATIONAL PLANS (REF A) THAT HIS NEPHEW AMMAR AL-BALUCHI AND WALID MUHAMMAD SALIH ((BIN ATTASH)) AKA KHALLAD WERE INVOLVED IN PLANNING. THESE REVELATIONS ONLY CAME TO LIGHT WHEN KSM WAS SHOWN WHAT CLEARLY WERE "CAPTURE" PHOTOS OF THESE TWO OPERATIVES.

--LOS ANGELES THREAT: ON 20 JUNE 2003, KSM PROVIDED ADDITIONAL DETAILS REGARDING A PLOT TO FLY A PLANE INTO THE "TALLEST BUILDING" IN CALIFORNIA. IN SUBSEQUENT DEBRIEFINGS KSM PROVIDES NEW DETAILS PREVIOUSLY UNTOLD REGARDING THIS PLOT.

--HEATHROW PLOT: THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION KSM PROVIDED ON THE HEATHROW PLOT WAS ONLY AFTER THIS INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM KHALLAD. ARMED WITH THIS INFORMATION THE DEBRIEFING TEAM WAS ABLE TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL DETAILS FROM KSM THAT HE HAD "FORGOTTEN."

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(b)(3) CIAAct
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B. FABRICATION:

--AFRICAN AMERICAN MUSLIM CONVERTS: DURING INITIAL INTERVIEWS [REDACTED] IN LATE MARCH 2003, KSM PROVIDED DEBRIEFERS INFORMATION ON THE RECRUITMENT ON AFRICAN AMERICAN MUSLIM CONVERTS WHO HAD TAKEN TRAINING IN AFGHANISTAN, AND MORE SPECIFICALLY THAT ABU ISSA TOLD HIM ABU HAMZA HAD BODYGUARDS THAT WERE AFRICAN AMERICAN MUSLIM CONVERTS IN THE US, SPECIFICALLY MONTANA. IN A SUBSEQUENT DEBRIEFING IN LATE APRIL, MUKHTAR ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE FABRICATED INFORMATION IN REF E, INDICATING THAT BLACK AMERICAN MUSLIMS SERVING AS BODYGUARDS FOR LONDON-BASED SHAYKH ((ABU HAMZA AL-MASRI)) HAD CONNECTIONS OR FAMILY IN MONTANA. WHEN MUKHTAR WAS CONFRONTED WITH REF E INFORMATION LISTING THE NAMES HE PROVIDED AS ABU HAMZA'S BODYGUARDS, HE EXPLAINED THAT THEY WERE JUST TWO AMERICAN JIHADISTS HE HAD HEARD ABOUT DURING THE AFGHAN JIHAD BUT THAT THEY WERE NOT/NOT ASSOCIATED WITH LONDON-BASED ABU HAMZA AL-MASRI, ISSA AL-BRITANI, OR MONTANA. MUKHTAR NERVOUSLY EXPLAINED TO DEBRIEFER THAT HE WAS UNDER "ENHANCED MEASURES" WHEN HE MADE THESE CLAIMS AND SIMPLY TOLD HIS INTERROGATORS WHAT HE THOUGHT THEY WANTED TO HEAR.

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5. ADDITIONAL INTELLIGENCE ABOUT THESE PLOTS ONLY CAME ABOUT FROM THE DILIGENCE OF THE DEBRIEFING/INTERROGATION TEAM, WHO, ARMED WITH ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FROM OTHER DETAINEES, WERE ABLE TO GET KSM TO FINALLY ADMIT TO HIS OMISSION. USUALLY, MUKHTAR CLAIMS THAT HE SIMPLY FORGOT THOSE DETAILS. IT IS CLEAR FROM KSM'S NOTES, THAT KSM HAS AN EXTREME ATTENTION TO DETAIL AND A CONTROLLING ASPECT TO HIS PERSONALITY THAT MAKES IT VERY DIFFICULT FOR US TO BELIEVE THAT HE SIMPLY FORGETS DETAILS OF AN OPERATION AS COMPLEX AS THIS ONE. HIS ATTENTION TO DETAIL COUPLED WITH HIS MICROMANAGING STYLE REGARDING OPERATIONS MAKES THESE OMISSIONS MORE ALERTING.

6. KSM'S PATTERN OF BEHAVIOR OVER THE PAST THREE MONTHS, TRYING TO CONTROL HIS ENVIRONMENT, LYING AND THEN ADMITTING THINGS ONLY WHEN PRESSED THAT OTHERS HAVE BEEN CAUGHT AND HAVE LIKELY ADMITTED THE PLOT, IS A CAUSE FOR CONCERN. KSM, MORE THAN ANY OTHER DETAINEE WE HAVE IN CUSTODY, LIKELY HAS ADDITIONAL PLANS THAT HE HAS NOT TOLD US ABOUT AND THAT THESE PLANS MAY VERY WELL BE FOR THE U.S. WE CANNOT DISMISS THAT HIS TACTICS ARE A BID TO STALL FOR TIME TO ALLOW THE OPERATIONS TO BE EXECUTED. WE THINK THAT IT

IS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE THAT HE MAY NEVER PROVIDE INFORMATION ON
ADDITIONAL PLOTS, BUT WE BELIEVE THAT WE WOULD BE REMISS IF WE DID
NOT LOOK AT THE POSSIBILITY OF CHANGING HIS ENVIRONMENT TO GAIN
FURTHER COOPERATION. TO THAT END, WE REQUEST BASE'S THOUGHTS ON
POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS TO GAIN GREATER COOPERATION AND MEASURES THAT
CONVINCE HIM THAT ONLY THROUGH A LONG-TERM DEMONSTRATION OF
TRUTHFULNESS CAN HE EXPECT TO KEEP ANY OF THE PRIVILEGES TO WHICH
HE HAS BEEN ACCUSTOMED.

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END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

1448-3

Date: 20040423

TO: ALEC

FROM:

SUBJECT: (b)(1)
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----- BODY -----

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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TOR: 231744Z APR 04 (b)(1) 19907

----- (b)(3) NatSecAct -----

~~TOP SECRET~~ 231722Z APR 04 STAFF(b)(1)
CITE (b)(3) NatSecAct

TO: IMMEDIATE ALEC INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR, (b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

FOR:

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

SUBJECT:

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CIAAct
(b)(3)
NatSecAct

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REF:

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TEXT:

COMBINE: COMPLETE

1. ACTION REQUIRED:

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46. [] NOTED THAT ISSA WAS GOOD FRIENDS WITH ABDUL AZIM (SEE BELOW), WHO HE HAD MET IN THE ISLAMIC CENTRE WITH KSM IN EARLY 2000. HE CAME INTO THE ROOM WITH KSM, WHO SPOKE TO HIM IN ENGLISH, AND CALLED HIM ISSA. [] CLAIMED THAT THIS IS HOW HE KNEW IT WAS ISSA THE AUTHOR (COMMENT: THIS IS AT ODDS WITH A PREVIOUS ACCOUNT, WHEN HE CLAIMS ISSA WAS POINTED OUT TO HIM AS THE AUTHOR). ISSA PROBABLY SPOKE NO ARABIC. PEOPLE OFTEN ASKED BN ABOUT ISSA, AS THEY WERE BOTH BRITISH INDIANS, BUT [] REPEATED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW HIM. BN RECALLED A CONVERSATION BETWEEN AZIM AND ISSA, IN WHICH AZIM ASKED HOW THINGS WERE IN THE UK AND ISSA RESPONDED THAT EVERYONE HAD FORGOTTEN ABOUT HIM (ISSA). THE INFERENCE DRAWN BY [] WAS THAT THE PAIR HAD ACQUAINTANCES IN COMMON IN THE UK. [] ADDED THAT ISSA MAY HAVE

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HELPED ABDUL AZIM RETURN TO THE UK.

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48. AFTER PRESSING, BN WAS REMINDED THAT HE HAD CLAIMED THAT WE DID NOT NEED TO WORRY ABOUT ISSA IN A PREVIOUS INTERVIEW. [] RESPONDED THAT HE THOUGHT WE MAY HAVE BEEN INTERESTED IN SOMEONE ELSE NAMED ISSA, AND THAT WAS WHO WE SHOULDN'T WORRY ABOUT (COMMENT: I.E. BECAUSE BN IS ALSO KNOWN AS ISSA). WE CLARIFIED, THOUGH, THAT [] IS NOT THE AUTHOR OF THE BOOK. [] CLAIMED THAT HE ONLY LOOKED UNCOMFORTABLE IN HIS DISCUSSION ON ISSA BECAUSE OF WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS A LOOK OF ALARM ON HIS INTERVIEWERS FACE WHEN HE RECALLED THAT HE HAD SEEN ISSA IN KSM'S COMPANY. [] THINKS THAT WE HAVE DRAWN TO WRONG CONCLUSIONS - KSM WAS NOT PLANNING ANYTHING WITH ISSA, BUT INNOCENTLY

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SHOWING HIM AROUND. [] THEN COMMENTED THAT HE REMAINS CONCERNED ABOUT GETTING OTHERS INTO TROUBLE, BUT PROVIDED A DESCRIPTION OF ISSA (COMMENT: AS AN APPARENT GESTURE TO PROVE THAT HE WILL CO-OPERATE):

49. STRAIGHT, MEDIUM LENGTH HAIR, MEDIUM (TO SHORT) IN HEIGHT, SKINNY BUILD. HE HAD A LONDON ACCENT ("NOT POSH"), BUT ONLY SAW HIM FOR ONE MINUTE, WHEN HE GAVE HIM HIS CUP OF TEA.

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50. [] CLAIMED THAT THE REASON THAT HE INITIALLY DENIED KNOWING ISSA AL HINDI BECAUSE ABDUL AZIM HAD SPENT A LOT OF TIME WITH SOMEONE HE CAN'T TALK ABOUT (I.E. REID), AND ABDUL AZIM WAS BEING VISITED BY ISSA AL HINDI. (COMMENT: THIS WAS AN UNCONVINCING EXPLANATION).

51. ABDUL AZIM WOULD KNOW ISSA AL HINDI, AS WOULD ANYONE WHO HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN JIHAD IN BRITAIN SINCE THE MID-90S. BABAR WOULD KNOW HIM. ANY OF THE SENIORS IN BABAR'S CIRCLE WOULD KNOW HIM. MOAZZEM BEGG WOULD KNOW HIM, AS WOULD REID, MOUSSAOUI AND MUKHTAR.

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
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
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288. CANARY WHARF WAS FIRST MENTIONED TO MUKHTAR POSSIBLY BY ABD
UL-JABBAR (REID). MUKHTAR WAS ASKING THE BRITONS ABOUT BIG BUILDINGS
THIS WAS AT THE TIME WHEN THE MALAYSIANS WERE IN THE HOUSE WITH
MUKHTAR. ABD UL-AZIZ LATER REPEATED WHAT MUKHTAR HAD SAID DURING THE
MEETING IN MCDONALDS. MUKHTAR WAS UNCERTAIN ABOUT WHERE TO STRIKE,
AND IT WAS AT THIS POINT THAT HE OPENED THE ALMANAC AND CROSSED OUT
THE WTC TOWERS AS THE WORLD'S TWO TALLEST BUILDINGS. [] THOUGHT THAT
THE THIRD WAS IN CALIFORNIA. A BUILDING IN MALAYSIA WAS ON THE LIST
BUT [] DOUBTED THIS WOULD BE A TARGET. MUKHTAR LEFT THE DECISION IN
THE HANDS OF THE BALUCHI. BUT MUKHTAR APPEARED TO BE FOCUSED SOLELY
ON TALL BUILDINGS.

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
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END OF MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~

1453-1

Date: 20040803

TO: (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

FROM:

SUBJECT: (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

----- BODY -----

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TOT: 032140Z AUG 04

DIRECTOR

(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~

STAFF

032140Z DIRECTOR

(b)(3) NatSecAct

TO:

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

FROM:

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecActSUBJECT: (b)(1)
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REF:

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TEXT:

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ACTION REQUIRED: NONE, FYI.

2.

INFORMATION ON A HARD DRIVE RECOVERED FROM A

RAID

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IS A DETAILED STUDY ON THE METHODOLOGIES TO

EFFECT A TERRORIST ATTACK. THE STUDY DESCRIBES THE OPERATIONAL AND LOGISTICS ENVIRONMENT IN THE UK, NOTING THAT THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN THE UK IS VERY HIGH AND THAT "ANY PROJECT THAT CAN BE CARRIED OUT IN THE UK" WOULD BE TRANSFERABLE TO ANY OTHER COUNTRY. THE DOCUMENT IS DIVIDED INTO TWO MAIN PARTS. THE FIRST PART INCLUDES SEVEN CHAPTERS ON THE TOPIC ENTITLED "ROUGH PRESENTATION FOR GAS LIMO PROJECT". THE SECOND PART IS ENTITLED "ROUGH PRESENTATION FOR RADIATION (DIRTY BOMB) PROJECT".

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4. THE FOLLOWING HIGHLIGHTS NOTABLE ITEMS FROM THE TWO SECTIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT:

A. NOTABLE FROM THE SECTION ON THE GAS LIMO PROJECT INCLUDES:

- 1) THE AUTHOR CONCLUDES THAT THE MOST FEASIBLE OPTION WOULD BE TO USE A LIMOUSINE TO DELIVER THE EXPLOSIVES.
- 2) OTHER VEHICLES THAT COULD BE USED INCLUDE SPACE CRUISER (FAMILY) VEHICLES.
- 3) CHAPTER SEVEN DESCRIBES MANPOWER AND COSTS.

B. NOTABLE FROM THE SECTION ON THE DIRTY BOMB PROJECT INCLUDES:

- 1) THE USE OF SMOKE DETECTORS TO DELIVER THE RADIOACTIVE SUBSTANCE AMERICIUM-147. THE AUTHOR PROPOSES TO USE 10,000 SMOKE DETECTORS AS PART OF AN EXPLOSIVE DEVICE TO SPREAD THIS RADIOACTIVE ELEMENT.
- 2) THE AUTHOR DISCUSSES IDEAS AND FACTS REGARDING THE VULNERABILITIES OF TRAINS.
- 3) THE AUTHOR DISCUSSES HIJACKING AND UTILIZING PETROL (GASOLINE) TANKERS TO RAM INTO A TARGET.

(b)(3) CIAAct

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END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

Date:

TO: HQSDISSEM

FROM:

SUBJECT: CT: COMMENTS ON INTENTION OF KHALID SHAYKH MUHAMMAD TO TARGET HEATHROW AIRPORT

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----- BODY -----

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TOT: 172132Z OCT 02

DIRECTOR

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct 132Z DIRECTOR

TO: PRIORITY HQSDISSEM.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~ (b)(3) NatSecAct

DIST: 17 OCTOBER 2002

(b)(1)

COUNTRY: [REDACTED]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

SUBJ: CT: COMMENTS ON INTENTION OF KHALID SHAYKH MUHAMMAD TO
TARGET HEATHROW AIRPORT

DOI: DECEMBER 2001 - JULY 2002

(b)(1)

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

SUMMARY: NONE.

TEXT: 1. [REDACTED]

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(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

2. [REDACTED]

OCTOBER 2002, A

SENIOR AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVE SAID THAT DURING A JULY 2002 MEETING IN
PAKISTAN, KHALID SHAYKH ((MUHAMMAD)) (KSM) TOLD RAMZI ((BIN
AL-SHIBH)) ABOUT HIS DESIRE TO TRAVEL TO SAUDI ARABIA TO RECRUIT
SAUDI MUJAHIDIN TO USE IN TERRORIST OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM (UK). KSM HAD SELECTED HEATHROW
AIRPORT OUTSIDE LONDON, UK, AS A TARGET FOR AN ATTACK INVOLVING
ONE OR TWO AIRCRAFT. THE PLANES WOULD BE USED TO ATTACK THE
AIRPORT ITSELF, RATHER THAN LEAVE HEATHROW IN ORDER TO BE USED IN
AN ATTACK AT A SECOND LOCATION. KSM INTENDED TO RETURN TO SAUDI
ARABIA AS SOON AS HIS DUTIES IN PAKISTAN WERE COMPLETED AND
PERMITTED HIM TO LEAVE. KSM TOLD BIN AL-SHIBH THAT HE WOULD
CHOOSE MUJAHIDIN OVER THE AGE OF 30 WHO WERE LIVING IN THE UK OR
WHO HAD LIVED OR STUDIED THERE AT SOME POINT IN THE PAST TO
CONDUCT THE ATTACK. THE AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVE SAID THAT HEATHROW
AIRPORT WAS A POWERFUL ECONOMIC SYMBOL WITHIN THE UK. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVE CLAIMED THAT
HE DID NOT HEAR KSM GIVE SPECIFIC DETAILS ABOUT HIS INTENTIONS TO

(b)(1)
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ATTACK HEATHROW AIRPORT. THE AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVE DID NOT PROVIDE ANY DETAILS ON KSM'S INTENTIONS TO CONDUCT TERRORIST OPERATIONS INSIDE THE UNITED STATES.)

3. ACCORDING TO THE SENIOR AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVE, KSM INDICATED THAT ONCE HE HAD ARRIVED IN SAUDI ARABIA, HE MAY HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO COLLUDE WITH 'ABD AL-RAHIM AL-((NASHIRI)) AKA ((MULLAH)) BILAL IN PLANNING THE ATTACK AGAINST HEATHROW. INDEED, KSM WANTED TO LEAVE PAKISTAN FOR SAUDI ARABIA BECAUSE THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT IN PAKISTAN MADE IT VERY DIFFICULT FOR AL-QA'IDA TO CARRY OUT DAY-TO-DAY ACTIVITIES. THE AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVE STATED THAT EVEN USING THE INTERNET IN PAKISTAN WAS CONSIDERED A RISKY VENTURE. [REDACTED] THE AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVE DID NOT INDICATE WHEN KSM'S DUTIES IN PAKISTAN WOULD BE COMPLETED, ALLOWING HIM TO RETURN TO SAUDI ARABIA. THE OPERATIVE ONLY INDICATED THAT UPON COMPLETION OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES IN PAKISTAN, KSM HOPED TO RETURN TO SAUDI ARABIA.) [REDACTED] THE AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVE DID NOT SAY WHETHER OR NOT KSM INTENDED TO ASSIST MULLAH BILAL WITH MULLAH BILAL'S OWN PLANS TO TARGET U.S. INTERESTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION.)

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4. WHEN DISCUSSING KSM'S INTENTIONS TO RECRUIT MUJAHIDIN IN SAUDI ARABIA, THE AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVE RECALLED A DECEMBER 2001 CONVERSATION BETWEEN KSM AND BIN AL-SHIBH DURING THE RETREAT FROM QANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN. AT THE TIME, KSM ASKED BIN AL-SHIBH IF HE COULD IDENTIFY CAPABLE/QUALIFIED OPERATORS TO SEND TO THE UNITED STATES OR UNITED KINGDOM (NFI). BIN AL-SHIBH TOLD KSM THAT HE WAS UNAWARE OF ANY SUCH QUALIFIED MUJAHIDIN. ALSO IN DECEMBER 2001, KSM TOLD BIN AL-SHIBH OF HIS DESIRE TO ENROLL BETWEEN ONE AND THREE INDIVIDUALS IN A FLIGHT TRAINING SCHOOL IN KARACHI, PAKISTAN. ACCORDING TO THE AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVE, KSM INSISTED THERE WAS ONE SUCH SCHOOL IN KARACHI AND THAT THE INDIVIDUALS ENROLLED THERE WERE TO BE INVOLVED IN KSM'S PLANS TO TARGET HEATHROW AIRPORT. [REDACTED]

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5. SEPARATELY, THE AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVE STATED THAT BIN AL-SHIBH RECEIVED A LETTER FROM KSM IN EARLY SEPTEMBER 2002 IN WHICH KSM INSTRUCTED BIN AL-SHIBH THAT A MESSAGE FROM AYMAN AL-((ZAWAHIRI)) WOULD BE FORTHCOMING. THE OPERATIVE ASSESSED THAT KSM LIKELY TRAVELED TO IRAN TO MEET WITH ZAWAHIRI SOMETIME AFTER KSM LEFT KARACHI IN JULY 2002. [REDACTED]

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-----TEAR LINE-----

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~ (b)(3) NatSecAct

TEXT:

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TEAR LINE-----

POC: CTC/UBL, (b)(3) CIAAct

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ACQ: (MID-OCTOBER 2002).

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

1677-2

Date: 20040226

TO: (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

FROM:

SUBJECT: NON-RECOGNITION OF ABU YUSIF CANDIDATE, (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

----- BODY -----

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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ALEC

(b)(3) NatSecAct

----- (b)(1) -----

~~SECRET~~ (b)(3) NatSecAct

STAFF

262236Z ALEC

(b)(3) NatSecAct

TO: PRIORITY INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR,

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

FROM: (b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

SUBJECT: NON-RECOGNITION OF ABU YUSIF CANDIDATE, (b)(3) NatSecAct

REF: (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

TEXT:

(b)(3) NatSecAct

1. ACTION REQUIRED:

2. AS FOLLOW-UP TO REFS A AND B REQUESTS FOR DETAINEE

IDENTIFICATION OF POSSIBLE ((ABU YUSIF AL-JAMA'IKI))

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

3. DETAINEE COMMENTS [REDACTED] AS POSSIBLE MATCH FOR
HEATHROW PLOT OPERATIVE ABU YUSIF AL-JAMAIKI:

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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

-- ON 11 FEBRUARY 2004, KHALID SHAYKH ((MOHAMMED))
AMMAR AL-((BALUCHI)) AND KHALAD ((BIN ATTASH)) WERE SHOWN
[REDACTED] PHOTO OF ABU YUSIF AL-JAMAIKI [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] NONE RECOGNIZED THE PHOTO OR HAD ANY
SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS TO ADD.

-- OF INTEREST, HOWEVER, HASSAN GHUL BELIEVED THAT HE
HAD SEEN THIS MAN BEFORE, BUT CLAIMED THAT HE WAS NOT SURE WHERE.
ON A SEPARATE, BUT RELATED NOTE, GHUL ALSO COMMENTED THAT HE
(GHUL) THINKS HE MAY HAVE FACILITATED THE TRAVEL OF AN ABU YUSIF
FROM THE UK BEFORE 9/11 TO KARACHI FOR ONWARD TRAVEL TO
AFGHANISTAN FOR TRAINING. GHUL WAS NOT SURE HOWEVER, [REDACTED]
WAS INDEED THE MAN HE FACILITATED, BUT SAID HE COULD NOT RULE IT
OUT. GHUL ALSO SAID THE MAN (ABU YUSIF) HE IS THINKING OF WAS A
BLACK MAN SENT TO HIM FROM THE UK [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
FINALLY, GHUL SAID HE WAS NOT SURE IF THE MAN HE FACILITATED
TRAVEL FOR WAS NAMED YUSIF, BUT HE THOUGHT IT WAS A GOOD
POSSIBILITY. [REDACTED]

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-- AS MENTIONED ABOVE, HASSAN GHUL BELIEVED HE HAD SEEN THIS MAN BEFORE, BUT CLAIMED THAT HE WAS NOT SURE FROM WHERE. ON A SEPARATE, BUT RELATED NOTE, GHUL COMMENTED THAT HE (GHUL) THINKS HE MAY HAVE FACILITATED THE TRAVEL OF AN ABU YUSIF FROM THE UK BEFORE 9/11 TO KARACHI FOR ONWARD TRAVEL TO AFGHANISTAN FOR TRAINING. GHUL WAS NOT SURE [REDACTED] WAS INDEED THE MAN HE FACILITATED, BUT SAID HE COULD NOT RULE IT OUT. GHUL ALSO SAID THE MAN (ABU YUSIF) HE IS THINKING OF WAS A BLACK MAN SENT TO HIM FROM THE UK [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] FINALLY, GHUL SAID HE WAS NOT SURE IF THE MAN HE FACILITATED TRAVEL FOR WAS NAMED YUSIF, BUT HE THOUGHT IT WAS A GOOD POSSIBILITY. [REDACTED]

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(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

1685-4

Date:

TO: ALEC

FROM:

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - DRAFT INTEL: KHALID SHAYKH MUHAMMAD PROVIDES ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON
HEATHROW OPERATION AND OPERATIVES

----- BODY -----

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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TOR: 201722Z MAY 03 (b)(1) 11717

(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~ 201719Z MAY 03 STAFF

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CIT (b)(3) NatSecAct

TO: IMMEDIATE ALEC INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

FOR:

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - DRAFT INTEL: KHALID SHAYKH MUHAMMAD PROVIDES
ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON HEATHROW OPERATION AND OPERATIVES

REF:

(b)(3) NatSecAct

TEXT:

(b)(3) CIAAct

1. ACTION REQUIRED:

2. ACQUISITION DETAILS: ALEC OFFICER

SERVED AS THE ON-SITE DEBRIEFER DURING A 20 MAY 2003 DEBRIEFING
SESSION OF KHALID SHAYKH ((MUHAMMAD)), AKA ((MUKHTAR)).

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3. MUKHTAR CLARIFIED THAT ((SALMAN)) (LNU) FROM ((ABU KHUBAYB))'S U.K.-BASED GROUP [REDACTED] IS IDENTIFIABLE WITH ((SULIMAN)), WHOM ALI ((ABD AL-AZIZ ALI)), AKA ((AMMAR AL-BALUCHI)), CLAIMED TO HAVE DISPATCHED TO THE UNITED KINGDOM IN LATE FEBRUARY 2003, [REDACTED] MUKHTAR DENIED THIS INDIVIDUAL WAS IDENTICAL TO SALMAN ((KHAN)), THE NEPHEW OF MAQSUD ((KHAN)) AND THE COUSIN OF MANSUR ((KHAN)), AKA ((HASSAN)).

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CIAAct


4. MUKHTAR DENIED THAT ((ISSA AL-BRITANI)) IS IN ANY WAY INVOLVED IN THE HEATHROW PLOT. HE ALSO DENIED THAT ((YUSIF AL-TRINIDADI)) IS IN ANY WAY INVOLVED IN THE PLOT.



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6. BASE PLANS TO FOLLOW-UP ON THE BELOW ISSUES WITH RAMZI ((BIN AL-SHIBH)). WE NOTE THAT MUKHTAR PREVIOUSLY REPORTED THAT SALMAN WORKED ON THE MEDIA COMMITTEE IN EARLY 2002, BUT CLARIFIED DURING THIS SESSION THAT HE MEANT 2001. REQUEST CORRECTION TO INTEL BASED ON [REDACTED]

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-----TEAR LINE-----

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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

END OF MESSAGE.

~~SECRET~~

1689-2

Date: 20030617

TO: (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

FROM:

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - QUESTIONING MAJID KHAN ABOUT ABU KHUBAYB GROUP MEMBERS, SULIMAN
AKA TALHA AND ADNAN AKA KHURRAM

----- BODY -----

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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172242Z

(b)(3) NatSecAct

TO: (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecActFROM: (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecActSUBJECT: EYES ONLY - QUESTIONING MAJID KHAN ABOUT ABU KHUBAYB
GROUP MEMBERS, SULIMAN AKA TALHA AND ADNAN AKA KHURRAMREF: (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED:

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(b)(3) CIAAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

TIRELESS EFFORTS
BY [REDACTED] INTERROGATION TEAMS HAVE RECENTLY SURFACED
SIGNIFICANT NEW INFORMATION FROM KSM, 'AMMAR, AND KHALAD ((BIN
ATTASH)) RELATING TO THE HEATHROW PLOT AND PLAYERS INVOLVED.
CONSISTENT THROUGHOUT THE REPORTS FROM THE TRIO ARE REFERENCES TO
A PAIR OF COMPUTER SAVVY PAKISTANI-ORIGIN UK PASSPORT HOLDERS,
SULIMAN AKA ABU TALHA/TALHA AND ADNAN AKA KHURRAM, WHO SERVED AS
HELPERS TO 'AMMAR IN KARACHI AND REPRESENTED THE UK-BASED ((ABU
KHUBAYB)) GROUP IN PAKISTAN (SEE REFS C-D FOR ADDITIONAL
BACKGROUND ON ABU KHUBAYB, AKA BABAR AHMED, AND HIS ASSOCIATES).

3. OF GREATEST CONCERN IS SULIMAN/TALHA, WHO REPORTEDLY
ACCEPTED RECRUITMENT INTO KSM'S HEATHROW OPERATION CIRCA
MARCH/APRIL 2002 AND SUBSEQUENTLY MADE AT LEAST THREE TRIPS TO THE
UK TO RECRUIT OPERATIVES, OBTAIN FLIGHT SCHEDULES INTO HEATHROW,
CASE CANARY WHARF, AND PRODUCE OR OUTSOURCE CASING REPORTS OF
AIRPORTS IN THE UK AND EASTERN EUROPE. WE ASSESS THAT THE TALHA
AND KURRAN NOTED BY MAJID KHAN ARE IDEN WITH SULIMAN/TALHA AND
ADNAN/KHURRAM, AND WE ARE EAGER TO HAVE MAJID KHAN QUESTIONED ASAP
ABOUT THE PAIR AND HOW TO FIND THEM IN PAKISTAN (NOTE: THE NAME
KHURRAM HAS BEEN SPELLED ((KHORAM)) IN SOME REPORTS, AND WE
SUSPECT KURRAN IS SIMPLY ONE OTHER REPORTER'S ATTEMPT AT SPELLING
A DIFFICULT NAME HEARD ORALLY).

4. KSM, 'AMMAR, AND KHALAD REMAIN LOATHE TO REVEAL DETAILS
OF THE HEATHROW PLOT, AND THEY ARE NO LESS CIRCUMSPECT ABOUT
INFORMATION THAT MIGHT HELP LEAD US TO SULIMAN/TALHA AND
ADNAN/KHURRAM. THE SUM OF THEIR REPORTING SEEMS TO INDICATE THAT
THE PAIR REMAIN IN KARACHI, THOUGH KHALAD INDICATED SULIMAN/TALHA
WAS PLANNING YET ANOTHER UK TRIP IN LATE APRIL. WHILE WE BELIEVE
ALL THREE DETAINEES LIKELY HAVE INFORMATION ABOUT RESIDENCES,
FAVORITE HAUNTS, FRIENDS AND FAMILY ASSOCIATED WITH THE PAIR THAT
COULD HELP LEAD TO THEIR CAPTURE IN PAKISTAN, THEY HAVE SO FAR
CLUNG TO SUCH INFORMATION. THEY HAVE DEFLECTED QUESTIONS ABOUT
SUCH ISSUES BY DESCRIBING STRICTLY BUSINESS-LIKE, HIGHLY
COMPARTMENTED RELATIONS WITH THE PAIR, UTTERLY DEVOID OF A SOCIAL
ELEMENT (THIS RINGS HOLLOW IN HQS/ALEC ESTIMATION). THE GRINDING,
PIECEMEAL SUCCESS FROM INTERROGATORS SO FAR IN OBTAINING
GRANULARITY ABOUT SULIMAN/TALHA AND ADNAN/KHURRAM HAS ONLY
RESULTED FROM DEFT PLAYING OF REPORTS FROM ONE DETAINEE OFF
ANOTHER, SUCH AS HIGHLIGHTED BELOW:

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5. WITH THE ABOVE AS BACKGROUND, WE HAVE PREPARED ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR USE WITH MAJID KHAN ABOUT SULIMAN/TALHA AND ADNAN/KHURRAM, BEYOND THOSE IN REF A. OUR HOPE IS THAT MAJID HIMSELF WILL PROVIDE US WITH INFORMATION POTENTIALLY LEADING TO THEIR LOCATION AND CAPTURE, AND/OR AT LEAST WILL GIVE US MORE FODDER FOR CONFRONTING KSM/AMMAR/KHALLAD ABOUT THEIR PITHY OUTPUT ON THE PAIR TO DATE. REGARDS AND GOOD LUCK.

-----TEARLINE-----

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SUBJECT: MAJID KHAN - QUESTIONS ABOUT TALHA AND KURRAN/KHURRAM

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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

1690

Date:

To: (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

FROM:

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - QUESTIONING AMMAR AL-BALUCHI AND MUSTAFA AL-HAWSAWI ON HEATHROW
PLOT OPERATIVES

----- BODY -----

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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SECRET

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TOT: 161821Z JUL 03

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TO: (b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

FROM: (b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecActSUBJECT: EYES ONLY - QUESTIONING AMMAR AL-BALUCHI AND MUSTAFA
AL-HAWSAWI ON HEATHROW PLOT OPERATIVES

REF:

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: --PLEASE USE PARA 5 TEARLINE SUGGESTED
REQUIREMENTS FOR AMMAR AND PARA 6 TEARLINE SUGGESTED REQUIREMENTS
FOR HAWSAWI.2. HQS/ALEC WOULD LIKE TO DRAW ADDEES ATTENTION TO
INFORMATION [REDACTED] THAT MAY NOT HAVE
BEEN ADDRESSED WITH AMMAR AL-((BALUCHI)) OR MUSTAFA AHMAD(b)(1)
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AL-((HAWSAWI)) REGARDING ONE ((ADIL AHMED)) VARIANT ((ADIL AHMAD)), AN EMPLOYEE AT HEATHROW INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, WHOSE NAME IS SIMILAR TO ((ABU ADIL)), ONE OF THE OPERATIVES IN THIS PLOT. AS STATION IS FULLY AWARE, HQS/ALEC REMAINS CONCERNED WITH WHAT WE BELIEVE TO BE PALTRY INFORMATION COMING FROM DETAINEES ABOUT OPERATIONS IN THE U.K., THE EVER CHANGING IMPORTANCE OF THE KHUBAYB GROUP, AND THE ORIGINAL HEATHROW PLOT OPERATIVES (ABU ADIL, ((ABU YUSEF)), ((AYYUB)), AND ((AZMARAI))). [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] ALTHOUGH THE ADIL AHMED WORKING AT HEATHROW MAY OR MAY NOT BE IDENTIFIABLE WITH ABU ADIL OF THE HEATHROW PLOT, HQS/ALEC BELIEVES THIS IS ONE LEAD WORTH FOLLOWING UP ON WITH DETAINEES. GIVEN THE ACCESS OF AMMAR AND HAWSAWI TO U.K. BASED OPERATIVES, WE BELIEVE DETAINEES COULD SHED LIGHT ON THIS AND OTHER U.K. BASED OPERATIVES.

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[REDACTED] ADIL AHMED WORKS AT HEATHROW AIRPORT AT AN UNSPECIFIED BAGGAGE HANDLING COMPANY.

FURTHER, ADIL RECENTLY VISITED PAKISTAN, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ADIL AHMED IS ALSO REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN PERIPHERALLY INVOLVED IN THE TOOTING GROUP (FORMER NAME OF THE ABU KHUBAYB GROUP).

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3. IN ADDITION, SINCE AMMAR TOOK OVER OPERATIONAL PLANNING FOR KSM AFTER HIS ARREST, WE BELIEVE THAT HE MAY VERY LIKELY HAVE MORE TO TELL. FOR EXAMPLE, DID ABU ADIL AND ABU YUSIF OBTAIN THEIR PILOTS LICENSES OR WERE AYUB AND AZMARAI SENT IN THEIR STEAD, PER KHALID SHAYKH ((MUHAMMAD))'S RECOMMENDATION. FOR MUSTAFA AL-HAWSAWI, WE WONDER WHAT HIS CONNECTIONS ARE TO HEATHROW PLOT OPERATIVES ABU ADIL AND ABU YUSIF, AYUB AND AZMARAI AND POSSIBLY ABU KHUBAYB GROUP MEMBERS. DESPITE HIS CLAIMS DURING HIS 24 MARCH DEBRIEFING THAT HE HAS NO KNOWLEDGE OF UK PLOTS OR INDIVIDUALS IN THE UK NAMED ABU ADIL OR ABU YOUSEF, WE ARE HARD PRESSED TO BELIEVE THAT GIVEN HAWSAWI'S FINANCIAL ROLE IN AL-QA'IDA AND WHETHER KSM'S TRUST, HE WOULD BE "LEFT OUT" OF THIS OPERATION.

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

[REDACTED] AS SUCH, WE WONDER IF HAWSAWI IS PRESSED ON THIS POINT WHAT POSSIBLE NEW LEADS ON ABU ADIL OR THE OTHER OPERATIVES IN THIS PLOT COULD BE DERIVED FROM HAWSAWI, ESPECIALLY SINCE KSM MENTIONED THAT HE (HAWSAWI) WOULD AT LEAST KNOW ABU ADIL'S EMAIL ADDRESS. FURTHER, AS OTHER DETAINEES HAVE POINTED OUT, HAWSAWI PROVIDED LOGISTICAL SUPPORT (AIR, HOTEL, AND CAR RENTALS) TO SOME OF THE 11 SEPTEMBER HIJACKERS, WE WONDER IF HE ALSO PROVIDED THIS TYPE OF SUPPORT FOR THE HEATHROW PLOT OPERATIVES.

4. DETAINEE INFORMATION ON HAWSAWI FOR BASE BACKGROUND:

--ACCORDING TO ((ABU ZUBAYDAH)), HAWSAWI IS A WELL RESPECTED MAN AND A MEMBER OF AL-QA'IDA'S MEDIA COMMITTEE ALONG WITH KSM.

ABU ZUBAYDAH FIRST SAW HIM SOME TIME AFTER THE ATTACK ON THE USS COLE (AFTER 12 OCTOBER 2000) WORKING ON A COMPUTER IN AL-QA'IDA'S MEDIA COMMITTEE. FURTHER ABU ZUBAYDAH POINTS OUT THAT HAWSAWI IS VERY GOOD FRIENDS WITH KSM. HAWSAWI IS ALSO KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT COMPUTERS. ABU ZUBAYDAH SAW HIM AGAIN RECENTLY AFTER THE SEPTEMBER 11TH ATTACKS AND BELIEVES THAT HE WAS EVACUATING AFGHANISTAN FOR IRAN. [REDACTED] (b)(3) CIAAct [REDACTED]

--PRIOR TO THE 11 SEPTEMBER ATTACKS, HAWSAWI ASSISTED RAMZI ((BIN AL-SHIBH)) BY PROVIDING HIM U.S. \$1,500 TO TRAVEL TO DUBAI. ONCE IN DUBAI, ON 9 SEPTEMBER, AT KSM'S URGING, BIN AL-SHIBH ADVISED HAWSAWI, WHO HAD NOT YET BEEN TOLD THE MISSION WAS IMMINENT, TO LEAVE DUBAI IMMEDIATELY. KSM TOLD BOTH BIN AL-SHIBH AND HAWSAWI TO GO TO QANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN, AND BIN AL-SHIBH ARRIVED IN QANDAHAR THE MORNING OF 11 SEPTEMBER. KSM WAS WAITING FOR BIN AL-SHIBH AT THE AIRPORT. HAWSAWI SOON ARRIVED AT THE SAME APARTMENT IN KARACHI AND INFORMED BIN AL-SHIBH THAT ON TELEVISION HE SAW A PLANE HIT A LARGE BUILDING. KSM SOON RETURNED TO THE APARTMENT AND TOGETHER BIN AL-SHIBH, HAWSAWI, AND KSM CELEBRATED THE SUCCESS OF THE MISSION. [REDACTED] (b)(3) CIAAct [REDACTED]

--BIN AL-SHIBH FURTHER NOTES THAT AS OF LATE APRIL OR EARLY MAY 2002, KSM WAS ASSISTING HAWSAWI BY PROVIDING A SAFEHOUSE AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL TO KEEP HAWSAWI SECURE. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] DURING THE MEETING, HAWSAWI AND BIN AL-SHIBH RECEIVED GREETINGS AND WORDS OF PRAISE FROM THE FOUR SENIOR AL-QA'IDA LEADERS FOR THEIR SUPPORT OF THE 19 AL-QA'IDA TERRORIST HIJACKERS. [REDACTED] COMMENT: ABU HAFS AL-MASRI WAS KILLED IN COALITION AIRSTRIKES IN AFGHANISTAN IN NOVEMBER 2001.) PRIOR TO THE 11 SEPTEMBER ATTACKS, HAWSAWI FACILITATED COMMUNICATIONS AND THE TRANSFER OF FUNDS VIA HIS LOCATION IN DUBAI, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, ON BEHALF OF MUHAMMAD 'ATTA AND THE OTHER 18 AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVES INVOLVED IN THE 11 SEPTEMBER OPERATION. HAWSAWI, DID NOT KNOW THE DETAILS OF THE 11 SEPTEMBER PLOT BUT HE DID FACILITATE THE AIR, HOTEL, AND RENTAL CAR RESERVATIONS FOR 15 OF THE 19 OPERATIVES OVER A SIX MONTH PERIOD PRIOR TO 11 SEPTEMBER. [REDACTED]

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(b)(3)
CIAAct

--ACCORDING TO KSM, HAWSAWI "DOES THINGS FOR THE BROTHERS." HE FURTHER COMMENTED THAT HAWSAWI IS "BLACK" AND CANNOT MOVE ABOUT EASILY IN PAKISTAN. IN ADDITION, KSM CLAIMED THAT HE VISITED HAWSAWI THE NIGHT OF THE ARREST ONLY BECAUSE OF A MEETING WITH ABU MUS'AB REGARDING A MONEY MAN "WHO CAME FROM YOUR SIDE." THIS IS ALMOST CERTAINLY A REFERENCE TO [REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

5. PLEASE USE SUGGESTED TEARLINES BELOW WITH AMMAR AND HAWSAWI.
THANKS

-----TEARLINE-----

~~SECRET~~/ [REDACTED] (b)(3) CIAAct

SUBJECT: QUESTIONS FOR AMMAR

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

-----TEARLINE-----

6. BASE, PLEASE USE SUGGESTED TEARLINE BELOW FOR HAWSAWI.

-----TEARLINE-----

~~SECRET~~/ [REDACTED] (b)(3) CIAAct

SUBJECT: QUESTIONS FOR HAWSAWI

HAWSAWI HAS THUS FAR PROVIDED US WITH LITTLE INTEL ON THE HEATHROW PLOT OR ITS OPERATIVES. IN FACT, IN LATE MARCH 2003 HAWSAWI WAS QUESTIONED ABOUT FUNDS TRANSFERS AND/OR PAYMENTS MADE TO KSM'S OPERATIVES IN THE UK. HE CLAIMED TO HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE OF FINANCIAL TRANSFERS AND/OR PAYMENTS TO INDIVIDUALS IN THE UK AND ALSO CLAIMED NOT TO HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF AL-QA'IDA ACTIVITIES IN THE UK INVOLVING INDIVIDUALS WITH THE NAMES ABU ADIL, ABU YOUSEF, OR OTHER INDIVIDUALS. HOWEVER, KSM MENTIONED THAT HAWSAWI WOULD KNOW ABU ADIL, WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT BELOW WILL PROVIDE SOME NEW LEADS. ADDITIONALLY, HAWSAWI HAS PROVIDED SOME INFORMATION ABOUT HIS ROLE IN AL-QA'IDA AS A FINANCE OFFICER AND LIMITED INFORMATION ABOUT HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH KSM.

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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

1692-2

Date: 20030510

(b)(1)

TO: (b)(3) NatSecAct

FROM:

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - CONFRONTING KHALID SHAYKH MUHAMMAD ON SULIMAN AND UK OPERATIONS

----- BODY -----

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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~~SECRET~~

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

TOT: 192314Z MAY 03

(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~

STAFF

192314Z (b)(3) NatSecAct

TO: (b)(1) DIATE (b)(3) NatSecAct INFO DIRECTOR.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

FROM: (b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) CIAActSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - CONFRONTING KHALID SHAYKH MUHAMMAD ON
SULIMAN AND UK OPERATIONSREF: (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE CONTINUE TO CONFRONT KSM ON
BELOW REQUIREMENTS.2. HQS/ALEC REQUESTS BASE CONFRONT KHALID SHAYKH
((MUHAMMAD)) (KSM) FURTHER ON THE TOPIC OF AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVES
DISPATCHED TO THE UK FOR TERRORIST OPERATIONS. WE NOTE
INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN KSM'S PAST STATEMENTS AND COMMENTS MADE BY
RECENTLY DETAINED ALI ((ABD'AL-AZIZ ALI)) AKA AMMAR
AL-((BALUCHI)). PER REF A, AMMAR DESCRIBED AN OPERATIVE NAMED

((SULIMAN)) WHOM AMMAR CLAIMED TO HAVE DISPATCHED TO THE UK IN LATE FEBRUARY 2003. ACCORDING TO AMMAR, SULIMAN'S ORDERS WERE TO GO TO THE UK AND ESTABLISH HIMSELF (HOUSING, JOB, ETC) AND TO IDENTIFY OTHERS IN THE UK SUITABLE FOR HIJACKING OR SUICIDE OPERATIONS. HQS/ALEC IS CONCERNED THAT KSM HAS NOT MENTIONED THIS OPERATIVE SULIMAN BEING DISPATCHED TO THE UK IN HIS DEBRIEFINGS. AS SULIMAN WAS SENT TO THE UK IN LATE FEBRUARY 2003, IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO KSM'S CAPTURE, IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN AN OPERATION FRESH IN KSM'S MIND.

3. HQS/ALEC NOTES THAT KSM MENTIONED AN INDIVIDUAL NAMED ((SALMAN KHAN)) IN 15 MAY 2003 DEBRIEFINGS, WHO MAY BE IDENTIFIABLE WITH AMMAR'S SULIMAN. PER REF B, KSM IDENTIFIED SALMAN ((KHAN)) AS THE NEPHEW OF MAQSUD AND THE COUSIN OF MANSUR ((KHAN)), AKA ((HASSAN)). HASSAN WAS THE AL-QA'IDA MEDIA OFFICIAL WHO SERVED AS THE COMMUNICATIONS CHANNEL TO MAJID KHAN AND IYMAN FARIS. PER KSM, DURING A MEETING WITH SALMAN IN MAQSUD'S KARACHI HOUSE IN APPROXIMATELY MID-2000, SALMAN TOLD KSM THAT HE PLANNED TO GO TO CANADA, AND OFFERED TO DO SOMETHING OPERATIONAL WHILE HE WAS THERE. KSM CLAIMED THAT AS SALMAN WAS YOUNG AND HAD NO TRAINING, HE WAS SUSPICIOUS OF HIS OFFER TO HELP OPERATIONALLY AND THOUGHT SALMAN WAS LOOKING FOR A WAY TO GET HIS TRIP FINANCED. KSM SAID HE REFUSED SALMAN'S OFFER AT THAT TIME. IN APPROXIMATELY FEBRUARY 2003, KSM SAID HE BEGAN TO RETHINK SALMAN'S OFFER, AND WAS PLANNING TO PROPOSE SENDING SALMAN FOR OPERATIONAL TRAINING WITH (('ABD AL-HADI)) AL-IRAQI, WHO WAS LOCATED IN WAZIRISTAN, PRIOR TO SALMAN'S DEPLOYMENT ON AN OPERATIONAL ASSIGNMENT, POSSIBLY IN CANADA. KSM SAID HE THOUGHT THAT SALMAN WAS COLLOCATED WITH HASSAN IN THE AREA KNOWN AS TANDO LEYAR, IN HYDERABAD, AS OF MID-FEBRUARY 2003. KSM CLAIMED HE WAS UNABLE TO CONTACT SALMAN BY EARLY MARCH, AND HAD THEREFORE NEVER PROPOSED THE TRAINING.

4. PER REF A, AMMAR PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON SULIMAN. ACCORDING TO AMMAR, SULIMAN WAS A PAKISTANI WITH A UK PASSPORT (AMMAR SAID HE NEVER SAW THE PASSPORT AND DID NOT KNOW SULIMAN'S TRUE NAME). SULIMAN IS REPORTEDLY 24/25 YEARS OLD, TALL WITH A FIT BUILD, FAIR COMPLEXION, WITH A SHORT BEARD. SULIMAN HAD FOUGHT IN AFGHANISTAN AND AMMAR SAID HE BELIEVED THAT SULIMAN HAD STUDIED IN THE UK. AMMAR SAID HE DID NOT RECALL SULIMAN'S EMAIL ACCOUNT BUT SAID HE DID EMAIL HIM AND DIRECTED HIM TO STAND DOWN UPON KSM'S ARREST. DESPITE SULIMAN'S SERVICE AS A FIGHTER IN AFGHANISTAN, AMMAR ASSESSED HE WAS NOT WILLING TO TAKE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH SUICIDE MISSIONS OR OTHER OPERATIONAL WORK. SULIMAN WAS DIRECTED TO SPOT, ASSESS, AND RECRUIT OPERATIVES FOR SUCH OPERATIONS. AMMAR SO FAR HAS NOT IDENTIFIED WHERE SULIMAN HAD BEEN DEPLOYED NOR WHERE HE HAD PREVIOUSLY LIVED IN THE UK. HOWEVER, AMMAR SAID HE BELIEVED SULIMAN'S PARENTS AND A BROTHER LIVED IN THE UK. SULIMAN REPORTEDLY WAS INTRODUCED TO AMMAR BY IMRAN, A PAKISTANI WHO HAD LEFT KARACHI FOR AFGHANISTAN IN JUNE 2002.

5. REQUEST BASE QUERY KSM IF HIS SALMAN AND AMMAR'S SULIMAN ARE ONE AND THE SAME AND PRESS FOR MORE DETAILS OF HIS ACTIVITIES. HQS/ALEC BELIEVES THIS IS A "NO WIN" AREA OF QUESTIONING FOR KSM; EITHER WAY BASE WILL HAVE CAUGHT DETAINEE ONCE AGAIN WITHHOLDING VALUABLE INFORMATION. IF THE TWO ARE SEPARATE INDIVIDUALS, HQS/ALEC FINDS IT IMPLAUSIBLE THAT KSM WOULD NOT HAVE KNOWN ABOUT AMMAR'S SULIMAN BEING SENT TO THE UK. IF SULIMAN AND SALMAN ARE ONE AND THE SAME, HQS/ALEC SUSPECTS THAT KSM WAITED TO DISCLOSE REF B INFORMATION UNTIL AFTER LEARNING OF AMMAR'S DETENTION, PROBABLY BECAUSE KSM MAY HAVE FELT HE HAD NOTHING TO LOSE BY DISCLOSING SOME INFORMATION AT THAT POINT. HOWEVER, EVEN THEN, HE DID NOT GIVE THE FULL STORY OF SULIMAN/SALMAN AND HIS MOST RECENT OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY.

6. AS AN ASIDE, HQS/ALEC ALSO NOTES A SIMILARITY BETWEEN THE TASKING AMMAR GAVE TO SULIMAN AND KSM'S REPORTED PLANS FOR ((ISSA AL-BRITANI)). APPRECIATE BASE'S THOUGHTS ON THE RESEMBLANCE.

7. HQS/ALEC APPLAUDS BASE'S ONGOING WORK IN OBTAINING CRITICAL THREAT INFORMATION FROM KSM, DESPITE DETAINEE'S PERSISTENT ATTEMPTS TO MANIPULATE AND DECEIVE. MANY THANKS AND GOOD LUCK IN YOUR CONTINUING EFFORTS. REGARDS.

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(b)(6)

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

1692-7

Date: 20040214

TO: (b)(3) NatSecAct

FROM: (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecActSUBJECT: [REDACTED] PROVIDE ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ON
POSSIBLE THREATS TO THE U.K.

----- BODY -----

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20525

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~~SECRET~~ 141708Z FEB 04 (b)(3) NatSecAct

CITE [REDACTED] 20525

TO: (b)(3) NatSecAct

FOR: (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecActSUBJECT: [REDACTED] PROVIDE ADDITIONAL
COMMENTS ON POSSIBLE THREATS TO THE U.K.REF: (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct(b)(1)
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NatSecAct

TEXT:

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

1. ACTION REQUIRED: BASE IS SUBMITTING BELOW INFORMATION IN
OPS CHANNELS AS THIS INFORMATION REPRESENTS ONLY [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] SPECULATION OR INFORMATION ON TOPICS
ON WHICH THESE DETAINEES HAVE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED. PLEASE ADVISE IF
HEADQUARTERS WISHES ALL OR PART OF BELOW INFORMATION TO BE SUBMITTED

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IN INTEL CHANNELS.

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2. ON 13 FEBRUARY 2004, [REDACTED] QUESTIONED

[REDACTED] ON
INFORMATION RELATED TO POSSIBLE THREATS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM (U.K.)
REGARDING REF A REQUIREMENTS [REDACTED]

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3. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] WAS EMPHATIC THAT HE NEVER USED HASSAN ((GHUL))
FOR ANY TYPE OF DIRECT OPERATIONAL WORK. [REDACTED] STATED THAT HE NEVER
USED GHUL AS A LINK WITH SAUDI AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVES. [REDACTED] SAID THAT
[REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] WERE HIS OPERATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS LINK WITH OPERATIVES,
NOT HASSAN GHUL.

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4. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
RECALLED HIS PREVIOUS STATEMENTS IN REF B VIVIDLY AND HE SAID THAT AT
THE TIME HE WAS ASKED TO GIVE HIS SPECULATION AND THAT ALL THAT HE
PROVIDED WAS MERELY HIS [REDACTED] SPECULATION AND GUESSES BUT THAT HE
WAS NOT ABLE TO PROVIDE FACTS. [REDACTED]

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7. [] WAS VERY CLEAR THAT WHILE GHUL WOULD LIKELY KNOW SOME PEOPLE IN QATAR HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT GHUL HAD ANY OPERATIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH PEOPLE IN QATAR. [] SAID THAT GHUL WAS INVOLVED IN THE MOVEMENT OF MUJAHIDIN FAMILIES OUT OF PAKISTAN AND [] BELIEVES THAT GHUL'S CONTACTS IN QATAR WOULD ONLY BE EITHER MUJAHIDIN AND THEIR FAMILIES WHOM GHUL SENT TO QATAR OR PEOPLE IN QATAR WHO HELPED GHUL FACILITATE THE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE THERE.

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8. ALSO, [] CLARIFIED THAT HE BELIEVES THAT IN THE VERY EARLY STAGES OF HIS DETENTION HE MAY HAVE MADE SOME SIMILAR STATEMENTS ABOUT HASSAN GHUL HAVING OPERATIONAL CONTACTS IN QATAR, BUT [] SAID THAT THESE EARLY STATEMENTS WERE NOT ACCURATE. BASE BELIEVES THAT [] IS LIKELY REFERRING TO REF C DRAFT INTEL REPORT WHICH IS DATED 11 MARCH 2003.

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9. [] ALSO COMMENTED ON HIS PREVIOUS STATEMENT FROM REF B THAT READS, [] SAID THAT EITHER ((ABU MU'SAB)) AL-BALUCHI OR GHUL TOLD HIM ABOUT TWO WEEKS BEFORE HIS [] CAPTURE, THAT A QATARI CALLED GHUL AND DISCUSSED THE MANY U.S. PLANES AT HIS LOCATION AND THE USE OF WEAPONS SUCH AS SAM-7'S AGAINST THESE PLANES. [] SAID THAT GHUL TOLD THE QATARI TO TALK TO ABU HAZIM. [] DOES NOT RECALL EXACTLY WHO TOLD HIM ABOUT THE CALL FROM QATAR TWO WEEKS BEFORE HIS DETENTION OR WHO EXACTLY RECEIVED THE CALL FROM QATAR. [] SAID THAT AT THE TIME, HE SPECULATED TO DEBRIEFERS THAT MAYBE HASSAN GHUL HAD RECEIVED THE CALL, AGAIN FOR THE SAME REASONS HE STATED PREVIOUSLY, IE THAT GHUL KNEW PEOPLE IN QATAR, BUT AGAIN GHUL WAS ONLY ONE POSSIBILITY. HOWEVER, [] ALSO ADDED THAT IT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ENTIRELY UNEXPECTED THAT GHUL WOULD RECEIVE SUCH A CALL. [] SAID THAT EVEN THOUGH GHUL WAS NOT INVOLVED DIRECTLY IN ANY OPERATIONS THAT [] KNEW OF, [] SAID THAT GHUL WAS INVOLVED WITH MANY AL-QA'IDA PEOPLE FACILITATING THE MOVEMENT OF FAMILIES AND MUJAHIDIN OUT OF PAKISTAN. THEREFORE, [] SAID THAT ANYONE DOING THIS WORK MAY OCCASIONALLY HEAR ABOUT OPERATIONAL INFORMATION BUT THAT DOES NOT MEAN HE WAS INVOLVED IN IT.

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10. SPECULATING [] SAID THAT IF SOMEONE CONTACTED GHUL WITH AN OPERATIONAL IDEA, GHUL WOULD KNOW ENOUGH PEOPLE IN AL-QA'IDA TO PUT THAT PERSON IN CONTACT WITH SOMEONE WHO WAS AN AL-QA'IDA OPERATIONAL PLANNER. ALSO, [] SAID THAT HE DOES NOT KNOW IF GHUL AND ((ABU HAZIM)) AL-SHA'IR HAVE ANY CONNECTION OR IF THEY EVEN KNOW EACH OTHER. HOWEVER, [] BELIEVES IT WOULD BE LIKELY THAT GHUL WOULD KNOW SOMEONE IN SAUDI ARABIA WHO HELPED GHUL WITH THE MOVEMENT OF FAMILIES WHO ALSO KNEW ABU HAZIM. IF GHUL WERE TO CONTACT A SAUDI CONTACT THAT SAUDI CONTACT MAY BE ABLE TO HELP GHUL GET IN TOUCH WITH ABU HAZIM OR ANOTHER PLANNER. ALSO, GHUL COULD CONTACT ABU MUS'AB TO HELP SOMEONE GET IN CONTACT WITH AN OPERATIONAL PLANNER IN AL-QA'IDA.

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11. [] WAS ASKED TO SPECULATE AS TO WHO MAY HAVE BEEN ABLE TO

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TAKE OVER FOR [] AS A LINK TO SAUDI ARABIA AND THE REST OF THE HEATHROW PLOT. [] STATED THAT HIS FIRST AND BEST GUESS IS THAT THE HEATHROW OPERATION WAS COMPLETELY COMPROMISED AND FINISHED WITH THE CAPTURE OF [] [] DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS ANYONE ELSE WHO WOULD HAVE KNOWN ABOUT AND BEEN ABLE TO CARRY ON THE PLANS FOR HEATHROW. ALSO, [] ADDED THAT HE IS NOT AWARE OF WHAT WORK [] MAY HAVE DONE ON THE HEATHROW PLOT AFTER HIS CAPTURE. WHEN ASKED TO PROVIDE HIS SPECULATION AS TO WHO COULD HAVE SERVED AS A LINK BETWEEN PAKISTAN BASED AL-QA'IDA MEMBERS AND SAUDI ARABIA IN A SIMILAR WAY THAT HE AND [] DID FOR THE HEATHROW PLOT, [] SAID THAT MAYBE ((ABDULLAH SINDHI)) COULD SERVE IN A SUCH A ROLE; BUT AGAIN [] DID NOT BELIEVE THAT IT WAS LIKELY THAT ANYONE WOULD BE ABLE TO CARRY ON WITH THE HEATHROW PLOT.

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12. [] WAS ASKED TO COMMENT ON WHO WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CONTINUE WITH THE HEATHROW PLOT IN A SIMILAR MANNER THAT [] DID AFTER [] CAPTURE. [] CLEARLY STATED THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT ANYONE WOULD HAVE CARRIED ON WITH THE HEATHROW PLOT WHERE HE [] HAD LEFT OFF. [] SAID THAT THE ONLY OTHER PERSON WHO EVEN KNEW ABOUT THE HEATHROW PLOT WAS ((ABU TALHA)) AL-PAKISTANI. HOWEVER, [] SAID THAT ABU TALHA WAS NOT AN OPERATIONAL PLANNER. ALSO, ABU TALHA DID NOT KNOW ALL OF THE PIECES OF THE PLAN. ADDITIONALLY, [] SAID THAT ABU TALHA DID NOT HAVE ANY LINKS TO SAUDI AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVES AND [] DID NOT BELIEVE THAT SAUDI AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVES WOULD EVEN KNOW WHO ABU TALHA IS.

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13. [] ALSO SAID THAT ALL ABU TALHA HAD WAS THE IDEA FOR THE HEATHROW OPERATION AND ABU TALHA DID NOT HAVE ANYONE ELSE TO HELP HIM WORK ON THE PLAN. ALSO, [] SAID THAT AFTER [] WERE CAPTURED, ABU TALHA WOULD KNOW THAT THE ENTIRE HEATHROW PLOT WOULD BE COMPROMISED. THEREFORE, [] SPECULATED THAT IF ABU TALHA WISHED TO CONTINUE WITH AN OPERATION AGAINST THE U.K. HE WOULD HAVE TO COMPLETELY CHANGE THE TARGETS, METHODS, AND MEANS TO CARRY OUT THE ATTACK.

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14. [] WAS ALSO ASKED TO COMMENT ON WHO WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE CONTINUE WITH THE HEATHROW PLOT IN A SIMILAR MANNER THAT [] DID AFTER [] CAPTURE. [] STATED THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT ANYONE WOULD BE ABLE TO PICK UP WITH THE HEATHROW PLOT AFTER HE AND [] WERE CAPTURED. [] STATED THAT ABU TALHA WAS THERE, BUT HE WAS "INVISIBLE" MEANING THAT NO ONE KNEW WHO HE WAS. ALSO, [] STATED THAT ABU TALHA ONLY KNEW A FEW OF THE PIECES OF THE HEATHROW PLOT. SPECULATING, [] SAID THAT ((ABU FARAJ)) AL-LIBI WAS AN IMPORTANT SENIOR LEADER OF AL-QA'IDA WHO HAD RESPONSIBILITIES OVER BOTH AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN AND [] SAID THAT ABU FARAJ MAY HAVE BEEN A PERSON WHO COULD COORDINATE AN ATTACK. HOWEVER [] WAS CLEAR THAT THIS WAS JUST A GUESS AND [] WAS ALSO VERY CLEAR THAT ABU FARAJ DID NOT KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT THE HEATHROW PLOT.

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END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

1692-13

Date:

(b)(1)

TO: ALEC,

(b)(3) NatSecAct

FROM:

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - 2 MAY 2003 AMMAR AL-BALUCHI INTERVIEW

----- BODY -----

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TOR: 021645Z MAY 03 (b)(1) 14291

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~~SECRET~~ 021643Z MAY 03 STAFF

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TO: IMMEDIATE ALEC,

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(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

FOR:

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - 2 MAY 2003 AMMAR AL-BALUCHI INTERVIEW

REF: (b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

TEXT:

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(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

1. ACTION REQUIRED: NONE, FYI.

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(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct 2. (b)(3) NatSecAct INTERVIEWS OF ALI

D'AL-((AZIZ)) ALI AKA AMMAR AL-((BALUCHI)) (SUBJ)

OFFICER

MONITORED VIA CCTV AND ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED IN PLANNING.

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] SUBJ ADMITTED CONTACT WITH SAUDI-BASED PLANNERS OF POSSIBLE IMMINENT ATTACKS, AND EXPANDED UPON HIS PLANNING FOR AN ATTACK AGAINST US CONSULATE KARACHI AND FOR SHIPPING EXPLOSIVES INTO THE U.S. FROM PAKISTAN. SUBJ DID NOT REVEAL IMMINENT THREAT INFORMATION.

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4. SUBJ STILL CLAIMS PLANNING FOR AN ATTACK USING EXPLOSIVES AGAINST U.S. CONSULATE KARACHI WAS IN ITS NASCENT STAGES, BUT SAYS HE HAD CONFIRMED A U.S. PRESENCE SIGNIFICANT ENOUGH TO WARRANT SUCH AN ATTACK. SUBJ CONFIRMED THIS PRESENCE BY EXTENSIVE MONITORING OF KNOWN USG VEHICLES VIA THEIR LICENSE PLATES AT THE KUAMABAD CROSSING IN CLIFTON, KARACHI. SUBJ ALSO CLAIMED HE MONITORED VEHICLES ENTERING AND EXITING THE CONSULATE FOR "15 MINUTES" AS WELL.

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] SUBJ PAID 600,000 RUPEES FOR THE EXPLOSIVES TO "UP-COUNTRY SMUGGLERS" BY DEPOSITING THIS AMOUNT [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] SUBJ HAD NOT DECIDED ON HIS SPECIFIC METHOD OF EXPLOSIVE ATTACK, BUT WAS CONSIDERING THE FOLLOWING:

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

A. USING A HELICOPTER [REDACTED] AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED. SUBJ CLAIMED THIS WOULD BE A SUICIDE ATTACK AND THAT AQ HAD HELICOPTER PILOTS IN AFGHANISTAN (NFI) WHICH COULD BE USED. SUBJ ALSO EXPLORED HELICOPTER FLIGHT TRAINING AT THE SHON FLYING CLUB IN KARACHI. HE DID NOT FOLLOW THROUGH SINCE IT WAS A 6-8 MONTH SCHOOL AND HE WANTED THE ATTACK TO OCCUR SOONER.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

B. DRIVING AN EXPLOSIVE LADEN MOTORBIKE INTO THE CONSULATE WALL, FOLLOWED BY AN EXPLOSIVE LADEN CAR THROUGH THE OPENING CREATED BY THE BIKE EXPLOSION.

C. CARJACKING A U.S. CONSULATE VEHICLE AND LOADING IT WITH EXPLOSIVES BEFORE ENTERING THE COMPOUND VIA THE MAIN ENTRANCE.

5. SUBJ FIRST MET SAIFULLAH ((PARACHA)) IN LATE 2000 WHEN INTRODUCED BY KSM AND CLAIMED PARACHA HAS "NO RELATION TO THIS BUSINESS" I.E. AL-QA'IDA. SUBJ WAS NOT AWARE HOW KSM KNEW PARACHA OR IF PARACHA HAD EVER MET UBL. SUBJ DID NOT ACKNOWLEDGE MEETINGS WITH THE PARACHA'S AND KARACHI-BASED SCIENTISTS. DURING THIS FIRST MEETING AT PARACHA'S OFFICE THEY DISCUSSED EQUIPMENT NEEDED FOR EDITING FILMS. SUBJ NEXT MET PARACHA AT THE END OF 2001 OR EARLY 2002 AGAIN REGARDING MEDIA EQUIPMENT. DURING THIS SECOND MEETING SUBJ LEARNED THAT KSM HAD GIVEN PARACHA USD 500,000 FOR SAFEKEEPING FOR A ONE YEAR. DURING SUBJ'S NEXT MEETING WITH PARACHA AND MAJID ((KHAN)) THEY DISCUSSED THE MECHANICS OF SHIPPING UNSPECIFIED GOODS FROM PAKISTAN TO THE U.S. SUBJ INTENDED TO SHIP EXPLOSIVES, BUT CLAIMS HE DID NOT ADVISE PARACHA NOR INTEND TO USE PARACHA'S COMPANY FOR THESE SHIPMENTS. SUBJ ALSO MET WITH PARACHA AND HIS SON UZAIR REGARDING ASSISTANCE WITH MAJID'S U.S. IMMIGRATION DOCUMENTS.

6. SUBJ CLAIMED EXPLOSIVES WERE NOT NECESSARY FOR MAJID'S GAS STATION EXPLOSION PLOT AS THE IN-GROUND TANKS PROVIDED AMPLE EXPLOSIVE THEMSELVES. ALSO, MAJID WAS NOT THE INTENDED RECIPIENT OF THE EXPLOSIVES SUBJ INTENDED TO SHIP TO THE US. INSTEAD HE PLANNED TO HAVE AN ENGLISH SPEAKING, WHITE-SKINNED "BROTHER" RECEIVE THE EXPLOSIVES WHEN SHIPPED. SUBJ DID NOT HAVE AN OPERATIVE THAT FIT THE BILL CURRENTLY IN THE U.S., BUT KSM SUGGESTED ABU ((ISSA)) WOULD BE IDEAL DUE TO HIS APPEARANCE, LANGUAGE SKILLS, AND UK STATUS; SUBJ NEVER MET ABU ISSA. [REDACTED] ASKED SUBJ IF HE CONSIDERED USING JAFAR AL ((TAYYAR)) TO RECEIVE THE EXPLOSIVES, BUT SUBJ SAID HE DID NOT. [REDACTED]

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7. SUBJ CLAIMED HE DISCUSSED BLOWING UP BRIDGES WITH MAJID BUT THIS IDEA WAS NO LONGER BEING CONSIDERED. HE DID NOT ACKNOWLEDGE DISCUSSING ANY PLOT WITH MAJID INVOLVING POISONS, ANTHRAX, ETC.

8. SUBJ CLAIMED HE DID NOT KNOW THE CURRENT LOCATION OF MAQSOOD ((KHAN)) OR MANSOUR ((KHAN)). HE MET MANSOUR A MONTH AGO IN PESHAWAR AND MANSOUR SAID HE WAS ENROUTE TO AFGHANISTAN. SUBJ BELIEVED SALMAN ((KHAN)) MAY BE LIVING WITH HIS FATHER IN TANDO ALLAH YAR.

9. SUBJ'S ONLY ASSOCIATE IN IRAN IS HIS BROTHER HASHIM ABD'AL-((AZIZ)) WHO IS 32-YEARS OLD AND MARRIED WITH THREE CHILDREN. HE CLAIMS ALL HIS ASSOCIATES WHO WERE IN IRAN HAVE RELOCATED TO SAUDI ARABIA.

10. SUBJ WOULD NOT IDENTIFY ANY OF HIS RESIDENCES OR SAFEHOUSES BESIDES USMAN'S AND SHAKIR'S WHICH WERE IDENTIFIED BY MAJID. SUBJ CLAIMED HE LIVED WITH USMAN OFF AND ON UNTIL MAJID'S ARREST.

11. SUBJ SAID HE LIVED AT AAFIA ((SIDDQUI))'S HOME WITH HIS TWO UNMARRIED SISTERS AND BROTHER SALEH UNTIL SALEH CAME UNDER SURVEILLANCE. HE SAID HE LEFT A COMPUTER AT AAFIA'S, BUT REMOVED THE HARD DRIVE AND GAVE IT TO ((KHAJA)) AKA ((TALHA)) WHO WAS PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED BY MAJID AS A DRIVER FOR SUBJ.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

Date: 20020808

TO: ALEC, DIRECTOR

FROM:

SUBJECT: (b)(1) [] CURRENT LOCATION AND INFORMATION ON ABU ISSA AL-PAKISTANI
(b)(3) NatSecAct

----- BODY -----

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TOR: 081717Z AUG 02 (b)(1) [] 80508

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

CITE [] 80508 [] (b)(3) NatSecAct

TO: IMMEDIATE ALEC, DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE [] (b)(1)
[] (b)(3) NatSecAct

FOR: [] (b)(1)
[] (b)(3) CIAAct
[] (b)(3) NatSecAct

SUBJECT: [] CURRENT LOCATION AND INFORMATION ON ABU
ISSA AL-PAKISTANI

REF: [] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct
[] (b)(3) NatSecAct

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: REQUEST ALEC/HQS INFORMATION ON POSSIBLE

(b)(3) CIAAct

CURRENT WHEREABOUTS OF ABU ISSA

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

4. WE HAVE NO CURRENT INTELLIGENCE AS TO THE WHEREABOUTS OF ABU ISSA.
NATURALLY WE ARE KEEN TO IDENTIFY HIM AND WOULD APPRECIATE ANY
FURTHER DETAILS

(b)(1)

5. MANY THANKS. KIND REGARDS.

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

END OF MESSAGE

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1502-1

Date: 20030331

TO: HQSDISSEM

FROM:

SUBJECT: CT: KHALID SHAYKH MUHAMMAD'S COMMENTS ON HIS PLANS TO TARGET U.S.
INFRASTRUCTURE TARGETS

----- BODY -----

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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TOT: 312243Z MAR 03

DIRECTOR

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

INTEL 312243Z DIRECTOR

TO: IMMEDIATE HQSDISSEM.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

REPORT CLASS ~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ ~~NOFORN~~

DIST: 31 MARCH 2003

COUNTRY: UNITED STATES

SUBJ: CT: KHALID SHAYKH MUHAMMAD'S COMMENTS ON HIS PLANS TO
TARGET U.S. INFRASTRUCTURE TARGETS

DOI: 1996 - MARCH 2003

SOURCE: A DETAINEE. (A DETAINEE)

SUMMARY: NONE. (b)(3) CIAAct

TEXT: 1. [] COMMENT: THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS FROM
SENIOR AL-QA'IDA OPERATIONAL PLANNER KHALID SHAYKH ((MUHAMMAD))
AKA ((MUKHTAR)) MAY HAVE BEEN MEANT TO INFLUENCE AS WELL AS
INFORM. MUKHTAR HAS ALSO BEEN KNOWN TO INTENTIONALLY WITHHOLD
INFORMATION AND EMPLOY COUNTERINTERROGATION TECHNIQUES.)

2. DURING A CUSTODIAL INTERVIEW ON 30 MARCH 2003, MUKHTAR
COMMENTED ON HIS PLANS TO TARGET THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF THE UNITED
STATES AND HIS OPERATIONAL MODUS OPERANDI. FROM 1996 UNTIL THE
TIME OF HIS CAPTURE, MUKHTAR IDENTIFIED INFRASTRUCTURE TARGETS FOR
ATTACK IN THE UNITED STATES BASED ALMOST SOLELY ON THE WORLD TIMES
ALMANAC (SIC). IN ADDITION TO USING THE ALMANAC TO TARGET NUCLEAR
POWER REACTORS IN THE UNITED STATES, MUKHTAR USED IT TO DEVELOP
POTENTIAL OPERATIONS AGAINST LARGE-SCALE WATER TREATMENT
FACILITIES, AND EXPANSES OF U.S. FOREST LAND SPANNING FOUR WESTERN
STATES.

3. MUKHTAR EXPLAINED THAT HIS CONCEPTS FOR OPERATIONS
TARGETING WATER RESERVOIRS AND WATER TREATMENT FACILITIES WERE NOT
AS DEVELOPED AS HIS PLAN FOR ATTACKING NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS.
MUKHTAR COULD NOT RECALL THE RESERVOIRS HE SELECTED FROM THE
ALMANAC, BUT NOTED THE BIGGER THEY WERE, THE BETTER, AND SAID THAT
HE HAD SET HIS EYES ON TARGETING THE LARGEST RESERVOIR LISTED IN
THE ALMANAC. []: MUKHTAR COULD NOT RECALL THE
SPECIFIC RESERVOIR, BUT WAS EMPHATIC THAT IT IS THE LARGEST ONE
LISTED IN THE ALMANAC AND SHOULD BE EASY TO FIND.) MUKHTAR HAD AT
ONE TIME WORKED IN LAHORE, PAKISTAN AS A WATER PLANNING ENGINEER
FOR A YEAR. BASED ON THIS EXPERIENCE, HE KNEW THERE WERE AT LEAST

(b)(3)
CIAAct

TWO WAYS TO TAMPER WITH THE WATER SUPPLY. THE FIRST METHOD WOULD BE TO PERMANENTLY DAMAGE THE HYDRAULIC PUMPS AND BACK-UP PUMPS OF A MAJOR RESERVOIR. EVEN IF THE PUMPS COULD BE REPLACED WITHIN A WEEK, CRIPPLING A LARGE-SCALE RESERVOIR WOULD LEAVE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF CITIZENS WITHOUT WATER, AND WOULD LEAVE THEM FEELING VULNERABLE TO FURTHER TERRORIST ATTACK. [REDACTED]: IT WAS MUKHTAR'S AND AL-QA'IDA'S GOAL TO MOUNT TERRORIST ATTACKS DIRECTLY AFFECTING THE U.S. ECONOMY AND U.S. CITIZENS, SINCE ONLY THEN WOULD CITIZENS PRESSURE THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO CHANGE ITS POLICIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST.)

(b)(3)
CIAAct

4. MUKHTAR'S SECOND APPROACH FOR ATTACKING WATER SUPPLIES INVOLVED INTRODUCING POISON INTO THE WATER. MUKHTAR REALIZED THAT CONTAMINATING A MAJOR WATER SUPPLY PRIOR TO CHLORINATION WOULD PROBABLY BE INEFFECTIVE. HOWEVER, INSERTING A CONTAMINATE INTO THE SYSTEM AFTER THE CHLORINATION PROCESS, OR EVEN HYPERCHLORINATING THE WATER BY RAISING TWO TO THREE-FOLD THE AMOUNT OF CHLORINE NORMALLY PUT INTO WATER, COULD CAUSE CONSIDERABLE HAVOC, EVEN IF ONLY TEN PERCENT OF THE POPULATION WAS MADE ILL. MUKHTAR HAD NOT WORKED OUT THE DETAILS OF THIS PLAN AND ADMITTED THAT DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE CONTAMINANT WOULD REQUIRE FURTHER RESEARCH. MUKHTAR WAS INTERESTED IN HAVING MAJID ((KHAN)) WORK ON THE WATER SUPPLY PROJECT, AS WELL AS A PROJECT TARGETING NUCLEAR REACTORS. HE DID NOT SHARE WITH KHAN ANY DETAILS ABOUT THESE OPERATIONS, AND TALKED TO KHAN IN ONLY GENERAL TERMS ABOUT KEEPING HIS MIND OPEN TO THE POSSIBILITY OF TARGETING REACTORS AND WATER SUPPLIES. [REDACTED] COMMENT: SEE [REDACTED] FOR INFORMATION ON MAJID KHAN AND HIS INVOLVEMENT IN PLANS TO TARGET THE U.S. WATER SUPPLY.)

(b)(3)
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5. MUKHTAR ALSO DEVELOPED A PLAN FOR SETTING FIRE TO FORESTS IN MONTANA, COLORADO, WYOMING, AND UTAH, HOPING TO CREATE DEVASTATION SIMILAR TO THE FIRES THAT RAVAGED AUSTRALIA IN 2002. HE HAD SPOKEN ABOUT THIS PLAN IN DETAIL WITH ((ABU ISSA AL-BRITANI)). MUKHTAR'S ORIGINAL PLAN CALLED FOR ABU ISSA TO TRAVEL TO THE UNITED STATES WITH THREE TO FOUR OTHER OPERATIVES. THE GROUP WOULD TIME THE FIRES TO OCCUR DURING MID-SUMMER, AND WOULD SET TIMED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES THROUGHOUT THE FORESTS AND GRASSLAND OF THESE FOUR U.S. STATES WITH THE INTENT TO CREATE MASSIVE FIRES THAT WOULD DEVASTATE LARGE TRACTS OF WOODLAND, FARMLAND, AND CIVILIAN HOUSING AREAS. THE TIMED CHARGES WOULD NOT DETONATE UNTIL THE GROUP HAD SAFELY DEPARTED THE UNITED STATES. MUKHTAR BELIEVED THAT SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE TO THE U.S. ECONOMY WOULD RESULT, AND ONCE IT WAS REALIZED THAT THE FIRES WERE TERRORIST ACTS, U.S. CIVILIANS WOULD PUT PRESSURE ON THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO CHANGE ITS POLICIES. ALTHOUGH MUKHTAR WANTED ABU ISSA TO TRAVEL TO THE UNITED STATES WITH THE SPECIFIC INTENT OF CARRYING OUT THIS OPERATION, USAMA BIN LADIN INSTEAD INSTRUCTED ABU ISSA TO TRAVEL TO THE UNITED STATES, REGISTER AS A STUDENT, AND CASE JEWISH TARGETS IN NEW YORK FOR AL-QA'IDA.

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END OF MESSAGE

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

END OF MESSAGE

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Date:

TO: (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

FROM:

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - FOLLOW-UP ON DETAILS REGARDING U.K.-BASED ABU ISSA AL-BRITANI

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TOT: 260043Z JUN 03

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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STAFF

260043Z ALEC (b)(3) NatSecAct

TO: IMMEDIATE INFO DIRECTOR.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

FROM:

(b)(3) NatSecAct

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - FOLLOW-UP ON DETAILS REGARDING U.K.-BASED
ABU ISSA AL-BRITANI

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

REF: (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: 1) PLEASE POSE BELOW FOLLOW-ON
QUESTIONS TO KSM REGARDING ABU ISSA'S TRAVEL2. ALEC/HQS APPRECIATES REF A FOLLOW-UP REGARDING KSM'S
KNOWLEDGE OF ((ABU ISSA AL-BRITANI)) AKA ((ISSA AL-HINDI)) AND(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

OTHER POTENTIAL US/UK OPERATIVES.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

5. WE BELIEVE KSM KNOWS MORE REGARDING THIS U.S. CONNECTION THAT HE IS PRESENTLY DIVULGING. IN RUNNING TO GROUND U.S. NEXUSES, WE FIND ISSA'S TRIP IN MARCH/APRIL 2001 MOST INTERESTING. IF ISSA WAS ONLY TO STAY IN THE U.S. FOR A FEW MONTHS, AS KSM HAS PROPOSED IN HIS RECENT DEBRIEFINGS ON THIS TOPIC, WHY WAS ISSA TASKED TO ENROLL IN A UNIVERSITY IN NEW YORK DURING THIS TIMEFRAME? DID KSM ADVISE THAT HE DO THIS AND IF SO, AT WHAT NEW YORK UNIVERSITY MIGHT ISSA HAVE ENROLLED? WHY WOULD ISSA BE ADVISED TO ENROLL IF HE ARRIVED IN MARCH/APRIL AND WAS PLANNING ON RETURNING TO THE U.K. IN MAY/JUNE 2001?

6. FABRICATION: ALEC/HQS ALSO WOULD LIKE KSM TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF HIS PREVIOUS STATEMENTS IN WHICH HE SAID HE HAD TASKED ISSA TO RECRUIT BLACK AMERICAN MUSLIM CONVERTS IN MONTANA. REF INDICATED THAT KSM SAID HE FABRICATED THIS INFORMATION, BUT WE NEED HIM TO CLARIFY EXACTLY WHICH PARTS OF THE STORY ARE TRUE AND WHICH ARE NOT. WE CONSIDER THESE ADMISSIONS OF FABRICATIONS TO BE ANOTHER RESISTANCE/MANIPULATION PLOY THAT WE WILL ADDRESS IN GREATER DETAIL OVERALL IN SEPARATE CABLE, BUT AS ALWAYS WELCOME BASE'S COMMENTS ON KSM'S CONVENIENT EXCUSES THAT HE FELT "FORCED" TO MAKE THESE ADMISSIONS.) OF COURSE, AL-QA'IDA HAS LONG BEEN TARGETING BLACK AMERICAN MUSLIM COVERTS FOR RECRUITMENT. IN THE WORDS OF ABU ZUBAYDAH, AL-QA'IDA CONSIDERS AFRICAN AMERICANS TO BE LIKE "TIME BOMBS" READY TO EXPLODE BECAUSE OF RACIAL DIVISIONS IN US SOCIETY. IF ISSA WAS NOT TASKED WITH THIS RECRUITMENT, WAS ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL TASKED TO RECRUIT BLACK AMERICAN MUSLIM CONVERTS INTO AL-QA'IDA'S RANKS? DID ISSA IN FACT TRAVEL TO

(b)(3)
CIAAct

MONTANA? IF SO, WITH WHOM DID HE TRAVEL AND BY WHAT MEANS DID HE GET THERE? WHY MONTANA? DO THEY CONSIDER THERE ARE PRO-AL-QA'IDA ENCLAVES IN THAT STATE THAT SUPPORT ITS U.S.-BASED OPERATIONS? WHO IS THE KEY CONTACT PERSON IN MONTANA? WHY DID KSM FABRICATE THE INFORMATION ON ISSA'S TASKING TO RECRUIT THESE CONVERTS IN MONTANA? DO BLACK AMERICAN MUSLIMS SERVE AS BODYGUARDS FOR LONDON-BASED SHAYKH ((ABU HAMZA AL-MASRI))? IF SO, DO THESE BLACK AMERICAN MUSLIMS HAVE RELATIVES/FAMILY MEMBERS/ASSOCIATES IN MONTANA? OR ELSEWHERE IN THE U.S.? KSM LATER EXPLAINED THAT THESE MEN WERE JUST TWO AMERICAN JIHADISTS HE HAD HEARD ABOUT DURING THE AFGHAN JIHAD AND THAT THESE AMERICAN JIHADISTS WERE NOT/NOT ASSOCIATED WITH LONDON-BASED ABU HAMZA, ISSA AL-BRITANI, OR MONTANA. IF THIS IS SO, THEN WHAT ELSE DOES HE KNOW ABOUT THESE "AMERICAN JIHADISTS"?

7. FROM REF D, WHEN KSM CLAIMED THAT IN 1999 HE SENT ABU ISSA TO THE UNITED STATES ON A LONG-TERM PROGRAM TO CONDUCT SURVEILLANCE ON TARGETS IN NEW YORK AND TO RECRUIT AFRICAN-AMERICAN ISLAM CONVERTS, WHY DID KSM WEAVE THIS TAIL? DID KSM SEND SOMEONE ELSE ON SUCH A TRIP OR DID THIS TRIP NEVER OCCUR? BEFORE TRAVELING TO THE UNITED STATES, KSM CLAIMED ABU ISSA TRAVELED TO THE UNITED KINGDOM, WHERE HE WAS SAID TO HAVE MET WITH SHAYKH ((ABU HAMZA AL-MASRI)) AKA MUSTAPHA ((KAMEL)), IMAM OF FINSBURY PARK MOSQUE, TO SEEK ABU HAMZA'S ADVICE ON RECRUITING AFRICAN-AMERICAN MUSLIMS. ACCORDING TO KSM, ABU HAMZA WAS THE IMAM OF A LARGE WELL-KNOWN MOSQUE IN LONDON, WITH A COTERIE OF BLACK MUSLIM BODYGUARDS. PLEASE HAVE KSM REVISIT THIS ISSUE AND EXTRACT WHAT PARTS HE CAN RECOUNT WITH ANY ACCURACY TO HELP DIFFERENTIATE FACT FROM FICTION.

8. REGARDING KSM'S REF A ASSERTION THAT ISSA PRESUMABLY FLEW INTO NEW YORK IN MARCH/APRIL 2001, BUT THEN WAS PLANNING TO STAY WITH HIS SISTER IN VIRGINIA, WE QUERY WHETHER AND HOW ISSA TRAVELLED TO VIRGINIA, AND WHETHER HE MET UP WITH ANY ASSOCIATES DURING HIS TIME IN THE U.S. BEFORE TRAVELING TO VIRGINIA, DID ISSA STAY IN NEW YORK? IF SO, WHERE DID HE STAY AND WHO DID HE MEET THERE?

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TO THE U.S.? IF STATION CAN PRESS KSM ON THE ISSUE OF WHAT TYPES OF PASSPORTS EITHER ISSA OR HIS SISTER USED, AND HOW THEY MIGHT HAVE OBTAINED THESE PASSPORTS, THIS WOULD BE GREATLY APPRECIATED.

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(b)(3) CIAAct
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9. WE APPRECIATE BASE'S EFFORTS IN ATTEMPTING TO OBTAIN THIS INFORMATION. WE ALSO APPRECIATE BASE'S EFFORTS OF IMPRESSING UPON KSM THE NEED TO PROVIDE TRUTHFUL AND COMPREHENSIVE ANSWERS TO ALL QUESTIONS TO ENSURE HIS BEST OUTCOME.

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END OF MESSAGE

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1314-256-1

Date: 20020423
TO:
FROM: CTC

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - UPDATE ON "KENYAN" AND "AMERICAN" IDENTIFIED BY ABU ZUBAYDAH AS PARTICIPANTS IN URANIUM DEVICE PLOT

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

TO:

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

FROM:

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - UPDATE ON "KENYAN" AND "AMERICAN" IDENTIFIED BY ABU ZUBAYDAH AS PARTICIPANTS IN URANIUM DEVICE PLOT

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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

TEXT:

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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

2. SUMMARY: IN REFS C THROUGH F INTERROGATION SUMMARIES, SENIOR AL-QA'IDA OPERATIONS OFFICER AND KEY UBL LIEUTENANT ((ABU ZUBAYDAH)) (AZ) HAS PROVIDED INFORMATION ON A POTENTIAL TERRORIST PLAN INVOLVING THE USE OF AN EXPLOSIVE DEVICE CONTAINING URANIUM

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
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THE TWO SUPPOSEDLY DOWNLOADED THE BOMB PLANS OFF THE
INTERNET

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(b)(3) CIAAct
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3. AZ IDENTIFIED THE "KENYAN" AS TALHA AL-((KINI)), AND THE "AMERICAN" AS ABDALLAH AL-((MUJAHIR)) (VARIAT - MUHAJIR) AKA ABU ABDALLAH AL-((AMRIKI)).

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

PER REF G, DURING AN

INTERROGATION SESSION THAT COVERED THE EVENING OF APRIL 22 AND
EARLY MORNING OF APRIL 23, AZ POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED THE "KENYAN"
AS ZOUAOUI AND THE "AMERICAN" AS PADILLA. [REDACTED]

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END OF MESSAGE

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(b)(3) CIAAct
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TOT: 251609Z JUL 02

DIRECTOR ☐ (b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

251609Z DIRECTOR ☐ (b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: THIS CABLE PROVIDES FORMAL AUTHORIZATION TO PROCEED WITH PORTIONS OF THE NEXT PHASE OF THE INTERROGATION OF ABU ZUBAYDAH. FORMAL APPROVAL FOR THE REMAINDER WILL FOLLOW ONCE WE HAVE RECEIVED APPROVAL FROM THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT. HQS DEFERS TO ☐ AS TO WHETHER TO PROCEED WITH THE PARTIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEXT PHASE AT THIS TIME OR TO AWAIT FINAL JUSTICE DEPARTMENT APPROVAL FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE TECHNIQUES.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

2. BACKGROUND. CIA PLANS TO IMPLEMENT MORE AGGRESSIVE TECHNIQUES IN OUR INTERROGATION OF ((ABU ZUBAYDAH)), IN ORDER TO OBTAIN ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE ABOUT AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVES IN THE

UNITED STATES AND PLANNED AL-QA'IDA LETHAL ATTACKS AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS AND U.S. INTERESTS. THE INTERROGATION TEAM HAS CONCLUDED THAT ABU ZUBAYDAH CONTINUES TO WITHHOLD CRITICAL THREAT INFORMATION, INCLUDING THE IDENTITIES OF AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVES IN THE UNITED STATES; THAT IN ORDER TO PERSUADE HIM TO PROVIDE THOSE IDENTITIES, THE USE OF MORE AGGRESSIVE TECHNIQUES IS REQUIRED; AND THAT THE USE OF THOSE TECHNIQUES WILL NOT ENGENDER LASTING AND SEVERE MENTAL OR PHYSICAL HARM.

-- SOME OF THESE TECHNIQUES INCORPORATE MILD PHYSICAL PRESSURE, WHILE OTHERS MAY PLACE ABU ZUBAYDAH IN FEAR FOR HIS LIFE. IT IS NOT INTENDED, HOWEVER, THAT ABU ZUBAYDAH ACTUALLY SUFFER SEVERE PHYSICAL OR MENTAL PAIN; IN ADDITION, APPROPRIATELY TRAINED MEDICAL PERSONNEL WILL BE PRESENT THROUGHOUT THE PROCESS.

-- THE USG STAFF EMPLOYEES ENGAGED IN THE INTERROGATION OF ABU ZUBAYDAH ARE COMPLEMENTED BY EXPERT PERSONNEL RETAINED ON CONTRACT WHO POSSESS EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE, GAINED WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, ON THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PHYSICAL METHODS OF INTERROGATION AND THE RESISTANCE TECHNIQUES EMPLOYED AS COUNTERMEASURES TO SUCH INTERROGATION.

-- ALTHOUGH THE INTERROGATION PROCESS HAS PRODUCED A LIMITED AMOUNT OF SUCCESS TO DATE, ABU ZUBAYDAH REMAINS ADROIT AT APPLYING A HOST OF RESISTANCE TECHNIQUES. HE IS THE AUTHOR OF A SEMINAL AL-QA'IDA MANUAL ON RESISTANCE TO INTERROGATION METHODS, AND THE AGENCY ASSESSES HE CONTINUES TO WITHHOLD CRITICAL, ACTIONABLE INFORMATION ABOUT THE IDENTITIES OF AL-QA'IDA PERSONNEL DISPATCHED TO THE UNITED STATES AND ABOUT PLANNED AL-QA'IDA TERRORIST ATTACKS. SIMPLY STATED, COUNTLESS MORE AMERICANS MAY DIE UNLESS WE CAN PERSUADE AZ TO TELL US WHAT HE KNOWS.

-- OUR ATTORNEYS HAVE PRESENTED THESE DETERMINATIONS AND OUR LEGAL ANALYSIS TO THE LEGAL ADVISER TO THE NSC, TO THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL AT THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND TO THE CRIMINAL DIVISION AT JUSTICE. THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO FBI DIRECTOR MUELLER ALSO HAS PARTICIPATED IN THESE DISCUSSIONS, AND THE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN BRIEFED AS WELL.

3. DISCUSSION. WE HAVE SECURED FORMAL APPROVAL FROM THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL TO EMPLOY THE CONFINEMENT BOX, AS DESCRIBED IN REF, IN THE COURSE OF THE INTERROGATION OF ABU ZUBAYDAH. WE ALSO HAVE SECURED FORMAL APPROVAL FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO EMPLOY THE FOLLOWING TECHNIQUES, WHICH ARE MORE FULLY DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 5 BELOW: THE ATTENTION GRASP; WALLING; FACIAL HOLD; FACIAL SLAP (INSULT SLAP); CRAMPED CONFINEMENT; WALL STANDING; STRESS POSITIONS; SLEEP DEPRIVATION; USE OF DIAPERS; AND USE OF HARMLESS INSECTS. WE NOTE THAT THESE TECHNIQUES ARE USED ON U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL DURING SERE TRAINING (WITH THE EXCEPTION OF DIAPERS AND REAL INSECTS. -- ALTHOUGH SERE TRAINING DOES MAKE USE OF SIMULATED SNAKES, INSECTS, ET CETERA, AS WELL AS FORCED

CROSS-DRESSING). A MEDICAL EXPERT WITH SERE EXPERIENCE WILL BE PRESENT THROUGHOUT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE PROCEDURES. PER THE SERE PSYCHOLOGISTS, THE ANTICIPATION OF THESE TECHNIQUES IS OFTEN WORSE THEN THE ACTIONS THEMSELVES.

4. PLEASE NOTE THAT WE STILL ARE AWAITING FINAL JUSTICE DEPARTMENT APPROVAL FOR THE USE OF THE WATER BOARD AND/OR THE USE OF MOCK BURIAL AS PART OF A THREAT AND RESCUE SCENARIO. WE DEFER TO AS TO WHETHER TO AWAIT THAT APPROVAL BEFORE COMMENCING THE NEXT PHASE OF THE INTERROGATION.

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5. IN ADDITION TO THE CONFINEMENT BOX DESCRIBED IN REF, THE INTERROGATION TEAM IS AUTHORIZED TO EMPLOY ANY OR ALL OF THE FOLLOWING TECHNIQUES:

-- ATTENTION GRASP: IN A CONTROLLED AND QUICK MOTION, GRASP THE INDIVIDUAL WITH BOTH HANDS, ONE ON EACH SIDE OF THE COLLAR OPENING. IN THE SAME MOTION, DRAW THE INDIVIDUAL TOWARD YOU.

-- WALLING: THE INDIVIDUAL IS STOOD IN FRONT OF A SPECIALLY CONSTRUCTED FLEXIBLE WALL. THE INDIVIDUAL'S HEELS TOUCH THE WALL. THE INDIVIDUAL IS PULLED FORWARD AND THEN QUICKLY AND FIRMLY PUSHED INTO THE WALL. THE HEAD AND NECK ARE SUPPORTED WITH A ROLLED HOOD OR TOWEL THAT PROVIDES A C-COLLAR EFFECT TO HELP PREVENT WHIPLASH. CONTACT WITH THE WALL IS MADE WITH THE INDIVIDUAL'S SHOULDER BLADES. TO REDUCE THE PROBABILITY OF INJURY, THE INDIVIDUAL IS ALLOWED TO REBOUND FROM THE WALL.

-- FACIAL HOLD: ONE OPEN PALM IS PLACED ON EITHER SIDE OF THE INDIVIDUAL'S FACE, FINGERTIPS WELL AWAY FROM THE INDIVIDUAL'S EYES. THE GOAL IS TO HOLD THE HEAD IMMOBILE.

-- FACIAL SLAP (INSULT SLAP): THE SLAP IS DELIVERED WITH FINGERS SLIGHTLY SPREAD. CONTACT SHOULD BE MADE WITH THE AREA DIRECTLY BETWEEN THE TIP OF THE CHIN AND THE BOTTOM OF THE CORRESPONDING EARLOBE. THE GOAL OF THE FACIAL SLAP IS TO INDUCE SHOCK AND SURPRISE, NOT SEVERE OR LASTING PAIN.

-- CRAMPED CONFINEMENT: INDIVIDUALS ARE PLACED IN A CONFINED SPACE THE DIMENSION OF WHICH RESTRICTS MOVEMENT. THE CONTAINER IS USUALLY DARK. INDIVIDUALS MAY BE KEPT IN LARGER CONFINEMENT SPACES FOR UP TO 18 HOURS, AND SMALLER CONFINEMENT BOXES FOR ONE HOUR.

-- WALL STANDING: THIS TECHNIQUE IS USED TO INDUCE FATIGUE. THE INDIVIDUAL STANDS APPROXIMATELY 4 OR 5 FEET FROM A WALL, WITH HIS FEET SPREAD APPROXIMATELY SHOULDER WIDTH. WITH ARMS OUT STRETCHED IN FRONT, FINGERS RESTING ON THE WALL SUPPORTING BODY WEIGHT. INDIVIDUALS ARE NOT ALLOWED TO MOVE OR REPOSITION THEIR FEET OR HANDS.

-- STRESS POSITIONS: A VARIETY OF STRESS POSITIONS ARE POSSIBLE. THEY FOCUS ON PRODUCING MILD PHYSICAL DISCOMFORT FROM PROLONGED MUSCLE USE, RATHER THAN PAIN ASSOCIATED WITH CONTORTIONS OR TWISTING OF THE BODY. THE TWO DISCUSSED WERE (1) ABU ZUBAYDAH SITTING ON THE FLOOR WITH LEGS EXTENDED STRAIGHT OUT IN FRONT OF HIM WITH HIS ARMS RAISED ABOVE HIS HEAD; AND (2) HAVING ABU ZUBAYDAH KNEEL ON THE FLOOR AND LEAN BACK AT A 45 DEGREE ANGLE.

-- SLEEP DEPRIVATION: PREVENTING SLEEP IS INTENDED TO HAVE THE EFFECT OF REDUCING ABU ZUBAYDAH'S ABILITY TO THINK ON HIS FEET AND TO MOTIVATE HIM TO COOPERATE BECAUSE OF THE DISCOMFORT ASSOCIATED WITH THE LACK OF SLEEP. FOR MOST PEOPLE, THE EFFECTS OF SLEEP DEPRIVATION REMIT AFTER ONE OR TWO NIGHTS OF UNINTERRUPTED SLEEP. IN RARE CIRCUMSTANCES, INDIVIDUALS PREDISPOSED TO PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS MAY DISPLAY ABREACTIONS, BUT THESE TOO GENERALLY REMIT AFTER THE INDIVIDUAL SLEEPS. THE RECORD (GUINNESS BOOK OF WORLD RECORDS) FOR VOLUNTARY SLEEP DEPRIVATION IS 205 HOURS WITH THE SUBJECT SHOWING NO SIGNIFICANT PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS AND QUICK RECOVERY AFTER ONE OR TWO DAYS OF SLEEP.

-- USE OF DIAPERS: ABU ZUBAYDAH APPEARS TO BE VERY FASTIDIOUS. HE SPENDS MUCH TIME CLEANING HIMSELF AND SEEMS TO GO OUT OF HIS WAY TO AVOID CIRCUMSTANCES LIKELY TO BRING HIM IN CONTACT WITH POTENTIALLY UNCLEAN OBJECTS OR MATERIAL. HE IS VERY SENSITIVE TO SITUATIONS THAT REFLECT A LOSS OF STATUS OR ARE POTENTIALLY HUMILIATING. ONE WAY TO LEVERAGE HIS CONCERNS, WHILE HELPING ENSURE HIS WOUND DOES NOT BECOME INFECTED WITH HUMAN WASTE WHEN IN CRAMPED CONFINEMENT IS TO PLACE HIM IN AN ADULT DIAPER. IF SOILED, CARE WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN TO KEEP HUMAN WASTE OUT OF HIS LEG WOUND.

-- INSECTS: ABU ZUBAYDAH APPEARS TO HAVE A FEAR OF INSECTS. ONE POSSIBILITY IS TO THREATEN TO PLACE STINGING INSECTS INTO THE CRAMPED CONFINEMENT BOX WITH HIM, BUT INSTEAD PLACE HARMLESS INSECTS. THE PURPOSE OF THIS WOULD BE TO PLAY OFF HIS FEARS AND INCREASE HIS SENSE OF DREAD AND MOTIVATE HIM TO AVOID THE BOX IN THE FUTURE BY COOPERATING WITH THE INTERROGATOR'S REQUESTS.

6. WE WILL ADVISE BY IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE ONCE WE HAVE A FINAL DETERMINATION ON THE WATER BOARD AND/OR THE MOCK BURIAL SCENARIO. BEST REGARDS AND GOOD LUCK.

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END OF MESSAGE

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SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - [] ON ABU ZUBAYDAH AS OF 2300 HOURS []

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SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - [] ON ABU ZUBAYDAH AS OF 2300 HOURS []

TIME) 18 JUNE 2002

REF: A. [] 10484

B. [] 10482

C. [] 10483

D. [] 10300

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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TEXT: (b)(3) NatSecAct

1. ACTION REQUIRED: -- PLEASE ENSURE THAT SUBSTANTIVE PORTIONS
OF INFORMATION BELOW ARE SHARED WITH FBI HQS MARKED ATTENTION []

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2. OVERALL STATE OF PLAY: AFTERNOON OF 18 JUNE 02,
INTERROGATION TEAM MEMBERS [REDACTED] AND
FBI SA (b)(6) [REDACTED] DELIVERED A CAREFULLY SCRIPTED MESSAGE TO ABU
ZUBAYDAH (SUBJECT) AS OUTLINED IN REF B. THE SESSION WAS SHORT AND
DELIBERATE LASTING FROM 1335 - 1350 HOURS. [REDACTED]

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THE TONE OF THE COMMENTS BY THE
INTERROGATORS WAS PROFESSIONAL AND BUSINESSLIKE. THE TONE OF THE
SUBJECT'S RESPONSES WERE FRUSTRATED AND AT TIMES MILDLY ANXIOUS.

SUBJECT SAT ON HIS MAT, PRAYED, AND DRANK WATER DURING THE HOUR OR TWO THAT PRECEDED THE "CRISIS PRECIPITATION" EVENT. AT 15:15, THE "CRISIS PRECIPITATION" EVENT BEGAN AS SIX SECURITY STAFF ENTERED THE SUBJECT'S CELL, HANDCUFFED HIM HIGH ON THE BARS, AND THEN HOODED HIM. THE TEAM IC PSYCHOLOGIST THEN ENTERED THE CELL AND PROCEEDED TO CUT THE SUBJECT'S CLOTHES FROM HIM FOLLOWING THE SAME PROCEDURE USED ON 19 MAY. THE SUBJECT WAS THEN RELEASED FROM THE BARS AND HAD HIS HANDS CUFFED BEHIND HIS BACK. THE IC TEAM PSYCHOLOGIST THEN PULLED THE SUBJECT TOWARD HIM USING A CONTROLLED ATTENTION GRAB (AS ROUTINELY USED IN SERE PROGRAM) AND SIMULTANEOUSLY DELIVERED A MESSAGE CONTAINING THE AGREED UPON THEMES, ESSENTIALLY TELLING THE SUBJECT THAT NO ONE WOULD TOLERATE BEING JERKED AROUND BY HIM ANYMORE WHEN THEY ASK FOR INFORMATION. SUBJECT WAS THEN TURNED BACK AROUND TOWARD THE BARS AND HANDCUFFED IN THE ROUTINE FASHION. THE IC TEAM PSYCHOLOGIST AND ALL BUT TWO OF THE SECURITY STAFF DEPARTED THE CELL. SUBJECT WAS RELEASED FROM HIS HANDCUFFS, UNHOODED, AND LEFT ALONE IN HIS CELL. THE "CRISIS PRECIPITATION" EVENT SCENARIO CONCLUDED AT 16:01. AFTER BEING LEFT ALONE, SUBJECT SLOWLY TURNED FROM THE CELL BARS AND APPEARED SOMEWHAT BEFUDDLED AND UNSETTLED. AFTER STANDING MOTIONLESS FOR SEVERAL SECONDS, HE SLOWLY STEPPED BACKWARDS AND EFFORTLESSLY LOWERED HIMSELF TO A SITTING POSITION. HE PULLED HIS LEGS UP CLOSE TO HIS BODY AND LEANED HIS BACK AGAINST THE WALL. HE SAT THERE LOOKING DEJECTED AND DISTRESSED. OUR ASSESSMENT OF HIS EMOTIONAL RESPONSES IS THAT HE WAS INITIALLY ANXIOUS, BUT THEN BECAME ANGRY WHEN HE REALIZED THAT HE HAD NOT ACTUALLY BEEN HARMED. HIS ATTITUDE AND DEMEANOR SUGGESTS THAT, AFTER HE REALIZED HE WASN'T GOING TO BE HURT, HE WAS INSULTED THAT WE WOULD TREAT HIM THAT WAY AND STARTED TO SULK.

ASSESSING SUBJECT'S RESISTANCE POSTURE:

BASED ON AN ONGOING ASSESSMENT OF THE SUBJECT'S BEHAVIOR PATTERNS [REDACTED] A DECISION BY THE TEAM WAS MADE TO ASSESS THE SUBJECT'S RESISTANCE POSTURE AND GIVE HIM A FACE SAVING OPPORTUNITY TO PROVIDE THE REQUESTED THREAT INFORMATION. [REDACTED]

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THIS SESSION ENDED WITH THE SUBJECT SAYING, "WHAT I HAVE, I GIVE IT ALL...I HAVE NO MORE." IT IS OUR OPINION THAT THE SUBJECT IS IN PART ATTEMPTING TO DEMONSTRATE TO HIS CAPTORS THAT USING PHYSICAL THREATS AGAINST HIM IS COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE.

AT THIS JUNCTURE, THE ISOLATION PHASE WAS STARTED. NEEDLESS TO SAY WE WILL CAREFULLY MONITOR SUBJECT'S BEHAVIOR AND REACTIONS OVER THE NEXT 24 HOURS.

4. THREAT UPDATE: NO NEW THREAT INFORMATION TO REPORT AS OF THIS WRITING.

5. MEDICAL UPDATE: SUBJECT'S DRESSING WAS CHANGED X.1. THE WOUND IS HEALING WELL AND VITAL SIGNS ARE STABLE. SUBJECT'S CONDITION REMAINS UNCHANGED.

6. MINIMIZE CONDITIONS CONSIDERED.

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END OF MESSAGE

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(b)(3) CIAAct

CITE 73208

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TO:

FOR: (b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - COMMENTS ON PROPOSED ENHANCED INTERROGATION
PROCESS

REF: DIRECTOR 375769 (b)(3) NatSecAct

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: REQUEST HQS GUIDANCE.

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THERE IS
INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS TO INDICATE THAT SUBJECT HAS INFORMATION ON
TERRORIST THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES,

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WE ARE A NATION OF LAWS AND WE DO NOT WISH
TO PARSE WORDS. A BOTTOM LINE IN CONSIDERING THE NEW MEASURES
PROPOSED FOR USE AT IS THAT SUBJECT IS BEING HELD IN SOLITARY
CONFINEMENT, AGAINST HIS WILL, WITHOUT LEGAL REPRESENTATION, AS AN
ENEMY OF OUR COUNTRY, OUR SOCIETY AND OUR PEOPLE. THEREFORE, WHILE
THE TECHNIQUES DESCRIBED IN HQS MEETINGS AND BELOW ARE ADMINISTERED
TO STUDENT VOLUNTEERS IN THE U.S. IN A HARMLESS WAY, WITH NO
MEASURABLE IMPACT ON THE PSYCHE OF THE VOLUNTEER, WE DO NOT BELIEVE

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WE CAN ASSURE THE SAME HERE FOR A MAN FORCED THROUGH THESE PROCESSES AND WHO WILL BE MADE TO BELIEVE THIS IS THE FUTURE COURSE OF THE REMAINDER OF HIS LIFE. STATION, [REDACTED] COB AND [REDACTED] PERSONNEL WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT POSSIBLE TO INSURE THAT SUBJECT IS NOT PERMANENTLY PHYSICALLY OR MENTALLY HARMED BUT WE SHOULD NOT SAY AT THE OUTSET OF THIS PROCESS THAT THERE IS NO RISK. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] HE IS AN INCREDIBLY STRONG WILLED INDIVIDUAL WHICH IS WHY HE HAS RESISTED THIS LONG

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3. THE ABOVE SAID, WE DEFER TO EXPERTS AND AS REQUESTED REF, BELOW -- IN PARAS FOUR AND FIVE -- PLS FIND COMMENTS DRAFTED BY INTERROGATION TEAM MEMBERS, IC SERE PSYCHOLOGISTS [REDACTED] OF REF B, CONCERNING POINTS RAISED REF A. WE HOPE HQS FINDS THIS CLARIFICATION HELPFUL.

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4. IC SERE PSYCHOLOGISTS FEEDBACK: OUR ASSUMPTION IS THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS OPERATION IS TO ACHIEVE A HIGH DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE THAT SUBJECT IS NOT HOLDING BACK ACTIONABLE INFORMATION CONCERNING THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES BEYOND THAT WHICH SUBJECT HAS ALREADY PROVIDED. GIVEN HIS DEMONSTRATED ABILITIES, HIS CURRENT LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE, AND HIS RELUCTANCE TO PROVIDE THREAT INFORMATION -- AGAIN BEYOND THAT WHICH HE HAS ALREADY PROVIDED -- IC SERE PSYCHOLOGISTS RECOMMEND USING AN ESCALATING INTERROGATION STRATEGY THAT HAS A HIGH PROBABILITY OF OVERWHELMING SUBJECT'S ABILITY TO RESIST. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS, THE ESCALATION MUST CULMINATE WITH PRESSURE WHICH IS ABSOLUTELY CONVINCING. WE PROPOSE TO EMPLOY THE PRESSURES/TECHNIQUES IDENTIFIED AT HQS (MINUS THE MOCK BURIAL--SEE PARA SIX BELOW) IN CONCERTED FASHION TO OVERWHELM SUBJECT'S ABILITY TO RESIST BY LEADING HIM TO BELIEVE THAT HE CANNOT PREDICT OR CONTROL WHAT HAPPENS TO HIM. THE PLAN IS TO RAPIDLY OVERWHELM SUBJECT, WHILE STILL ALLOWING HIM THE OPTION TO CHOOSE TO COOPERATE AT ANY STAGE AS THE PRESSURE IS BEING RATCHETED UP. THE PLAN HINGES ON THE USE OF AN ABSOLUTELY CONVINCING TECHNIQUE. THE WATERBOARD MEETS THIS NEED. WITHOUT THE WATERBOARD, THE REMAINING PRESSURES WOULD CONSTITUTE A 50 PERCENT SOLUTION AND THEIR EFFECTIVENESS WOULD DISSIPATE PROGRESSIVELY OVER TIME AS SUBJECT FIGURES OUT THAT HE WILL NOT BE PHYSICALLY BEATEN AND AS HE ADAPTS TO CRAMPED CONFINEMENT.

5. EFFECTIVE USE OF THE WATERBOARD OVERWHELMS THE INDIVIDUAL'S ABILITY TO RESIST. IC SERE PSYCHOLOGISTS CONCUR WITH THE JPRA REPRESENTATIVE'S ASSERTION THAT IF USED TO PUSH STUDENTS TOO FAR IN TRAINING PROGRAMS, THE WATERBOARD CAN HAVE THE UNWANTED SIDE EFFECT OF REDUCING THE STUDENT'S CONFIDENCE IN HIS OR HER ABILITY TO RESIST IN ACTUAL CAPTIVITY AND INTERFERE WITH LEARNING. THE FACT THAT THE WATERBOARD OVERWHELMS MOST PEOPLE'S ABILITY TO RESIST IS PRECISELY WHY IC SERE PSYCHOLOGISTS THINK THIS PROCEDURE WOULD BE EFFECTIVE AGAINST THE RESISTANCE STRATEGIES SUCCESSFULLY EMPLOYED BY SUBJECT TO DATE. IC SERE PSYCHOLOGISTS ARE NOT AWARE OF ANY SPECIFIC STATISTICS REGARDING LONG TERM MENTAL HEALTH OUTCOMES OR CONSEQUENCES FROM USE OF WATERBOARD IN TRAINING. IC SERE PSYCHOLOGISTS DO KNOW THAT THE NAVY HAS NOT REPORTED ANY SIGNIFICANT LONG TERM MENTAL HEALTH CONSEQUENCES FROM USE OF THE WATERBOARD IN TRAINING. IC SERE PSYCHOLOGISTS ARE ALSO AWARE THAT JPRA -- WHICH IS THE OPR FOR EXECUTIVE OVERSIGHT OF ALL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) SERE SCHOOLS AND CHARGED WITH INSURING SAFETY OF THE TECHNIQUES USED IN TRAINING -- HAS NOT REPORTED ANY SIGNIFICANT LONG TERM MENTAL HEALTH CONSEQUENCES ASSOCIATED WITH USE OF THE WATERBOARD. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING THE USE OF THE WATERBOARD IN NAVY SERE SCHOOLS

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CAN BE OBTAINED FROM [REDACTED], THE JPRA SERE PSYCHOLOGIST; AND [REDACTED], THE WEST COAST NAVY SERE SCHOOL PSYCHOLOGIST. SPEAKING DIRECTLY TO THE ISSUE OF INDUCING SEVERE MENTAL PAIN OR SUFFERING, ANY PHYSICAL PRESSURE APPLIED TO EXTREMES CAN CAUSE SEVERE MENTAL PAIN OR SUFFERING. HOODING, THE USE OF LOUD MUSIC, SLEEP DEPRIVATION, CONTROLLING DARKNESS AND LIGHT, SLAPPING, WALLING, OR THE USE OF STRESS POSITIONS TAKEN TO EXTREME CAN HAVE THE SAME OUTCOME. THE SAFETY OF ANY TECHNIQUE LIES PRIMARILY IN HOW IT IS APPLIED AND MONITORED.

6. STATION [REDACTED] DEFER TO HQS ON USE OF THE MOCK BURIAL WHICH IS LESS CRUCIAL TO THE PROCESS. THIS APPROACH WAS SUGGESTED AT HQS AS ONE/ONE METHOD FOR TRANSITIONING SUBJECT FROM HIGH PRESSURE INTERROGATIONS TO A MORE DEBRIEFING-LIKE SETTING IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT THAT SUBJECT COULD SUCCESSFULLY RESIST THE WATERBOARD DURING THE HIGH PRESSURE PHASE. THERE ARE OTHER WAYS TO TRANSITION SUBJECT AND WE DO NOT NEED TO PURSUE THIS OPTION IF IT HOLDS UP THE APPROVAL PROCESS INORDINATELY.

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END OF MESSAGE

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SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - DETAILS RE 06 AUGUST 02 CYCLE OF INTERROGATIONS
OF ABU ZUBAYDAH

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE ENSURE THAT SUBSTANTIVE PORTIONS
OF INFORMATION BELOW ARE SHARED WITH FBI HQS MARKED ATTENTION:

2. DAY THREE OF THE ENHANCED INTERROGATION PHASE COMMENCED AT
1042 HOURS. ABU ZUBAYDAH (SUBJECT) SPENT THE PREVIOUS EVENING IN THE
LARGE CONFINEMENT BOX. PER THE CURRENT INTERROGATION STRATEGY
SUBJECT'S SLEEP CONTINUES TO BE DISRUPTED THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT. AT
1042 HOURS THE GUARDS AND IC SERE PSYCHOLOGISTS (INTERROGATORS)
ENTERED THE CELL AND SUBJECT WAS TAKEN OUT OF THE LARGE BOX. AS
DISCUSSED DURING THE 0900 HOURS STAFF MEETING, TEAM MEMBERS
IN CONSULTATION WITH THE MEDICAL STAFF CRAFTED A SCENARIO IN WHICH
SUBJECT COULD CLEAN HIS EXPOSED WOUND WITHOUT DISRUPTING THE
INTERROGATION PROCESS. FYI: AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED, SUBJECT'S
BANDAGE CAME COMPLETELY OFF WITHIN THE FIRST 4 HOURS OF THE ENHANCED
PHASE OF INTERROGATION. THE GUARDS SWAPPED OUT SUBJECT'S WRIST
SHACKLES, FOR A CLEAN PAIR, SINCE THEY OCCASIONALLY COME INTO CONTACT
WITH THE EXPOSED WOUND. SUBJECT WAS BROUGHT TO THE "WALLING" WALL.

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A ROLLED TOWEL WAS PLACED BEHIND SUBJECT'S NECK. WHEN ASKED WHAT WAS THE ONE THING SUBJECT DID NOT WANT US TO KNOW, SUBJECT DENIED HE WAS WITHHOLDING ANY INFORMATION. SUBJECT RECEIVED AN INSULT SLAP. SUBJECT WAS "WALLED" WHEN HE DENIED HAVING ANY INFORMATION TO STOP OPERATIONS AGAINST THE U.S.

3. THE INTERROGATORS DEMANDED THAT SUBJECT CLEAN HIS WOUND AS THEY HAD NO INTEREST IN GETTING ANY EXUDATE FROM HIS WOUND OR ANY OTHER OF HIS BODILY FUNCTIONS ON OR NEAR THEM. SUBJECT WAS PROVIDED 6 GAUZE PADS SOAKED IN BETADINE SOLUTION AND WAS TOLD IN A FIRM AND PERFUNCTORY MANNER THAT HE ONLY HAD A FEW MINUTES TO TAKE CARE OF HIMSELF. SUBJECT WAS TOLD THE PEOPLE WHO WERE FORMERLY TAKING CARE OF HIM HAD LEFT THE PREMISES AND THAT SUBJECT WAS TO GET THE JOB DONE AND NOT WASTE THE INTERROGATORS TIME. IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THIS BRIEF INTERLUDE, SUBJECT WAS WALLED WITH THE QUESTION, "WHAT IS IT THAT YOU DO NOT WANT US TO KNOW?" SUBJECT CONTINUED TO DENY THAT HE HAD ANY INFORMATION. AT 1110 HOURS THE INTERROGATOR WALKED SUBJECT INTO THE LARGE CONFINEMENT BOX AND PERFORMED AN ATTENTION GRAB. SUBJECT WAS BRIDGED INTO THE BOX WITH THE FOLLOWING PHRASE: WHAT INFORMATION DID SUBJECT HAVE AT THE TIME OF HIS ARREST WHICH WOULD STOP OPERATIONS.

4. AT 1130 HOURS SUBJECT WAS TAKEN OUT OF THE LARGE CONFINEMENT BOX AND HOODED. HE WAS BROUGHT TO THE "WALLING" WALL AND IN AN EFFORT TO CONTINUE TO DISLOCATE HIS EXPECTATIONS SUBJECT WAS LEFT STANDING HOODED IN THE PRESENCE OF THE GUARDS UNTIL 1209 HOURS. AT THAT TIME THE SECURITY TEAM MOVED SUBJECT BACK TO THE LARGE BOX, REMOVED THE HOOD, POINTED TO HIS WASTE BUCKET AND PLACED HIM BACK IN THE BOX. THE SECURITY TEAM HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED WITH THIS MOTION IN AN ATTEMPT TO GET SUBJECT TO RELIEVE HIS BLADDER.

5. AT 1246 HOURS THE INTERROGATORS BROUGHT THE WATER BOARD INTO THE CELL. THE LARGE BOX WAS OPENED AND SUBJECT WAS HOODED. SUBJECT'S HOOD WAS REMOVED AND SUBJECT MOVED ONTO THE WATER BOARD WITH NO RESISTANCE. SUBJECT BEGAN CRYING AS HE WAS TOLD THAT WE WANTED INFORMATION TO STOP OPERATIONS AGAINST THE U.S. SUBJECT WAS TOLD THAT HE COULD STOP THE PROCESS AT ANY TIME. SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH HIS APPEAL THAT HE HAS TOLD ALL THAT HE HAS AND MUTTERED "HELP

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BETWEEN 1250 AND 1315 THE WATER BOARD TECHNIQUE WAS APPLIED NUMEROUS TIMES. SUBJECT WAS PUT INTO THE LARGE BOX AT 1317 AND TAKEN BACK OUT AT 1321 HOURS AND PLACED ON THE WATER BOARD IN A SITTING POSITION. SUBJECT APPEARED DESPONDENT AND SAT HUNCHED OVER AT THE END OF THE BOARD AND CRIED IN AN APPARENTLY GINE FASHION. SUBJECT CONTINUED TO SAY THAT AFTER HE HAD PRAYED HE WAS TELLING THE TRUTH IN AN EFFORT TO SAVE HIMSELF AND HIS BROTHERS. AT 1326 HOURS SUBJECT WAS PUT BACK IN THE LARGE CONFINEMENT BOX.

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6. AT 1629 HOURS, THE TEAM ENTERED THE CELL AND OPENED THE BOX. THE INTERROGATOR GAVE THE SAME BRIDGE WHICH SUBJECT WAS LEFT WITH WHEN HE WAS PUT IN THE BOX REGARDING OPERATIONS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND WHAT INFORMATION HE HELD BACK FROM THE PREVIOUS INTERROGATORS. SUBJECT HAD NO RESPONSE, AND WAS LED FROM THE BOX TO THE WATER BOARD AND AGAIN ASKED THE BRIDGE. SUBJECT STARTED CRYING AND CLAIMED HE HAD GIVEN US EVERYTHING. SUBJECT WAS INFORMED HE NEEDED TO START GIVING NEW INFORMATION IN ORDER TO STOP THE WATER TREATMENT; HE WAS WARNED NOT TO MANUFACTURE INFORMATION.

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SUBJECT WAS

TRANSITIONED BACK TO THE LARGE BOX AT 1754 HOURS

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8. CURRENT STATUS: AFTER THREE DAYS OF THE AGGRESSIVE INTERROGATION PHASE, SUBJECT HAS FAILED TO PROVIDE ANY NEW INFORMATION REGARDING IMMINENT THREATS OR ATTACKS AGAINST THE US. AT THE RISK OF STATING THE OBVIOUS, THERE ARE POTENTIALLY TWO REASONS FOR HIS FAILURE TO PROVIDE SUCH INFORMATION: (A) SUBJECT KNOWINGLY POSSESSES ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND CONTINUES TO CONCEAL THIS INFORMATION DESPITE THE SIGNIFICANT ESCALATION OF THE INTERROGATION PROCESS OR (B) SUBJECT HAS NO SIGNIFICANT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION DIRECTLY RELATED TO THREATS/ATTACKS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, BEYOND THAT WHICH HE HAS ALREADY PROVIDED, BUT MAY BE WITHHOLDING INFORMATION RELATED TO PAST OPERATIONS AND/OR ACTIVITIES NFI. WISH TO UNDERScore THAT IN THE OPINION OF [] TEAM MEMBERS IT IS PREMATURE IN THE NEW INTERROGATION PHASE TO ADEQUATELY DISCERN WHICH RATIONALE (ITEM A OR B) IS THE CORRECT REASON FOR THE LACK OF NEW INFORMATION.

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SUBJECT'S MEDICAL CONDITION IS STILL STABLE GIVEN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

9. PLANS: SUBJECT WILL REMAIN IN THE LARGE CONFINEMENT BOX WITH HIS SLEEP DISRUPTED THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT UNTIL INTERROGATIONS RESUME MORNING OF [] AUGUST 02. THIS IS TO ALLOW SUBJECT A CHANCE TO CONSUME ENSURE AND FLUIDS IN ORDER TO FACILITATE THE INTERROGATION PROCESS.

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SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - INTERROGATION PLAN

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1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE REVIEW AND WILL ASSUME CONCURRENCE UNLESS ADVISED DIFFERENTLY. ALSO, [] CTC ADVISED [] THAT THERE HAD BEEN A MESSAGE PREPARED BY CTC OFFERING GUIDANCE ON LEGAL ISSUES WHICH WE DO NOT BELIEVE WE HAVE RECEIVED. REQUEST CTC RE-TRANSMIT []

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THE THREE MEMBER BEHAVIORAL INTERROGATION TEAM ALONG WITH

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AS WELL AS THE TWO NVTAG SPECIAL AGENTS SPENT THE EVENING FINE TUNING THE IMPENDING INTERROGATION OF [] THE ANTICIPATED MOVE OF [] FROM THE HOSPITAL TO [] COULD OCCUR AS EARLY AS [] APRIL 2002. REGARDLESS OF ACTUAL DATE OF TRANSPORT, ALL CONCURRED THAT [] WOULD BE TRANSPORTED IN A STATE OF PHARMACEUTICAL UNCONSCIOUSNESS TO DECREASE POTENTIAL SECURITY CONCERNS AS WELL AS TO MAXIMIZE THE INTENDED EFFECT OF DISORIENTING [] WHEN HE AWAKENS IN A NEW ENVIRONMENT. THE CONTINUED AND DELIBERATE ATTEMPT TO DENY ORIENTING INFORMATION FOR THE DURATION OF THE INTERROGATION PHASE WILL PERSIST.

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3. PRESENT ELICITATION AND INTERVIEW OF [] APPEARS TO BE GATHERING CONFIRMATORY INFORMATION OF HISTORICAL EVENTS AND ACTIVITIES THAT HAVE BEEN HELPFUL TO THE OVERALL COLLECTION OF INFORMATION FROM [] YET APPEARS TO BE INFORMATION THAT IS LIKELY BELIEVED TO BE DISPOSABLE AND FROM [] POINT OF VIEW ALREADY KNOWN BY [] THE PRESENT STYLE OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION HAS BEEN INTENTIONALLY PURSUED TO ALLOW [] TO ESTABLISH A RELATIONSHIP WITH [] THAT CONVEYS RESPECT AND TOLERANCE TO HEAR SPECIFIC AND HEALING INFORMATION THAT COULD BE SHAMEFUL AND DIFFICULT FOR [] TO DISCLOSE. THE DEVELOPED RELATIONSHIP WHERE [] IS VIEWED AS THE PRINCIPAL INTERLOCUTOR IS AN INTENTIONAL DYNAMIC IT IS PART OF THE STRATEGIC INTERROGATION PROCESS.

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4. THE MEDICAL COMPLICATIONS THAT TO DATE HAVE BEEN EBBING AND FLOWING PRESENT SIGNIFICANT DIFFICULTY TO THE ENTIRE PROCESS AND HAVE THEREFORE BEEN CAREFULLY CONSIDERED IN THE INTERROGATION PLAN TO

MINIMIZE POTENTIAL DISRUPTION TO THE NECESSARY FLOW OF THE STRATEGIC

N. FOR EXAMPLE, ONCE [] IS MOVED TO [] AND THE INTERROGATION STRATEGY IS BEING PROSECUTED, THE RE-TRANSPORT OF [] TO THE HOSPITAL HAS TO BE WITHHELD UNLESS GRAVE MEDICAL CONDITIONS DEVELOP. INSTEAD, THE CURRENT STRATEGY IS TO INCORPORATE THE MEDICAL DAILY CARE INTO THE PLAN SO THAT WE CAN ATTEMPT TO STAVE OFF A GRAVE CONDITION. CLEARLY, THE DAILY INTRODUCTION OF MEDICAL STAFF TO CARE FOR [] IS NOT IDEAL TO THE INTERROGATION PROCESS, BUT GIVEN HIS MEDICAL CONDITIONS WE ARE BETTER OFF INTERWEAVING THE MEDICAL EXAMS THAN ATTEMPTING TO FORGO THEM. THEREFORE, WE WILL HAVE MEDICAL

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STAFF DRESSED IN UNIFORMS THAT ARE A SOLID COLOR, CONCEAL FACIAL FEATURES AND SKIN, AS WELL AS COVER THE EYES YET ALLOW FOR REASONABLE VISUAL PERCEPTION, I.E. TINTED GOGGLES. WHEN ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY,

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THE PHYSICIAN CAN REMOVE HIS/HER GOGGLES TO EXAMINE [] TO ENSURE ACCURACY OF THEIR EVALUATION. FURTHER, IN AN ATTEMPT TO DIMINISH AFFIRMATION OF [] AS AN INDIVIDUAL AND TO RESTRICT PSYCHOLOGICAL

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AFFILIATION, BY ANYONE OTHER THAN [] THE MEDICAL STAFF WILL BE INSTRUCTED TO USE HAND SIGNALS TO COMMUNICATE WITH [] AND WHEN NECESSARY TO COMMUNICATE WITH [] THROUGH [] ACCORDING TO

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[] WILL REQUIRE FOUR EVALUATIONS DAILY, THEREFORE WE HAVE DESIGNED THAT [] WILL BE SEEN A MINIMUM OF 6 TIMES A DAY ON A VARIABLE SCHEDULE TO DISCOURAGE [] FROM ORIENTING TO THE EVALUATION TIMES AS WELL AS ATTEMPT TO HEAD OFF [] POTENTIAL MANIPULATION OF THE PROCESS BY REQUESTING MEDICAL CARE BECAUSE OF PAIN OR SOME OTHER SYMPTOMOLOGY. WE WILL CAREFULLY EVALUATE EVERY REQUEST THAT []

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MAKES FOR MEDICAL ATTENTION, YET OUR BASIC POSTURE WILL BE TO PROVIDE MEDICAL ATTENTION ON THIS VARIABLE AND INTERMITTENT SCHEDULE AND NOT WHEN HE REQUESTS MEDICAL CARE, UNLESS OF COURSE WE BECOME CONCERNED THAT HIS REQUEST HAS MERIT. THE PRIMARY REASON FOR THIS APPROACH IS

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THAT [] WILL LIKELY ATTEMPT TO MANIPULATE THE INTERROGATION PROCESS AND TRY TO GAIN A LEVEL OF CONTROL OVER HIS ENVIRONMENT. TO FURTHER DISCOURAGE POTENTIAL PROBLEMS, WHILE [] CONTINUES TO PHYSICALLY RECOVER FROM HIS GAPPING LEG WOUND WE WILL USE STANDARD MEDICAL BINDING OF HIS WRISTS TO KEEP [] FROM ATTEMPTING TO INTRODUCE FECAL MATTER OR ANY OTHER FOREIGN SUBSTANCE TO HIS OPEN WOUNDS TO CAUSE A MEDICAL CRISIS. AS HIS WOUNDS HEAL AND THIS TYPE OF CONCERN DIMINISHES [] WILL BE ALLOWED TO HAVE ADDED MOBILITY. THE 24 HOUR MONITORING OF [] BY AUDIO/VISUAL MEANS FURTHER ENHANCES OUR EFFORTS TO AFFORD HIS MEDICAL SAFETY WHILE STILL ACCOMPLISHING OUR INTELLIGENCE GOALS.

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5. THE SECURITY TEAM AND THE BEHAVIORAL TEAM HAVE WORKED COOPERATIVELY TO ENSURE CONSISTENCY IN THE STRATEGIC PROCESS WHILE RETAINING ALL NECESSARY SECURITY CONCERNS. THE SECURITY TEAM WILL BE DRESSED IN SOLID BLACK UNIFORMS, HEAD AND FACE COVERING AND THE USE OF HAND SIGNALS. THE SECURITY TEAM WILL FULFILL A VITAL FUNCTION IN THE OVERALL PROCESS AND WILL HAVE ONE OFFICER IN THE INTERROGATION ROOM ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE CELL TO HELP KEEP [] AWAKE DURING THE DISORIENTATION PHASE OF THE PROCESS.

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6. THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT, [] PSYCHOLOGICAL STATE AND THE ACTUAL INTERROGATION PROCESS ARE INTENTIONALLY DESIGNED TO DEVELOP THREE BASIC PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS TO ENHANCE COOPERATION AND WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS VITAL INTELLIGENCE. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL DEPENDENCE, LEARNED HELPLESSNESS AND SHORT TERM THINKING ARE KEY FACTORS IN REDUCING [] SENSE OF HOPE THAT HIS WELL HONED COUNTER-MEASURE INTERROGATION SKILLS WILL HELP HIM FROM DISCLOSING IMPORTANT INTELLIGENCE. BY USING BRIGHT (PHYSICALLY NOT HARMFUL) LIGHTS IN AN ALL WHITE ENVIRONMENT, WHITE NOISE PRODUCED BY

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LOUD "MASKING" EQUIPMENT (PHYSICALLY NOT HARMFUL), DISORIENTATION BY NOT ALLOWING IN NATURAL LIGHT NOR ROUTINE OF SCHEDULE, KEEPING [] MAKING HIM DEPENDENT BY NOT RESPONDING TO HIS REQUESTS OR REMOVING AS MUCH CONTROL AS POSSIBLE FROM HIS ABILITY TO

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7. THE INTERROGATION PROCESS HAS TO BE AN EXTENSION OF THE PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL MANIPULATION THAT HAS BEEN DESIGNED. [] WILL BE GIVEN SPECIFIC INSTRUCTION IN USING INTERROGATION STYLE DIALOGUE AND WILL HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO ROLE PLAY WITH THE BEHAVIORAL TEAM TO INCREASE HIS COMFORT WITH THE PROCESS AS WELL AS PREPARE HIM FOR THE INTERACTION DURING THE INITIAL PHASES OF THE INTERROGATION PROCESS. ONCE COOPERATION AND VITAL INTELLIGENCE IS OBTAINED AND [] APPEARS TO HAVE RESIGNED HIMSELF TO THE PROCESS [] WILL MOVE MORE AND MORE TOWARD A TRADITIONAL DEBRIEFING STYLE. IF NECESSARY, [] CAN BE RETURNED TO A MORE RESTRICTIVE ENVIRONMENT IF [] BECOMES RESISTIVE AFTER A PERIOD OF COOPERATION.

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8. THE INTERROGATION PROCESS WILL ESTABLISH SHORT-TERM THINKING, DECREASED INTERNAL PROBLEM SOLVING AND DIMINISH EVASIVE TECHNIQUES THAT [] HAS LEARNED OR HAS NATURALLY IN HIS ATTEMPT TO CONCEAL AND NOT DISCLOSE VITAL INTELLIGENCE. [] WILL BE ENCOURAGED TO TAKE A POLITE, RESPECTFUL AND NON-CONFRONTATIONAL INTERACTIVE STYLE WITH [] WHILE ALSO NOT BE APOLOGETIC NOR UNDETERRED FROM GETTING [] TO ANSWER [] DIRECT QUESTIONS WITH SPECIFIC AND DETAILED RESPONSES. BY NOT ALLOWING [] TO MANIPULATE THE PROCESS BY EITHER MAKING COMPLAINTS OR ATTEMPTING TO DERAIL [] THE SHORT TERM THINKING APPROACH WILL AGREE WITH [] COMPLAINT FOLLOWED BY RESTATING THE QUESTION. THEME DEVELOPMENT AND MONOLOGUES BY [] WILL FURTHER ENHANCE THE PROCESS. THE THEMES AND MONOLOGUES WILL BE CAREFULLY CONSTRUCTED BY [] ALONG WITH CONSULTATION WITH THE BEHAVIORAL TEAM. THE PROCESS IS A HIGHLY EFFECTIVE WAY TO MOVE PAST THE "THROW AWAY" INTELLIGENCE THAT [] WILL LIKELY ATTEMPT TO STALL THE PROCESS. THE USE OF COUNTER-MEASURES BY A DETAINEE IS NOT INTENDED TO KEEP THE INTERROGATOR FROM BECOMING AWARE THAT THE DETAINEE IS USING THEM, BUT RATHER ARE DESIGNED TO FRUSTRATE AND DETER THE INTERROGATOR FROM GETTING VITAL INFORMATION.

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9. THE CURRENT ANTICIPATED TIME LINE AND PROCESS IS AS FOLLOWS: TRANSPORT FROM THE HOSPITAL, DURING WHICH [] WILL BE MEDICALLY PLACED INTO AN UNCONSCIOUS STATE, [] FACIAL HAIR, SCALP AND BEARD, WILL BE SHAVED TO DENY [] THE OPPORTUNITY TO DETERMINE HOW LONG AND FAR HE WAS TRANSPORTED. THE FIRST 24-48 HOURS [] WILL BE KEPT AWAKE BY HAVING A GUARD IN THE INTERROGATION ROOM, OUT OF SIGHT OF [] BUT CLOSE ENOUGH TO FIRMLY ROUST [] AFTER THE INITIAL ISOLATION PROCESS, THE FIRST SESSION WILL OCCUR WHERE [] WILL TELL [] THAT THINGS HAVE CHANGED, THAT WE NEED TO TALK ABOUT - MANY THINGS AND THAT YOU NEED TO TELL ME ABOUT MANY THINGS, BUT WE ARE GOING TO START WITH "THE ONE THING YOU DON'T WANT ME TO KNOW." [] WILL LIKELY PROTEST OR ATTEMPT TO DIVERT THE QUESTION. [] WILL AGREE WITH A PROTEST, I.E. THE ROOM IS VERY BRIGHT, BY SAYING "YES THE ROOM IS VERY BRIGHT, NOW [] WHAT IS THE ONE THING THAT YOU DO NOT WANT TO TELL ME." IF [] DOES NOT ANSWER DIRECTLY, [] WILL INFORM [] THAT HE NEEDS TO TELL [] THE ONE THING THAT [] DOES NOT WANT TO TELL [] AND THAT HE WANTS [] TO THINK ABOUT HIS ANSWER AND THEN TURN AND WALK OUT OF THE ROOM. THIS SAME PROCESS WILL OCCUR OVER THE NEXT MULTIPLE HOURS UNTIL [] PROVIDES A "MENU" OF THINGS HE THINGS [] WANTS INFORMATION ABOUT. AS HE PROVIDES THE AFOREMENTIONED "MENU," WITHOUT REALIZING IT, [] IS ACTUALLY PROVIDING/CONFIRMING TOPICS HE HAS INFORMATION ABOUT. AT THIS POINT, [] WILL BE ENCOURAGED TO PICK ONE OF THE TOPICS THAT HE LISTED IN "MENU" AND ATTEMPT TO GET [] TO PROVIDE SPECIFICS ABOUT THE TOPIC. IF [] DOES NOT PROVIDE INFORMATION(b)(1) THEN [] WILL INFORM [] THAT HE WANTS [] TO TALK A [] AREA WHEN HE RETURNS, (b)(1) AND WALK AWAY. MOST IMPORTANTLY, (b)(3) CIAAct AND APPEAR RELAXED, (b)(3) CIAAct AND NOT APPEAR FRUSTRATED(b)(3) NatSecActNTED BY []

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RELUCTANCE. [] WILL CONTINUE TO BE KEPT FROM SLEEPING DURING THESE ENCOUNTERS. ONCE [] PROVIDES SPECIFICS ABOUT THIS TOPIC AREA FROM HIS "MENU" [] WILL TELL HIM THAT THIS WAS NOT THE "ONE THING" [] DID NOT WANT TO TELL HIM. [] WILL TELL [] THAT HE IS [] TO TELL HIM ABOUT THE ONE THING HE DOES NOT WANT TO TELL [] REACTION TO THIS REBUFF SHOULD PROVIDE VALUABLE BEHAVIORAL CLUES AS TO HOW CLOSE WE ARE TO MORE VITAL INFORMATION AND THE DEPTH OF [] RESOLVE TO RESIST. THIS PROCESS WILL BE CAREFULLY MONITORED AND WHEN APPROPRIATE [] WILL PROGRESS TO UTILIZATION OF MONOLOGUES AND THEME DEVELOPMENT.

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10. TO AID THE AFOREMENTIONED APPROACH, THE INTERROGATION TEAM, IN CONJUNCTION WITH [] OFFICERS, IDENTIFIED A PRIORITIZED LIST OF KEY ISSUES/TOPICS TO BE COVERED WITH [] DURING THE INTERROGATION. THIS LIST WILL HELP KEEP THE INTERROGATION FOCUSED ON INFORMATION OF HIGHEST PRIORITY AND SERVE AS A USEFUL TOOL TO GAUGE WHEN [] EMPLOYS RESISTANCE TECHNIQUES TO DIVERT OUR ATTENTION TO LOWER PRIORITY ITEMS. THIS LIST WILL BE PROVIDED SEPARATELY FOR HQS ASSESSMENT AND ADJUSTMENT AS NECESSARY.

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11. THE WHITE NOISE GENERATORS WILL BE USED IN VARIABLE LENGTHS OF TIME TO HELP DISRUPT [] PROBLEM SOLVING THINKING AND TO INCREASE HIS SENSE OF HELPLESSNESS BY HIGHLIGHTING HIS INABILITY TO ALTER THE ENVIRONMENT AROUND HIM. WE WANT TO INSTILL IN [] THAT WE ARE NOT GOING AWAY AND THAT THE ONLY MECHANISM HE HAS AT HIS DISPOSAL TO CONTROL THE ENVIRONMENT WILL BE IN PROVIDING VITAL INTELLIGENCE TO [] OVER TIME [] WILL EARN BASIC PRIVILEGES WHEN [] AND THE BEHAVIORAL TEAM FEEL THAT IT IS CONDUCIVE TO THE INTERROGATION. QUITE CLEARLY, [] WILL NEVER BE GRANTED A PRIVILEGE WHEN [] REQUESTS ONE BUT RATHER APPEAR TO [] THAT [] CONTROLS HIS ENVIRONMENT AND THAT HE HAS TO PLEASE [] TO MAKE HIS CONDITIONS BETTER.

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12. NEEDLESS TO SAY, THERE ARE A VAST NUMBER OF OTHER NUANCES AND MINOR BUT IMPORTANT DETAILS THAT WOULD MAKE THIS CABLE SEVERAL VOLUMES LONG. WE THOUGHT THIS THUMBNAIL GIST WOULD HELP HQS GET AN APPRECIATION OF THE LONG AND CAREFULLY THOUGHT OUT PROCESS THAT HAS BEEN DESIGNED TO PERSECUTE THIS MISSION. []

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CITE [] 10536

TO: IMMEDIATE ALEC INFO DIRECTOR []

FOR: []
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SLUGS: []

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - ADDITIONAL OPERATIONAL AND SECURITY
CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE NEXT PHASE OF ABU ZUBAYDAH
INTERROGATION

REF: A. [] 10530 |
B. [] 105298 | (b)(3) NatSecAct
C. [] 72767 |
D. (b)(1) 10534 |
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IF SUBJECT DEVELOPS A SERIOUS MEDICAL CONDITION WHICH MAY INVOLVE A HOST OF CONDITIONS INCLUDING A HEART ATTACK OR ANOTHER CATASTROPHIC TYPE OF CONDITION, ALL EFFORTS WILL BE MADE TO ENSURE THAT PROPER MEDICAL CARE WILL BE PROVIDED TO SUBJECT. IN THE EVENT SUBJECT DIES WE NEED TO BE PREPARED TO ACT ACCORDINGLY KEEPING IN MIND THE LIAISON EQUITIES INVOLVING OUR HOSTS. IF SUBJECT DIES, WE PLAN ON SEEKING ASSISTANCE FOR THE CREMATION OF SUBJECT.

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REGARDLESS WHICH OPTION WE FOLLOW, HOWEVER, AND ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE PLANNED PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURE TECHNIQUES TO BE IMPLEMENTED, WE NEED TO GET REASONABLE ASSURANCES THAT SUBJECT WILL REMAIN IN ISOLATION AND INCOMMUNICADO

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FOR THE REMAINDER OF HIS LIFE.

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SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - DETAILS OF 12 AUGUST 2002 CYCLE OF
 INTERROGATIONS OF ABU ZUBAYDAH

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TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: NONE, FYI ONLY.

2. SUMMARY: DURING DAY NINE OF THE AGGRESSIVE INTERROGATION
 PHASE, SUBJECT PROVIDED NO NEW THREAT INFORMATION REGARDING PLANNED
 OR FUTURE TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST THE U.S. SUBJECT WAS

(b)(1) INTERROGATED TWICE ON 12 AUGUST, BOTH TIMES ON THE WATER BOARD. (b)(3) NatSecAct

3. DAY NINE OF THE AGGRESSIVE INTERROGATION PHASE COMMENCED AT
 1101 HOURS LOCAL TIME, 12 AUGUST 2002. (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct AT 1922 HOURS 11 AUGUST ((ABU ZUBAYDAH)) (SUBJECT) WAS
 MOVED FROM THE LARGE BOX BY THE SECURITY TEAM. HIS WOUND WAS
 CLEANED AND WATER/ENSURE WAS REPLACED. SUBJECT WAS RETURNED TO THE
 LARGE BOX BY THE SECURITY TEAM AT 1930 HOURS. AT 0500 HOURS 12

(b)(1) AUGUST, SUBJECT WAS REMOVED FROM THE LARGE BOX BY THE SECURITY TEAM

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AND SEATED ON THE FLOOR. SUBJECT WAS HOODED AT 0630 HOURS, SECURITY TEAM STOOD SUBJECT UP SO THAT HIS WOUND COULD BE INSPECTED. SUBJECT WAS THEN RE-SEATED ON THE FLOOR, STILL HOODED. AT 0700 HOURS, SECURITY TEAM RETURNED SUBJECT TO THE LARGE BOX, WHERE HE REMAINED UNTIL 1101 HOURS. AT THIS TIME, SECURITY TEAM MEMBERS ENTERED THE ROOM, UNLOCKED THE LARGE BOX AND WHEELED IN THE WATER BOARD. SUBJECT WAS TAKEN OUT OF THE BOX BY SECURITY TEAM MEMBERS AND INTERROGATOR PLACED THE WATER BOARD COLLAR AROUND HIS NECK. THE ROLLED TOWEL/NECK SUPPORT WAS PLACED AROUND SUBJECT'S NECK BY THE INTERROGATOR, AND HE WAS MOVED TO STAND NEXT TO THE WATER BOARD [REDACTED]

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INTERROGATORS STOOD SILENTLY BY SUBJECT FOR A MOMENT. SUBJECT AT ONE POINT SWAYED AND LOST HIS BALANCE, BUT RIGHTED HIMSELF WITH NO ASSISTANCE; HE SAID NOTHING. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] SUBJECT WAS LED TO THE WATER TABLE AND MADE TO SIT ON ITS EDGE. SUBJECT WAS TOLD TO LIE ON THE WATER BOARD AND DID SO SLOWLY.

4. INTERROGATORS STRAPPED SUBJECT TO THE WATER BOARD [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] THE FIRST ~~WATER~~ TREATMENT WAS APPLIED AT 1125. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] SUBJECT WAS LEFT ON THE ~~WATER~~ BOARD EYES COVERED
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[REDACTED] INTERROGATORS RETURNED TO THE ROOM AT 1156 HOURS [REDACTED]
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[REDACTED] ~~WATER~~ TREATMENT WAS APPLIED AT 1157 HOURS. SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH HIS DENIALS, AND ANOTHER ~~WATER~~ TREATMENT WAS APPLIED AT 1158 HOURS. SUBJECT'S DENIALS PERSISTED AS INTERROGATORS INSISTED SUBJECT KNEW MORE THAN HE WAS TELLING THEM. ANOTHER ~~WATER~~ TREATMENT WAS APPLIED AT 1159 HOURS. [REDACTED]

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

[REDACTED] SUBJECT WAS RELEASED FROM THE ~~WATER~~ BOARD AND TOLD TO GET UP. SUBJECT WAS TOLD NOT TO WASTE HIS TIME WHILE THINKING. SUBJECT WAS SUBSEQUENTLY PUT IN TO THE LARGE BOX AT 1203 HOURS. SECURITY TEAM MEMBERS CLEANED HIS WOUND AREA, ADJUSTED HIS HANDCUFFS AND LOCKED THE DOOR.

5. AT 1230 HOURS SUBJECT WAS TAKEN OUT OF THE LARGE BOX, AND HIS WOUND CLEANED. AT 1345 HOURS SUBJECT WAS SEATED ON THE FLOOR, HOODED. AT 1545 HOURS SECURITY TEAM MEMBERS HAD SUBJECT STAND AGAINST THE WALL. AT 1615 HOURS, SUBJECT WAS AGAIN SEATED ON THE FLOOR. AT 1632 HOURS, THE SECURITY TEAM ENTERED, AND BROUGHT IN THE ~~WATER~~ BOARD SUBJECT WAS RAISED FROM THE FLOOR, AND HIS HOOD REMOVED. UPON SEEING THE ~~WATER~~ BOARD SUBJECT LOOKED AT INTERROGATORS, SLOWLY WALKED FORWARD OF HIS OWN ACCORD TO THE SIDE OF THE ~~WATER~~ BOARD AND WAITED FOR INTERROGATOR TO PLACE THE COLLAR AROUND HIS NECK. SUBJECT LAID HIMSELF DOWN ON THE ~~WATER~~ BOARD SHAKING. [REDACTED]

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

Page 3

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

WATER TREATMENT WAS APPLIED AT 1707 HOURS.

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1) INTERROGATORS COVERED SUBJECT'S EYES WITH THE CLOTH.
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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Page 4

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

INTERROGATORS DEPARTED THE ROOM AT 1709. SEVERAL SECONDS LATER SUBJECT BEGAN TO VOMIT. INTERROGATORS IMMEDIATELY RETURNED TO THE ROOM, PARTIALLY UNSTRAPPED SUBJECT AND RAISED HIM TO A SITTING POSITION SO THAT HE COULD CLEAR HIS AIRWAY.

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

AT 1714 SUBJECT WAS TAKEN OFF THE WATER BOARD AND HOODED. AT 1715 SECURITY TEAM MOVED SUBJECT TO SIT ON THE FLOOR AND INITIATED THE WHITE NOISE. SUBJECT WAS MOVED IN TO THE LARGE BOX BY THE SECURITY TEAM AT 1738 HOURS.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

END OF MESSAGE

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Page 5

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(b)(3) CIAAct
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Power Point Presentation

Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)

Slide 2:

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)

**Con: Not a USG-controlled facility
Requires diplomatic/policy decisions**

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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SUBJECT:

Slide 4: Guantanamo Bay (Brig)

Pro: US Military-controlled facility

High degree of physical security (b)(1)

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Con:

Viability of maintaining secrecy of Abu Zubaydah's presence an issue

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(5)

Possible loss of control to US military and/or FBI

Possible impact on prisoners if AZ's presence becomes known

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(5)

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(5)

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(5)

Slide 6:

US Military Custody

Pro: US Military-controlled facility

(b)(1)

Con: Maintaining secrecy

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(5)

Poor area security


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SUBJECT:


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Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah

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Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah

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(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)

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Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah Guantanamo Bay (Brig)

Pro: US Military-controlled facility
High degree of physical security

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)

Con:

Viability of maintaining secrecy of Abu Zubaydah's presence an issue

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)

Possible loss of control to US military and/or FBI

Possible impact on prisoners if AZ's presence becomes known

~~TS/NF~~

Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah

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(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)

Pro:

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)

No issues of possible US court jurisdiction

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)

Con: Not a USG-controlled facility
Requires diplomatic/policy decisions

~~TS//NF~~

Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah

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(b)(3) NatSecAct
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Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah

US Military Custody

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)

Pro: US Military-controlled facility

Con: Maintaining secrecy

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)

Poor area security

~~TS//NF~~

Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)

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Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)

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Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah

US Military Custody (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
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Pro: US Military-controlled facility

Con: Maintaining secrecy

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)

Poor area security

~~TS//NF~~

Date: 20020810

TO: ALEC (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
FROM:

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - [] TEAM ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT STATUS OF THE AGGRESSIVE
INTERROGATION STRATEGY OF ABU ZUBAYDAH

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TOR: 100335Z AUG 02 [] 10607

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CITE (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
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(b)(1) TO: IMMEDIATE ALEC INFO DIRECTOR, []
(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct CTC [] INFO []

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CTC/LGL, []

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1) SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - [] TEAM ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT STATUS OF
(b)(3) NatSecAct THE AGGRESSIVE INTERROGATION STRATEGY OF ABU ZUBAYDAH

REF: (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE SEE PARA 7 ON DESIRABILITY OF
HOLDING A VTC WITH HQS AT [] AUGUST (HQS TIME), AND PARA 8
(b)(1) REQUEST FOR INDICATIONS OF STEPS TO BE TAKEN POST-INTERROGATION.
(b)(3) NatSecAct [] RESPECTFULLY REQUESTS RESPONSE BY OOB 11 AUGUST []
(b)(3) NatSecAct

2. SUMMARY: [REDACTED] TEAM'S COLLECTIVE PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT IS THAT IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY ((ABU ZUBAYDAH)) (SUBJECT) HAS ACTIONABLE NEW INFORMATION ABOUT CURRENT THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES. TEAM THINKS, HOWEVER, SUBJECT IS STILL HOLDING BACK INFORMATION ABOUT HIS INVOLVEMENT IN PAST OPERATIONS. THE CURRENT (b)(1) LEVEL OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURES WILL BE MAINTAINED FOR THE TIME (b)(3) NatSecAct BEING TO REFINE THIS PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT. THE CONDITIONING PROCESS HAS BEEN FASTER THAN ANTICIPATED, PRIMARILY BECAUSE THE WATERBOARD QUICKLY OVERWHELMED SUBJECT'S ABILITY TO RESIST. TO AVOID THE RISK OF GOING BEYOND LEGAL AUTHORITIES, WE DO NOT RECOMMEND ESCALATING THE PRESSURE. IF A HQS TEAM CANNOT VISIT SITE EARLY THE WEEK OF 12 AUGUST, RECOMMEND A VTC WITH [REDACTED] STATION, [REDACTED] AT 0900 ON 13 AUGUST (HQS TIME) TO DISCUSS TEAM'S PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT AND POST-INTERROGATION STEPS WITH SUBJECT. END SUMMARY.

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3. THIS CABLE HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH COS (b)(1) [REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct [REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct [REDACTED]

WHAT FOLLOWS IS

[REDACTED] COLLECTIVE TEAM ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE AGGRESSIVE INTERROGATION STRATEGY VIS-A-VIS THE CRITICAL QUESTION OF WHETHER SUBJECT HAS ANY ACTIONABLE NEW INFORMATION ABOUT CURRENT THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES. THIS ASSESSMENT TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE SESSIONS CONDUCTED FROM 4 AUGUST TO DATE. THESE SESSIONS INVOLVED USE OF MOST OF THE APPROVED PSYCHOLOGICAL TECHNIQUES AUTHORIZED PER REF C, INCLUDING THE WATER BOARD.

4. AT THIS JUNCTURE IN THE AGGRESSIVE INTERROGATION PROCESS, IT IS THE TEAM'S COLLECTIVE PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT THAT IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY SUBJECT HAS ACTIONABLE NEW INFORMATION ABOUT CURRENT THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES. THIS SAID, THE TEAM PLANS TO MAINTAIN THE CURRENT LEVEL OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURES FOR THE TIME BEING TO DEVELOP AND REFINE THIS PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT.

5. AS NOTED ABOVE, THE INTERROGATION STRATEGY COMMENCED ON 4 AUGUST AND WE HAVE IMPLEMENTED MOST OF THE APPROVED PSYCHOLOGICAL TECHNIQUES, INCLUDING THE WATER BOARD. LARGELY BECAUSE OF USE OF THE WATER BOARD, THE CONDITIONING PROCESS HAS BEEN FASTER THAN ANTICIPATED. IN OUR COLLECTIVE OPINION, THE WATERBOARD HAS OVERWHELMED SUBJECT'S ABILITY TO RESIST. FURTHERMORE, IT IS OUR ASSESSMENT THAT THE INTENSITY OF THE PRESSURE APPLIED TO HIM THUS FAR APPROACHES THE LEGAL LIMIT. FOR THE TIME BEING, CURRENT LEVELS CAN BE MAINTAINED WITHOUT VIOLATING THE LAW. FOR THIS REASON, WE DO NOT RECOMMEND ESCALATING THE INTENSITY OF THE PRESSURE, BUT RECOMMEND HOLDING IT AT PRESENT LEVELS TO ALLOW FOR MORE DEFINITIVE JUDGMENT. ACCORDING TO THE MEDICAL OFFICER ON THE SCENE, UNDER CURRENT MEDICAL INTERVENTION SUBJECT'S MEDICAL STATUS IS LIKELY TO DETERIORATE TO AN UNACCEPTABLE LEVEL OVER THE NEXT TWO WEEKS, AND THUS WILL CONTINUE TO BE CLOSELY MONITORED.

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6. ABOVE NOTWITHSTANDING, [] TEAM THINKS SUBJECT IS STILL HOLDING BACK INFORMATION. IT IS LIKELY, HOWEVER, THAT THIS INFORMATION IS RELATED TO SUBJECT'S INVOLVEMENT IN PAST OPERATIONS. IT IS ALSO OUR OPINION THAT: SUBJECT CAN STILL BE A PRODUCTIVE SOURCE OF INFORMATION CONCERNING PAST OPERATIONS; SUBJECT CAN IDENTIFY AND PROVIDE BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON OTHER OPERATIVES; AND SUBJECT CAN PROVIDE INSIGHT INTO THE WAY THE AL QA'IDA NETWORK FUNCTIONS.

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7. AS NOTED REF B, [] SUGGESTED THAT AN OBSERVER TEAM INCLUDING A SENIOR REPRESENTATIVE OF CTC TRAVEL [] TO OBSERVE ONGOING INTERROGATIONS DURING THE WEEK OF 12 AUGUST 02. THE PURPOSE OF THIS REQUEST WAS TO GIVE A HQS TEAM AN ON-THE-GROUND APPRECIATION FOR THE TACTICS/TECHNIQUES BEING USED AS A WAY OF ASSURING HQS THAT TECHNIQUES ARE BEING APPLIED TO THE LETTER/INTENT OF THE LAW, ALLOW A HQS TEAM THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS TEAM CONCERNS REGARDING POSITIVE/NEGATIVE IMPACT OF INCREASED PYSCHOLOGICAL PRESSURE TO ACHIEVE OUR GOALS RE ACTIONABLE THREAT INFORMATION, AND REINFORCE TEAM REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE END GAME STRATEGY RE SUBJECT. GIVEN THE SPEED WITH WHICH SUBJECT HAS REACTED TO THE WATERBOARD PROCEDURE, OVERALL CONCERNS THAT CURRENT PRESSURES NOT BE EXCEEDED, THE FACT THAT THIS PHASE IS POSSIBLY BEST BROUGHT TO CLOSURE WITHIN THE NEXT TEN DAYS, AND ON-THE-GROUND DISCUSSIONS WITH COS WHICH

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FORMED THE BASIS FOR THIS CABLE, TEAM PROPOSES A VTC (WITH TAPE FOR HQS TO OBSERVE) AT 0900 ON 13 AUGUST HQS TIME [] []. WHILE TEAM CONTINUES TO BELIEVE A FIRST-HAND, ON-THE-GROUND LOOK IS BEST, IF A HQS TEAM CANNOT MAKE IT BY EARLY THE WEEK OF 12 AUG, THE VTC WILL ACCOMPLISH THE IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENT AS WE SEE IT.

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8. LOOKING AHEAD: [] TEAM STRONGLY BELIEVES THAT THE ABOVE PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT, AND REFINEMENTS OF IT TO FOLLOW, MAKE EVEN MORE URGENT THE NEED TO ADDRESS STEPS TO BE TAKEN WITH SUBJECT AFTER THE AGGRESSIVE INTERROGATION PHASE ENDS. []

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[] ALL CONCERNED -- HQS/ALEC, STATION, [] -- MUST DEVELOP A COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF AT LEAST THE NEXT STEP, IF NOT THE NEXT SEVERAL STEPS. ALEC/HQS COMMENTS WELCOME AND SOLICITED. REGARDS.

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CABLETYPE:

(b)(3) NatSecAct

END OF MESSAGE

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Date: 20021018

(b)(1)

TO: (b)(3) NatSecAct

FROM: CTC/UBL

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - PDB ASSESSMENT OF ABU ZUBAYDAH'S PROVISION OF INFORMATION

----- BODY -----

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TOT: 181439Z OCT 02

ALEC

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STAFF

181439Z ALEC 189716

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

INFO DIRECTOR.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

FROM:

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(b)(3) CIAAct

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SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - PDB ASSESSMENT OF ABU ZUBAYDAH'S PROVISION OF INFORMATION

REF: NONE

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: NONE, FYI FOR INTERROGATION TEAM.

2. FYI FOR THE INTERROGATION TEAM, THE FOLLOWING ASSESSMENT OF ((ABU ZUBAYDAH))'S INFORMATION AND HIS CONTINUED WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INTELLIGENCE WAS PREPARED FOR THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEFING. THIS ASSESSMENT WAS PRODUCED IN EARLY OCTOBER BY [] AND COORDINATED WITH CTC/UBL. THE PRIMARY DRAFTER WAS AN [] ANALYST WHO HAD SERVED AT [] (IDEN). WE PROVIDE THIS DOCUMENT FOR THE RECORD AND FOR THE BACKGROUND OF THE INTERROGATION TEAM, AS IT ACCURATELY REFLECTS THE COLLECTIVE HQS VIEW OF THE INFORMATION PROVIDED TO DATE.

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HE CONTINUES TO WITHHOLD SIGNIFICANT THREAT
INFORMATION.

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(b)(5) ABU ZUBAYDAH RESISTED PROVIDING USEFUL
INFORMATION UNTIL BECOMING MORE COOPERATIVE IN EARLY AUGUST,
PROBABLY IN THE HOPE OF IMPROVING HIS LIVING CONDITIONS.

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END OF MESSAGE

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2722-524

Date: 20020602

TO: ALEC

FROM:

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - SUMMARY OF DAILY OBSERVATIONS AND ASSESSMENT OF ABU ZUBAYDAH SINCE
16 APRIL; ASSESSMENT OF HOW THE PROCESS HAS EVOLVED

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TO: IMMEDIATE ALEC INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR(b)(1)

FOR:

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SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - SUMMARY OF DAILY OBSERVATIONS AND ASSESSMENT OF
ABU ZUBAYDAH SINCE 16 APRIL; ASSESSMENT OF HOW THE PROCESS
HAS EVOLVED

REF: A. ALEC

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B.

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TEXT:

COMBINE: COMPLETE

1. ACTION REQUIRED: NONE. FYI.

2. PER REF A AND PURSUANT TO REF B, BELOW IS AN OVERVIEW AND ASSESSMENT INTENDED TO CHRONICLE ((ABU ZUBAYDAH)) (SUBJECT)'S STRATEGY FOR RESISTING INTERROGATION EFFORTS AND AVOIDING DISCLOSURE OF CRITICAL THREAT INFORMATION DURING THE FIRST [] INTERROGATION SESSIONS. IN ADDITION, BELOW OUTLINE ALSO OFFERS THE TEAM'S OPERATIONAL PSYCHOLOGISTS' PERSPECTIVE ON SOME OF THE CRITICAL FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE SUBJECT'S DECISION TO BEGIN PROVIDING NEW THREAT-RELATED INFORMATION IN SESSION [] THESE NEW DISCLOSURES SIGNIFICANTLY EXCEEDED WHAT SUBJECT HAD PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED AND SUBJECT ADMITTED THAT HE HAD INTENTIONALLY HELD BACK THE INFORMATION. IN OUR OPINION, THE ASSESSMENT BELOW DOES AN EXCELLENT JOB OF ADDRESSING HIS GENERAL APPROACH TO CAPTIVITY AND RESISTANCE, IDENTIFYING SUBJECT'S OVERALL RESISTANCE STRATEGIES, AND APPROACH TO IMPLEMENTING THE STRATEGIES WITH INTERROGATORS. THIS ASSESSMENT IS CRITICAL FOR OUR ONGOING INTERROGATION PROCESS WITH SUBJECT. THE ASSESSMENT SHOULD BE READ, HOWEVER, AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF AN ENTIRE "PROCESS" AS OPPOSED TO AN "EVENT" WHICH LEAD TO THE RESULTS OF [] SESSION. ADDITIONALLY, IN THE COLLECTIVE INTERROGATION TEAM'S ASSESSMENT, WHILE ON SOME LEVELS IT CAN BE ARGUED THAT SUBJECT WAS WINNING SOME OF THE BATTLES, THE INTEL DERIVED FROM LONG, SUSTAINED AND CAREFULLY SCRIPTED INTERROGATION SESSIONS OVER A PERIOD OF TIME LED TO CRITICAL FI WHICH WE SUBMIT WAS IN A CATEGORY OTHER THAN "THROW AWAY" TYPE INFO. AS WE CONTINUE WITH OUR INTEGRATED INTERROGATION PROCESS WE CERTAINLY NEED TO KEEP REFLECTING ON WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED TO DATE. ONGOING CONSIDERATION OF THE THEMES NOTED BELOW CAN IMPROVE OUR STRATEGIC APPROACH AND HELP MAXIMIZE OUR EFFORTS TO GAIN CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE WHILE AT THE SAME TIME NOT TRACK OF THE TANGIBLE PROGRESS THAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED OVER AN EVOLVING PROCESS. FOR THE RECORD, THE DETAILS BELOW HAVE BEEN DRAFTED BY [] WITH THE HELP OF SERE PSYCHOLOGIST []

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3. SUMMARY: BEGINNING WITH THE DAY HE ARRIVED AT [] SITE, SUBJECT APPEARED TO BE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN DEVELOPING AND MAINTAINING A STRONG RESISTANCE POSTURE. THIS POSTURE INCLUDED BUILDING, TESTING, AND REVISING A MENTAL MODEL THAT HELPED HIM UNDERSTAND AND, TO SOME DEGREE, PREDICT AND MANAGE HIS CAPTORS AND SURROUNDINGS. THIS DEVELOPING AD HOC MENTAL MODEL ALSO PROVIDED STRUCTURE THAT HELPED HIM ORGANIZE, SELECT, DEPLOY, AND ASSESS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SPECIFIC RESISTANCE STRATEGIES. EARLY ON, SUBJECT STRUGGLED WITH FATIGUE RESULTING FROM MILD TO MODERATE SLEEP DEPRIVATION AND SHOWED RESILIENCE AS HE REGROUPED AFTER TWO OF HIS RESISTANCE STRATEGIES WERE UNDERMINED IN MID-TO LATE-APRIL. DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF MAY 2002, THE TEAM DECIDED TO POSTPONE THE STRATEGY OF APPLYING STEADILY INCREASING PRESSURES ON THE SUBJECT DUE TO A NUMBER OF CONSTRAINING FACTORS. THE TEAM THEN SHIFTED TO A STRATEGY THAT EMPHASIZED THE COMBINATION OF A FRIENDLIER (POSITIVE RAPPORT-BUILDING) STYLE OF INTERACTION, ATTENTION TO HEALTH/WELFARE NEEDS, AND THE PERSISTENTLY REPEATED PRESENTATION OF PROOF THAT SUBJECT WAS CAUGHT IN LIES AND INCONSISTENCIES. IN PART, THIS SHIFT WAS MADE TO ACCOMMODATE AND TEST AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE THAT A

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FRIENDLIER APPROACH AND BETTER TREATMENT WOULD LEAD THE SUBJECT TO BE MORE COOPERATIVE. THE SUBJECT'S RESPONSE TO THIS SHIFT WAS TO CONTINUE TO ADHERE TO PREVIOUSLY SEEN RESISTANCE STRATEGIES. THE SUBJECT APPEARED UNMOVED BY THE ONGOING ACCUSATIONS OF "LYING" AND "INCONSISTENCY". OVER TIME, HE MAY HAVE INTERPRETED THIS SHIFT IN THE TONE AND NATURE OF HIS TREATMENT/CONDITIONS AS AN INDICATION THAT THE INTERROGATION WAS RUNNING ITS COURSE. FURTHERMORE, THE SUBJECT MAY HAVE CONCLUDED THAT HE HAD LESS AND LESS REASON TO FEEL PRESSURED BY THE INTERROGATORS DESPITE THEIR EMPHATIC STATEMENTS THAT THINGS WOULD GET WORSE IF HE WAS NOT MORE TRUTHFUL AND FORTHCOMING WITH INFORMATION. THE SUBJECT'S COMPLACENCY MAY HAVE BEEN REINFORCED BY HIS RECOGNITION THAT HIS DAY-TO-DAY CAPTIVITY CONDITIONS REMAINED THE SAME, AND EVEN IMPROVED SOMEWHAT SINCE THE SHIFT IN INTERROGATION STRATEGY. MOREOVER, THE SUBJECT LIKELY FACTORED IN THE CONSTANT AND METICULOUS MEDICAL ATTENTION AND THE CARING THAT IT CONVEYED TO HIM IN TERMS OF HIS IMPORTANCE TO THE USG.

IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE SUBJECT MISSED THE FACT THAT HIS ONGOING RESISTANCE AND INTRANSIGENCE DID NOT NEGATIVELY IMPACT HIS CONDITIONS OR STATUS. HIS BEHAVIOR AND DEMEANOR SUGGESTED THAT HIS CONFIDENCE AND MORALE WERE GENERALLY STRONG AND GROWING STRONGER AS THE INTERROGATIONS EXTENDED INTO MID-MAY. BY THIS TIME, IT IS LIKELY THAT THE SUBJECT BELIEVED HIS AD HOC MODEL INCLUDED A FAIRLY ACCURATE UNDERSTANDING AND REPRESENTATION OF HIS SITUATION. SUBJECT APPEARED QUITE CONFIDENT IN HIS ABILITY TO CONTROL THE INFORMATION FLOW AND OUTCOME OF THE SESSIONS. HE MAY EVEN HAVE BEEN ANTICIPATING A FAIRLY BENIGN COURSE OF EVENTS. SOME OF HIS STATEMENTS INDICATED THAT HE BELIEVED HE WAS [REDACTED] HE MAY HAVE EXPECTED THAT THE INTERROGATORS WOULD EVENTUALLY GROW TIRED, TERMINATE THE SESSIONS, AND ESCORT HIM OUTDOORS AND INTO [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] FURTHERMORE, HE MAY HAVE EXPECTED THAT HE WOULD BE PLACED WITH OTHER JIHADIST DETAINEES AND, IN DUE COURSE, FLOWN TO GUANTANAMO BAY. THE PROCESS AND SEQUENCE OF MANIPULATIONS, AND OVERALL EFFECT OF CONTRIBUTIONS BY TEAM MEMBERS, APPEAR TO HAVE LED THE SUBJECT TO A POINT WHERE HE FELT SECURE AND CONFIDENT. THE SUBJECT MAY HAVE SYSTEMATICALLY REACHED A POINT OF CONSIDERABLE OVER-CONFIDENCE. SUCH OVER-CONFIDENCE MAY ACCOUNT FOR HOW DRAMATIC THE EFFECTS WERE WHEN THE SUBJECT'S BELIEFS AND ASSUMPTIONS WERE SEVERELY DISLOCATED BY THE MYSTERIOUS AND ANGRY MAN WHO STRIPPED HIM OF HIS CLOTHES AND EXPECTATIONS ON 19 MAY.

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THE SUBJECT DISPLAYED THREE NEW BEHAVIORS AFTER THE INTRODUCTION OF THE ANGRY MAN INTO HIS CELL ON 19 MAY: (1) URGENT REQUESTS TO SEE AN INTERROGATOR; (2) PROFUSE AND RAPID VERBALIZATION OF DETAILS RELATED TO TOPICS OF INTEREST; AND (3) DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION VIA HANDWRITTEN NOTES. AT THIS TIME, SUBJECT CONTINUES TO PROVIDE INFORMATION THROUGH DAILY NOTES AND SOMETIMES VOLUNTEERS DETAILS ON TOPICS NOT BROACHED BY INTERROGATORS. TEAM MEMBERS HAVE ALSO NOTED SUBJECT NOW SINGS HIS PRAYERS ALOUD, APPEARS MORE NATURAL AND SPONTANEOUS IN CONVERSATION, SEEMS MORE BORED WHEN ALONE IN HIS CELL, AND APPEARS LESS INCLINED TO DISENGAGE FROM CONVERSATION AT THE

END OF INTERROGATION SESSIONS. THERE IS A COMPLETE ABSENCE OF THE SOMEWHAT STAGED, ARTIFICIAL, AND EXAGGERATED BEHAVIOR WE SAW PREVIOUSLY (E.G., INTENTLY STARING AT PHOTOGRAPHS FOR LONG PERIODS OF TIME AS THOUGH TRYING TO RECALL WHO THE PERSON IS). SINCE SESSION

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☐ WE HAVE NOT SEEN ANY CLEAR OR CONSISTENT EVIDENCE OF HIS PREVIOUSLY EMPLOYED RESISTANCE STRATEGIES. WHILE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO JUDGE THE DEGREE TO WHICH SUBJECT IS OMITTING IMPORTANT DETAILS, HE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE USING RESISTANCE TECHNIQUES TO STALL, DISRUPT, OR DERAIL THE FOCUS OF THE INTERVIEW, NOR DOES HE SEEM TO BE INTENTIONALLY LIMITING HIS ANSWERS. IN GENERAL, SUBJECT APPEARS MORE RELAXED AND WILLING TO PROVIDE SOLICITED AND UNSOLICITED INFORMATION. DESPITE RECENT ENCOURAGING CHANGES, INTERROGATION TEAM MEMBERS WILL REMAIN ALERT FOR A RESURGENCE IN SUBJECT'S USE OF THESE AND OTHER RESISTANCE STRATEGIES. END OF SUMMARY.

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VI. REPEAT STEPS 1-V.

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11. SHATTERING ABU'S MODEL BY DISLOCATING HIS EXPECTATIONS: AT THE CONCLUSION OF SESSION [] (19 APRIL), TEAM MEMBERS CONFERRED AND DISCUSSED THE IMPORTANCE OF IMMEDIATELY RATCHETING UP THE PRESSURE IN A WAY THAT WOULD SEVERELY UNSETTLE AND SHATTER SUBJECT'S CONFIDENCE AND CERTAINTY. IN THE TEAM'S OPINION, SUBJECT HAD REACHED A POINT OF BEING QUITE CONFIDENT IN HIS EVALUATION AND WORKING MODEL OF THE TEAM'S INTENT, CONSTRAINTS, AND LIMITATIONS. AT THIS POINT, HE HAD REASON TO BELIEVE HIS RESISTANCE TECHNIQUES WERE WORKING WELL AND HE COULD OUTLAST THE INTERROGATORS WITHOUT CONCERN FOR DIRE CONSEQUENCES. HE WAS NOW READY TO PUSH THE LIMITS AND TEST THE TEAM'S RESOLVE. THE TEAM RESPONDED BY HAVING SUBJECT HOODED AND HIS HANDS CUFFED HIGH ON THE BARS OF HIS CELL. A MEMBER OF THE INTERROGATION TEAM (ONE OF THE PSYCHOLOGISTS) -- WHOSE VOICE SUBJECT HAD NEVER HEARD BEFORE -- ENTERED THE CELL IN A BRUSQUE MANNER, VIOLENTLY TOSSED THE PLASTIC PATIO CHAIR AGAINST THE CELL WALL, AND ABRUPTLY RIPPED OFF SUBJECT'S CLOTHES. AFTER DOING THIS, THE TEAM MEMBER ASKED THE SUBJECT, "ARE YOU SURE THAT YOU WANT TO GO DOWN THIS PATH...LATER ON, REMEMBER IT WAS YOU WHO CHOSE IT?" SUBJECT WAS CLEARLY TAKEN ABACK AND VISIBLY SHAKEN BY THIS WHOLLY UNEXPECTED AND DISCONCERTING ACTION. LOUD ABRASIVE MUSIC WAS STARTED AGAIN (AFTER NOT BEING HEARD FOR SEVERAL WEEKS). SUBJECT WAS UNHOODED AND CUFFED TO A LOWER PORTION OF THE BARS. HE WAS LEFT SITTING ON THE FLOOR NAKED FOR AN HOUR TO PONDER AND RECONSIDER HIS SITUATION. AT THE OUTSET OF SESSION [] THE INTERROGATOR IMMEDIATELY ENTERED INTO A SHORT MONOLOGUE WHILE THE SUBJECT REMAINED IN HIS PREVIOUS POSITION -- SHACKLED TO THE BARS AND SITTING ON THE FLOOR. THE SUBJECT'S EYES WERE GENERALLY DOWNCAST. HIS DEMEANOR AND ATTITUDE APPEARED TO HAVE CHANGED TO DEJECTION. SUBJECT APPEARED TO ACCEPT A FACE-SAVING WAY

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(b)(3) CIAAct
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TO PROVIDE THREAT INFORMATION AND THEN IMMEDIATELY BEGAN TALKING ABOUT POSSIBLE THREATS THAT HE HAD NOT DISCUSSED IN SUCH DETAIL BEFORE. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE SESSION, THE INTERROGATOR ASKED SUBJECT IF HE COULD DO ANYTHING FOR HIM AND THE SUBJECT RESPONDED, "SOMETHING TO COVER MY BUTTS."

12. MAINTAINING PRESSURE: AS SESSION [] CONCLUDED, THE PROBLEM FOR THE INTERROGATION TEAM WAS HOW TO SUSTAIN THE SUBJECT'S APPARENT SENSE OF DISLOCATION AND PRESSURE WITHOUT IMPEDING HIS NEW WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS, THE INTERROGATION TEAM MEMBER WHO HAD STRIPPED AND WHISPERED TO THE SUBJECT EARLIER RETURNED TO THE CELL. WHILE THE SUBJECT WAS HOODED AND CUFFED TO THE BARS, THE TEAM MEMBER WHISPERED, "YOU MAY HAVE FOOLED THOSE OTHER GUYS, BUT YOU DON'T FOOL ME...AFTER THEY GET TIRED OF YOU JERKING THEM AROUND AND LEAVE, IT WILL BE JUST YOU AND ME." ONCE AGAIN, SUBJECT WAS LEFT TO CONSIDER HIS NEW SITUATION. THE INTERROGATION TEAM LEFT THE SITE FOR DINNER. WHILE EATING, THE TEAM RECEIVED TWO TELEPHONE CALLS FROM SECURITY STAFF STATING SUBJECT WAS ASKING TO TALK TO AN INTERROGATOR. IT IS NOTABLE THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME SINCE INTERROGATIONS BEGAN SUBJECT REQUESTED TO SPEAK TO AN INTERROGATOR. IN THIS CASE, HE WAS SPECIFICALLY REQUESTING TO SEE THE INTERROGATOR TO WHOM HE HAD LAST SPOKEN. WHEN THE INTERROGATOR REENTERED THE SUBJECT'S CELL, SUBJECT GAVE HIM A COLLECTION OF NOTES WRITTEN USING CRAYON AND PAPER. THE NOTES INCLUDED THREAT AND OPERATIONAL INFORMATION. PRIOR TO THIS DAY, SUBJECT HAD ESSENTIALLY IGNORED THE PAPER AND CRAYON THAT HAD BEEN LEFT IN HIS CELL. IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING THE NOTES, SUBJECT BEGAN TO SPEAK RAPIDLY AND DELIVER AN OUTPOURING OF INFORMATION. SUBJECT DID NOT REQUIRE PROMPTING AND STAYED ON TOPIC. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY OF SUBJECT'S PREVIOUSLY USED RESISTANCE STRATEGIES. AFTER BEING JOINED BY AN [] SPEAKING INTERROGATOR [] SUBJECT EXPLAINED THE REASON HE DECIDED TO COOPERATE WAS HE PRAYED HIS ISTIKHARAH (SEEKING GOD'S GUIDANCE) AND WAS NOW READY AND WILLING TO TELL WHAT HE REALLY KNEW. AFTER SESSION [] HAD CONCLUDED, SUBJECT SAT ALONE IN HIS CELL AND SANG HIS PRAYERS. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME SINCE HE ARRIVED AT THE INTERROGATION FACILITY THAT HE SANG HIS PRAYERS ALOUD.

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13. IN [] TEAM PSYCHOLOGISTS WILL FORWARD ADDITIONAL COMMENTS, LESSONS LEARNED, AND DIAGRAMS ILLUSTRATING OUR DESCRIPTIVE MODEL OF SUBJECT'S RESISTANCE POSTURE AND INTERROGATION BEHAVIOR TO DATE.

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END OF MESSAGE

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503-2

Date: 20030320

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM:

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - 19 MARCH 2003 INTERROGATION OF KHALID SHAYKH MUHAMMAD

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 (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct

TOR: 201037Z MAR 03 (b)(1) 10902

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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 CITE (b)(3) NatSecAct

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

FOR:

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 (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - 19 MARCH 2003 INTERROGATION OF KHALID SHAYKH
 MUHAMMAD

REF:

(b)(3) NatSecAct

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: NONE, FYI.

2. ATMOSPHERICS:

A. ON 19 MARCH 2003 ((KHALID SHAYKH MUHAMMAD)) (KSM) WAS
 INTERROGATED BY HVT INTERROGATORS [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] IN THREE WATER BOARD SESSIONS (ONE
 ABBREVIATED), ONE LONG INTERROGATION SESSION, AND ONE THREE-HOUR

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ENHANCED MEASURES INTERROGATION SESSION. KSM MAINTAINED HE HAD NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THREATS TO THE US, BUT ASKED FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO WRITE INFORMATION IN ARABIC.

B. KSM SPENT THE NIGHT IN THE STANDING POSITION, HAVING INITIATED SLEEP DEPRIVATION AT 0900 ON 18 MARCH 2003. AT THE FIRST SESSION, KSM WAS CONFRONTED WITH HIS EARLIER INCONSISTENCIES (LIES) ABOUT JAFFAR AL-TAYYAR AND THE ISSUE OF HIS PASSPORT. KSM USED HIS USUAL STRATEGY OF TRYING TO OBFUSCATE WITH IRRELEVANT DETAILS, MISDIRECTION, AND ENTICING LEADS. HE WAS TAKEN TO THE WATER BOARD ROOM WHERE HE WAS SUBJECTED TO THE WATER BOARD ENHANCED MEASURE BY INTERROGATORS [REDACTED] AT THIS WATER BOARD SESSION, KSM SEEMED TO LOSE CONTROL AND ADMITTED THAT HE HAD LIED ABOUT JAFFAR AL-TAYYAR. KSM SAID THAT AL-TAYYAR HAD BEEN COMPROMISED AFTER 9/11, AND AS A RESULT KSM COULD NOT USE HIM FOR A MISSION. KSM SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN FORCED TO LIE, AND HAD MADE UP STORIES ABOUT JAFFAR AL-TAYYAR. HE BEGGED TO WRITE A STATEMENT IN ARABIC, SAYING HE COULD WRITE 50 PAGES IN ARABIC, BUT DENIED HAVING ANY NEW INFORMATION ABOUT THREATS TO THE US. HE WAS RETURNED TO HIS CELL, WHERE HE WAS PLACED IN THE STANDING POSITION.

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C. KSM WAS RETURNED TO THE WATER BOARD AT APPROXIMATELY 1450, WHERE HE WAS SUBJECTED TO ANOTHER WATER BOARD SESSION BY INTERROGATORS [REDACTED] AT THIS SESSION, KSM WAS OFFERED THE OPPORTUNITY TO IDENTIFY AND PROVIDE DETAILS ABOUT THE NEXT ATTACK ON THE US. AGAIN, KSM DENIED ANY KNOWLEDGE OF ATTACKS OTHER THAN THE ONES HE HAD PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED. KSM WAS EXTREMELY FOCUSED, SEEMING TO BE CONCENTRATING HIS STRENGTH ON GETTING THROUGH THE WATER BOARDING. AT THE END OF THE SESSION, HE WAS RETURNED TO HIS CELL.

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D. AT 1530, THE INTERROGATION TEAM INITIATED A THREE-HOUR ENHANCED INTERROGATION SESSION WITH KSM. ROTATING IN 30-MINUTE SHIFTS, THE INTERROGATORS CONCENTRATED ON CONDITIONING KSM BY UTILIZING A MIX OF ATTENTION GRAB, WALLING, WETTING DOWN, INSULT SLAP, ABDOMINAL SLAP, AND FACIAL GRASP. AT THE END OF THE SESSION, KSM WAS ASKED IF HE HAD ANYTHING NEW TO PROVIDE ON THREATS TO THE US. HE CLAIMED HE DID NOT, AND WAS RETURNED TO THE WATER BOARD. IN AN ABBREVIATED SESSION (ONE WATERING), KSM AGAIN OFFERED TO WRITE INFORMATION IN ARABIC, CLAIMING THAT HE DID NOT WRITE WELL IN ENGLISH. HE WAS TOLD HE WOULD BE GIVEN THE CHANCE, BUT THAT IF HE WASTED THE INTERROGATORS' TIME HE WOULD SPEND AN EQUIVALENT AMOUNT OF TIME ON THE WATER BOARD. EVEN BEFORE COMING OFF THE WATER BOARD, KSM INSISTED HE HAD NOTHING NEW TO PROVIDE, BUT MIGHT BE ABLE TO GIVE ADDITIONAL DETAILS. HE WAS RETURNED TO HIS CELL, WHERE HE WAS ALLOWED TO SIT AND WRITE FOR ONE HOUR. AT THE END OF THE PERIOD, HE WAS RETURNED TO THE STANDING POSITION.

3. ENHANCED MEASURES: PER THE REQUIREMENTS OF REF B, APPROPRIATE MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSONNEL WERE PRESENT. ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES FOR KHALID SHAYKH MUHAMMAD WERE

(b)(1) AUTHORIZED BY REF B, AUTHORIZED TO BE EMPLOYED BY CERTIFIED

(b)(3) CIAAct INTERROGATORS [REDACTED]

(b)(3) NatSecAct [REDACTED]

(b)(6) THE FOLLOWING ENHANCED MEASURES WERE EMPLOYED BY HVTI TEAM WITH COB, RMO, AND HVT PSYCHOLOGIST OBSERVING: FACIAL GRASP, ATTENTION GRASP, WALLING, WATER DOUSING, ABDOMINAL SLAP, INSULT SLAP. SUBJECT'S SLEEP DEPRIVATION BEGAN AT 0900 ON 18 MARCH 2003.

(b)(1) 4. WATERBOARD: THREE SESSIONS (ONE ABBREVIATED, WITH ONE

(b)(3) CIAAct WATERING) CONDUCTED BY HVT INTERROGATORS [REDACTED]

(b)(3) NatSecAct [REDACTED]

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5. ASSESSMENT: WITH THE RE-INITIATION OF PRESSURE ON KSM, HE REVERTED TO HIS PATTERN OF TRYING TO PROVIDE ENOUGH INFORMATION TO INTEREST THE INTERROGATORS AND RELIEVE THE PRESSURE, WHILE ATTEMPTING TO MISDIRECT THE LINE OF QUESTIONING AWAY FROM THREATENING THEMES. AT THE FIRST WATER BOARD SESSION, KSM APPEARED TO LOSE SOME STRENGTH AND DEMONSTRATED A SMALL DEGREE OF SURRENDER. PRESSURE WAS MAINTAINED, WITH THE SINGLE-MINDED FOCUS OF GAINING IMMINENT THREATS AGAINST THE US, AND THE EFFECT APPEARED CUMULATIVE. KSM HAS A STRONG RESISTANCE LEVEL, BUT HIS STRATEGY IS DEVELOPING CRACKS. NOW THAT KSM HAS ADMITTED LYING ABOUT SOME PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED INFORMATION, WE ARE CONCERNED THAT HE MAY BE USING DELAYING TACTICS TO GAIN TIME FOR A PENDING OPERATION.

6. PLANS: THE PRESSURE WILL BE MAINTAINED. THE FOCUS IS ON PENDING THREATS TO THE US, AND KSM WILL GAIN NO RELIEF UNTIL HE PROVIDES THE INFORMATION. KSM'S WRITTEN WORK WILL BE REVIEWED, AND ITS INITIAL VALUE ASSESSED. DEPENDING ON THE VALUE OF THE INFORMATION, KSM WILL EITHER BE DEBRIEFED IN DETAIL, OR HE WILL CONTINUE WITH THE ENHANCED MEASURES INTERROGATION.

7. MEDICAL OBSERVATIONS: SEE [REDACTED] FOR DETAILS OF KSM REVIEW.

8. HVT PSYCHOLOGIST COMMENTS AND UPDATED SUMMARY:

A. DURING THE DAY'S INITIAL INTERROGATION SESSION, SUBJECT APPEARED MORE FATIGUED AND LETHARGIC THAN HE HAS PREVIOUSLY. THAT SAID, SUBJECT WAS ALERT AND HIS SPEECH WAS ORGANIZED, PURPOSEFUL, AND APPROPRIATE TO CONTEXT. HOWEVER, HIS VOICE SOUNDED TIRED AND HIS SPEECH RATE WAS DIMINISHED AND MORE FALTERING AT TIMES WITH LONGER PAUSES. THE CHANGE IN THE FLUIDITY OF HIS SPEECH WAS PARTICULARLY APPARENT WHEN INTERROGATORS CONFRONTED HIM ABOUT HIS INCONSISTENT STORIES AND DISCLOSURES. HIS CLEAR ATTEMPTS TO LIE AND MISDIRECT, AND FAILURE TO VOLUNTARILY CORRECT HIS LIES, PROMPTED HIS TRANSFER TO THE WATERBOARD ROOM.

B. SUBJECT BEGAN TO WHIMPER, WHINE, AND MOAN AS SOON AS SECURITY STAFF TOOK CONTROL OF HIM AND BEGAN LEADING HIM TO THE WATERBOARD ROOM. FOR A FEW MOMENTS AFTER ASSUMING HIS POSITION ON THE WATERBOARD, SUBJECT APPEARED SOMEWHAT FRANTIC AND BEGAN TO SPEAK

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RAPIDLY AND ACKNOWLEDGE THAT HE HAD LIED ABOUT A NUMBER OF DETAILS RELATED TO JAFFAR ((AL-TAYYAR)). HE ASSERTED THAT HE COULD BE MORE CLEAR AND COULD "WRITE 50 PAGES" IF ALLOWED TO USE ARABIC. INTERROGATORS THEN TOLD HIM THEY WERE ONLY INTERESTED IN WORDS, WHETHER ENGLISH OR ARABIC, THAT DISCLOSED DETAILS ABOUT THE NEXT ATTACK ON AMERICA. SUBJECT REPLIED THAT HE HAD "ALREADY TOLD EVERYTHING" AND HAD "NOTHING MORE TO ADD" ABOUT SUCH ATTACKS. INTERROGATORS TOLD SUBJECT THAT FROM THIS POINT ON THEY ONLY WANTED TO HEAR HIM SPEAK IF HE WAS REVEALING THE NEXT ATTACK ON AMERICA AND/OR USAMA ((BIN-LADEN'S)) INTENDED ATTACK. SUBJECT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THESE INSTRUCTIONS AND DID NOT MAKE FURTHER ATTEMPTS TO ENGAGE WITH INTERROGATORS DURING THE REMAINDER OF THE WATERBOARD SESSION. DESPITE BEING MORE ANXIOUS AND LESS EFFECTIVE THWARTING THE WATERBOARD PROCEDURE, SUBJECT APPEARED TO RESIGN HIMSELF TO BEING STOIC AND DOING HIS BEST TO COPE WITH THE WATERBOARD PROCEDURE. TODAY WAS THE FIRST TIME THAT HE GRABBED AND HELD ON TO THE CLOTHING OF INTERROGATORS DURING THE MORE INTENSE MOMENTS OF THE PROCEDURE. THROUGHOUT THE DAY AND EARLY EVENING, THE HVT INTERROGATION TEAM FOLLOWED THE TDY DEBRIEFER RECOMMENDATION TO DEVOTE ALL MEASURES TO PRESSURING THE SUBJECT ON THE SINGLE ISSUE OF THE "NEXT ATTACK ON AMERICA". IN ADDITION, THE USE OF ATTENTION GRABS, INSULT SLAPS, WALLING, WATER DOUSING, AND WATERBOARD WERE INTENDED TO FURTHER WEAR DOWN THE SUBJECT'S RESOURCES, MOTIVATION, AND WILLINGNESS TO EFFECTIVELY RESIST.

C. THE LATTER PORTION OF THE AFTERNOON AND EARLY EVENING WERE DEVOTED TO WALLING AND WATER-DOUSING AS A MEANS TO FURTHER UNDERMINE THE SUBJECT'S RESOURCES FOR RESISTANCE. AS IN THE WATERBOARD SESSIONS, SUBJECT GENERALLY SHOWED REMARKABLE COMPOSURE AND TOLERANCE. AGAIN, HE APPEARED TO RESIGN HIMSELF TO BEING STOIC AND TOLERATING THE ENHANCED MEASURES AS BEST HE COULD. THERE WERE NO INDICATIONS THAT SUBJECT WAS BEING PROVOCATIVE OR ACTIVELY DEFIANT. DESPITE INCREASED FATIGUE, HE RESPONDED TO INTERROGATORS AS DIRECTED AND, ON OCCASION, QUIETLY STATED THAT HE HAD "TOLD EVERYTHING". OVERALL, SUBJECT CONTINUES TO EVIDENCE GOOD RESILIENCE AND A RESISTANCE POSTURE THAT INCLUDES AVOIDING OVERT PROVOCATION, PRESENTING A GENERALLY STEADY AND COMPOSED DEemeanOR AND MIXING TRUTH WITH MISDIRECTION AND LIES. FURTHERMORE, SUBJECT'S RESISTANCE POSTURE INCLUDES TENACIOUSLY ADHERING TO THE STORY THAT HE AND AL-QA'IDA WERE TOO HARASSED AND DISRUPTED AFTER 11 SEPT TO ORGANIZE AND MOUNT BIG OR SIGNIFICANT ATTACKS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES. HIS STORY ALSO INCLUDES THE ASSERTION THAT ARRESTS AND OTHER DISRUPTIONS HAVE FORCED AL QA'IDA TO DECENTRALIZE AND LOOSEN SOME OF THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL ON DISPERSED FIELD LEADERSHIP. THE GENERAL EFFECT IS AN IMAGE OF A BELEAGUERED AND HOUNDED LEADER WHO HAS BEEN RENDERED IMPOTENT DUE TO AMERICA'S HEIGHTENED SECURITY, THE LOSS OF AFGHANISTAN, AND WORLD-WIDE TARGETING OF AL QA'IDA OPERATIVES AND RESOURCES. BECAUSE IT INCLUDES ELEMENTS OF REALITY, THIS IS AN ELEGANT AND SOMEWHAT COMPELLING RESISTANCE POSTURE. IT IS HIGHLY LIKELY THAT SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS OF THIS "PROJECTED IMAGE" ARE INTENDED FOR EFFECT AND TO MISLEAD.

D. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] BASED ON THE CURRENT ASSESSMENT, THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS
THAT SUBJECT IS AT RISK TO SUFFER PROFOUND OR PERMANENT EMOTIONAL AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL HARM.

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END OF MESSAGE

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(b)(1) **1. How much has the CIA paid Mitchell and Jessen since 2002?**
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(TS [] NF) Dr. James Mitchell was paid a total of \$1,459,601.43 as an independent contractor (IC) to the CIA from FY 2001 to FY 2005. This included services to the Directorate of Science and Technology and to the CTC Renditions, Detentions and Interrogations Program (RDI). Costs from FY 2001 through FY 2005 include payment for research and development as well as operational services.

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(TS [] NF) Dr. J. Bruce Jessen was paid a total of \$1,204,550.42 as an IC to the CIA from FY 2002 to FY 2005. This included services to the Directorate of Science and Technology and to the CTC/RDI. Costs from FY 2002 thru FY 2005 include payment for research and development as well as operational services.

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(TS [] NF) During FY 2005, Drs. Mitchell and Jessen formed Mitchell, Jessen, and Associates (MJA) ending their role as independent contractors. In addition to continuing the provision of professional services by Drs. Mitchell and Jessen, MJA provided qualified interrogators, detainee security officers for CIA detention sites, and curriculum development and training services for the RDI program. MJA also provided training services for other CTC/SMD elements unrelated to the RDI program. From FY 2005 through 23 January 2009, MJA was paid a total of \$71,968,923.90.

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(TS [] NF) During the periods Drs. Mitchell and Jessen, and later MJA, were associated with the CTC/RDI program, the program provided intelligence to disrupt terrorist plots, remove terrorist leaders from the battlefield, and deny AQ a safe haven in which to plan and train. []

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[] CIA assesses that most, if not all, of the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by any other means.

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(TS) (S//NF) High Value Detainees (HVDs) in the RDI program also allowed us to confirm reporting from other clandestine sources, and helped connect fragmentary information, such as special intelligence, cyber collection, and media and computer exploitation. Over 90 percent of the disseminated reporting obtained from the RDI program was passed to foreign liaison service partners, assisting them in the prevention and disruption of plots and enabling the capture of other terrorists. Below are some of the key captures, disrupted plots, and intelligence gained from HVDs in the RDI program.

Key Captures:

The unraveling of Jemah Islamiya (JI) and the network of AQ senior associate Hambali; **(Is this a capture?)**

The arrest of Dhiren Barot (aka Issa al-Hindi) in the United Kingdom;

Identifying the "other" shoe bomber – Sajid Badat;

The arrest of Jose Padilla and Binyam Muhammed;

The arrest of Lyman Faris.

Major Plots Disrupted:

The West Coast Airliner Plot;

Heathrow Airport Plot;

The Karachi Plots;

Plots in the Saudi Peninsula.

2. Is Mitchell, Jessen and Associates currently under contract?

(S//NF) Yes, a decision has been made to exercise the final option year of the contract, beginning 2 March 2009, with a planned significant reduction in the requirements and cost.

3. If they are currently under contract how much will CIA pay for their contract for this fiscal year?

(S//NF) The actual cost of the contract in FY 2009 is currently unknown. The scope and value of the contract are largely dependent on the decommissioning of the existing facilities, the plans for which are currently under review. We do expect a significant reduction in FY 2009 from previous years but the exact contract cost is as yet unknown.

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LEGAL APPENDIX PARAGRAPH 5

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AUTHORIZED KILLING VS. MURDER

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HOSTILE INTERROGATIONS: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR CIA OFFICERS

I. **U.S. federal law** makes it a crime for a U.S. citizen to torture someone both at home and abroad, even when directed to do so by superiors.

A. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340 - 2340B implements the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and incorporates verbatim the definition of "torture" from that treaty; namely, the Convention defines torture as "an act committed by a person acting under color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering," where "severe mental suffering" is further defined as "the prolonged mental harm resulting from" either causing or threatening infliction of severe physical pain; the administration or threat of administration of mind-altering drugs; the threat of imminent death; or threatening to do the above to someone else.

B. Use of necessity as a defense to prosecution in a U.S. court

1. Israel's Supreme Court has recognized that government officials who are prosecuted for torture may use the affirmative defense of necessity—i.e., "for the purpose of saving the life, liberty, body or property, of either himself or his fellow person, from substantial danger of serious harm, imminent from the particular state of things (circumstances), at the requisite timing, and absent alternative means for avoiding the harm."³ That is, a government officer can avoid criminal prosecution if the torture was necessary to prevent a danger "certain to materialize" and when no other means of preventing the harm are available.
2. The ruling, however, specifically notes that although necessity can be used as a *post factum* defense, it cannot serve as a source of positive, *ab initio* authority for the systemic (even if rare) use of torture as a valid interrogation tool.
3. The U.S. Code does not contain a statutory necessity defense provision, but U.S. common law has recognized an analogous doctrine:
 - State v. Marley, 509 P.2d 1095, 1097(1973): Defendants were charged with criminal trespass on the property of Honeywell Corporation in Honolulu. They argued that they were seeking to stop the Vietnam War and raised as one of their defenses the "necessity defense." The court stated:

The "necessity defense" exonerates persons who commit a crime under the pressure of circumstances if the harm that would have

³ H.C. 5100/94, 4054/95, 6536/95, 5188/96, 7563/97, 7628/97, 1043/99.

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resulted from compliance with the law would have significantly exceeded the harm actually resulting from the defendant's breach of the law. Successful use of the "necessity defense" requires (a) that there is no third and legal alternative available, (b) that the harm to be prevented be imminent, and (c) that a direct, causal relationship be reasonable anticipated to exist between defendant's action and the avoidance of harm.

Although the Marley court decided the necessity defense was not available to these particular defendants, the standard they set out is the norm.

- In United States v. Seward, 687 F.2d 1270, 1275 (10th Cir. 1982) (en banc), *cert. denied*, 459 U.S. 1147 (1983), the court held that a defendant may successfully use a defense of necessity to excuse otherwise illegal acts if (1) there is no legal alternative to violating the law, (2) the harm to be prevented is imminent, and (3) a direct, causal relationship is reasonable anticipated to exist between defendant's action and the avoidance of harm. Under the defense of necessity, "one principle remains constant: if there was a reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law, 'a chance both to refuse to do the criminal act and also to avoid the threatened harm,' the defense[] will fail," *Id.* at 1276, quoting United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980). In proving that there were no legal alternatives available to assist him, a defendant must show he was "confronted with ... a crisis which did not permit a selection from among several solutions, some of which did not involve criminal acts." *Id.*
- See also United States v. Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d 691, 695 n.2 (9th Cir. 1984) (defense of necessity available when person faced with a choice of two evils and must decide whether to commit a crime or an alternative act that constitutes a greater evil); United States v. Nolan, 700 F.2d 479, 484 (9th Cir.) (the necessity defense requires a showing that the defendant acted to prevent an imminent harm which no available options could similarly prevent).
- In sum: U.S. courts have not yet considered the necessity defense in the context of torture/murder/assault cases, primarily because in cases where one or two individuals were hurt out of necessity, this was treated as a *self-defense* analysis. See Tab 2, *supra*. It would, therefore, be a novel application of the necessity defense to avoid prosecution of U.S. officials who tortured to obtain information that saved many lives; however, if we follow the Israeli example, CIA could argue that the torture was necessary to prevent imminent, significant, physical harm to persons, where there is no other available means to prevent the harm.

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- A policy decision must be made with regard to U.S. use of torture in light of our obligations under international law, with consideration given to the circumstances and to international opinion on our current campaign against terrorism—states may be very unwilling to call the U.S. to task for torture when it resulted in saving thousands of lives.

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04 March 2005

~~(TS//~~ TALKING POINTS FOR 10 MARCH 2005 DCI MEETING PC:
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE HIGH-VALUE DETAINEE INTERROGATION (HVDI)
TECHNIQUES

1. ~~(TS//~~ CIA's use of DOJ-authorized enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of a comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled us to disrupt terrorist plots, capture additional terrorists, and collect a high volume of critical intelligence on al-Qa'ida. We believe that intelligence acquired from HVD interrogations has been a key reason why al-Qa'ida has failed to launch a spectacular attack in the West since 11 September 2001.

2. ~~(TS//~~ Background: Assessing the effectiveness of individual interrogation techniques in producing intelligence is difficult, if not impossible for practical or legal reasons. Some interrogation techniques do create a higher level of physiological or psychological stress than others and do contribute more to creating the appropriate interrogation environment. However, overuse of certain interrogation techniques believed to be most effective may actually make them less effective over time. Therefore, more than the effectiveness of each individual technique, the coherent integration of the techniques helps create an environment conducive to persuading high-value terrorist detainees (HVDs) to provide critical information on terrorist threats and the location of other terrorists. An actual study of the effectiveness of individual techniques could be construed as human experimentation, which is strictly regulated, if not precluded, by law.

3. ~~(TS//~~ The Central Intelligence Agency can advise you that this program works and the techniques are effective in producing foreign intelligence. Since the program's inception, we have used interrogation techniques only when necessary and with a limited number of detainees--a total of [] of the [] detainees we have held. Of the [] detainees we now hold, only [] have been exposed to the most coercive techniques. We assess we would not have succeeded in overcoming the resistance of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM), Abu Zubaydah, and other equally resistant high value terrorist detainees without the applying, in a careful, professional and safe manner, the full range of interrogation techniques. Prior to the use of enhanced measures against skilled resisters like KSM and Abu Zubaydah--the two most prolific intelligence producers in our control--we acquired little threat information or significant actionable intelligence. Both terrorists clearly believed that the United States lacked the capability and willingness to apply psychological and physical

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SUBJECT: (TS// //NF) Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques

pressures to compel them to cooperate. KSM and Zubaydah also expressed their belief that the general US population was "weak," lacked resilience, and would be unable to "do what was necessary" to prevent the terrorists from succeeding in their goals. Indeed, before his interrogation using enhanced techniques, when KSM was asked about future attacks planned against the United States, he coldly relied "Soon, you will know."

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4. (TS// //NF) CIA also assesses there is a strong correlation between the intensity of an HVD's commitment to Islam and jihad and his resistance to interrogation. In reflecting on his interrogation experience, Abu Zubaydah said "Allah does not expect brothers to bear a burden too great for them to withstand." According to Zubaydah, brothers who are captured and interrogated are permitted by Allah to provide information when they believe they have "reached the limit of their ability to withhold it" in the face of psychological and physical hardships. In contrast, the use of interrogation approaches based on a "battle of wits" or "out-smarting" a committed HVD has not proved effective in overcoming resistance and acquiring actionable threat and HVD locational information.

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5. (TS// //NF) Results CIA's use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of a comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots, capture additional terrorists, and collect a high volume of critical intelligence on al-Qa'ida. We believe that intelligence acquired from these interrogations has been a key reason why al-Qa'ida has failed to launch a spectacular attack in the West since 11 September 2001. Key intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation techniques:

- The Karachi Plot: This plan to conduct attacks against the US Consulate and other US interests in Pakistan was uncovered during the initial interrogations of Khallad Bin Attash and Ammar al-Baluchi and later confirmed by KSM, who provided additional information on the Karachi plot and confirmed al-Qa'ida's collaboration with local Pakistani extremists. KSM provided information on the Karachi plot after we showed him "capture" photos of Ammar and Khallad, and he confirmed al-Qa'ida's collaboration with local Pakistani extremists.
- The Heathrow Plot: Initial interrogations of Ammar and Khallad resulted in information on this plot to hijack commercial airliners in Eastern Europe and fly them into Heathrow Airport. Using the information from Khallad and Ammar, we confronted KSM and uncovered details on the plot's evolution and the potential operatives involved. Khallad admitted that he

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had directed Saudi leader Hazim al-Sha'ir to begin locating pilots for the attack.

- **The "Second Wave":** This was a KSM plot to use East Asian operatives to crash a hijacked airliner into the tallest building on the US West Coast (Los Angeles) as a follow-on to 9/11. We learned this during the initial interrogation of KSM and later confirmed it through the interrogation of Hambali and Khallad.
- **The Guraba Cell:** We learned of this 17-member Jemaah Islamiyah cell from Hambali, who confirmed that some of the cell's operatives were identified as candidates to train as pilots as part of KSM's "second wave" attack against the US.
- **Issa al-Hindi:** KSM first identified Issa al-Hindi as an operative he sent to the US prior to 9/11 to case potential targets in NYC and Washington. When shown surveillance photos provided by HVDs confirmed al-Hindi's identity. Al-Hindi's capture by the British resulted in the disruption of a sleeper cell and led to the arrest of other operatives.
- **Abu Talha al-Pakistani:** Khallad and Ammar identified Abu Talha as the leader of the Karachi cell and the Heathrow Plot. The combined intelligence gathered from Khallad, Ammar, KSM, Hassan Ghul, and other HVDs resulted in Abu Talha's recent arrest in Pakistan and the disruption of ongoing plots to target Western interests in London.
- **Hambali's Capture:** During KSM's interrogation we acquired information that led to the capture of Hambali in August 2003 and to the partial dismantling of the Jemaah Islamiyah leadership in SE Asia. KSM first told us about Majid Khan's role in delivering \$50,000 to Hambali operatives for an attack KSM believed was imminent. We then confronted Khan with KSM's admission and email intercepts confirming the money transfer and Khan's travel to Bangkok. Khan admitted he delivered the money to an operative named "Zubair," whom we subsequently identified and captured. Zubair's capture led to the identification and subsequent capture of an operative named Lilie who was providing forged passports to Hambali. Lilie identified the house in Bangkok where Hambali was hiding. When we confronted Hambali with details of what we knew from other detainees, he admitted that he was grooming the Guraba cell for US operations at the behest of KSM.

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- **Jafaar al-Tayyar:** Tayyar is an al-Qa'ida operative who was conducting casing in the US for KSM prior to 9/11, according to KSM and other HVDs. KSM confirmed that he recruited Tayyar—who is still at large—to conduct a major operation against US interests. KSM described Tayyar as the next Muhammad Atta. Tayyar's family is in Florida and we have identified many of his extremist contacts. Acting on this information, the FBI quickly publicized Tayyar's true name and aggressively followed up with his family and friends in the United States, causing Tayyar to flee the United States.

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and we are actively pursuing his capture.

- **Dirty Bomb Plot:** Abu Zubaydah provided significant information on two operatives, Jose Padilla and Binyam Mohammed, who planned to build and detonate a "dirty bomb" in the Washington DC area. Zubaydah's reporting led to the arrest of Padilla on his arrival in Chicago in May 2003 and to the identification of Mohammad, who was already in Pakistani custody under another identity.

- **Shoe Bomber:** We learned from KSM and Ammar that Sajid Badat was the operative slated to launch a simultaneous shoe bomb attack with Richard Reid in December 2001.

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- **Shkai, Pakistan:** The interrogation of Hassan Ghul provided detailed tactical intelligence showing that Shkai, Pakistan was a major Al-Qa'ida hub in the tribal areas. Through use of during the Ghul interrogation, we mapped out and pinpointed the residences of key AQ leaders in Shkai. This intelligence was provided

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